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ABSTRACT 
 
          The work aims to demonstrate that at the heart of Eriugena’s approach to 
Christian theology there lies a profoundly philosophical interest in the necessity 
of a cardinal shift in the paradigms of thinking – namely, that from the 
metaphysical to the dialectical one, which wins him a reputation of the ‘Hegel 
of the ninth century,’ as scholars in Post-Hegelian Germany called him. 
          The prime concern of Eriugena’s discourse is to prove that the actual 
adoption of the salvific truth of Christ’s revelation about all humans’ Sonship to 
God (resulting in their return to union with Him) directly depends on the way 
the truth of God’s Oneness is consistently thought of.  It is exactly the dialectic 
of the universal and particular which allows Eriugena both to tackle the 
dichotomy between being and non-being (called by him the fundamental 
division) and to proceed towards raising a question how the totality of God’s 
being can be approached so as to let him radically reconsider a predominantly 
metaphysical view of creation the theological reflection traditionally relies on. 
          According to the dialectical understanding of unity (with a strong appeal 
to a dialectically coherent treatment of contradiction) that Eriugena does adhere 
to, the reality of creation cannot be thought of, and therefore known, otherwise 
than in the way of being inseparable from the universal Principle of all.  This is 
the Principle abandoned by nothing, unless the mind corrupted by the senses 
thinks otherwise and, following the metaphysical pattern of dichotomy (as that 
of the fundamental division), improperly sets the creation and its Principle 
apart.  Restoration of the mind to the proper rational motion of recta ratio (right 
reason) freed, as Eriugena argues, from the dictates of senses therefore becomes 
the way of both the epistemological breakthrough to the infinite whole and 
practical return (reditus) from the world of finite things (the corrupt mind’s 
construct) to living in the divine reality of creation. 
          The work’s argument is based on the assumption of close affinity 
between Eriugena’s discourse and that of his Islamic contemporaries (Allaf, al-
Nazzam, al-Kindi, and others), who developed their dialectical ideas within the 
Mu’tazilah tradition of a philosophically disciplined approach to the truth of 
God’s Oneness.  In particular, al-Nazzam’s engagement with Parmenides’ 
Periphyseon and his resistance to the danger of a dualistic interpretation of its 
ontology seem to provoke Eriugena’s innovative approach to Christian theology 
with a view to suggesting a mode of overcoming dualism as the main obstacle 
on the way to the Truth revealed. 
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          This vision of the meaning of Eriugena’s undertaking allows us not only 
to better understand the novelty of his approach to Christian theology, but also 
reconsider some of the key points of his discourse that seem to have become a 
sort of commonplace in Eriugenian studies: 
1. Unlike the prevalent opinion, not  the forms of the division of Nature but 
the modes of interpreting being and non-being are to be understood to 
constitute the genuine subject-matter of each book of the Periphyseon 
and, hence, of the five parts of his system. 
2. The fourfold division of Nature is to be interpreted not as a basic 
structure of the system offered by Eriugena, but as a means of introducing 
dialectic to the body of theology by refuting Augustine’s metaphysical 
vision of a hierarchical model of the universe and indicating the way of 
resolution of the cardinally theological contradiction – God does and does 
not create at the same time. 
3. All this gives reason to disagree with a general tendency of associating 
Eriugena’s work with exploration of the division of God’s Nature and to 
reinterpret it as an immense anti-division project to be understood as an 
important turn in the history of Christian thought entirely focused on the 
truth of God’s Oneness and human life in conformity to it. 
 
*** 
 
          I affirm that this thesis is entirely my own work and has not been 
submitted for examination in any form elsewhere. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The central point 
 
     The research undertaken within the framework of this thesis aims to 
demonstrate that at the heart of Eriugena’s approach to Christian theology there 
lies a profoundly philosophical interest in the necessity of a cardinal shift in the 
paradigms of thinking – namely, from the metaphysical to the dialectical one, – 
which wins him a reputation of the “Hegel of the ninth century”, as scholars in 
Post-Hegelian Germany called him.  In particular, L. Noack, while admitting an 
extraordinary affinity of Eriugena’s ideas with those of German idealism, says 
that the majestic system offered by Eriugena betrays in him a “Hegel of the 
ninth century, who in a variety of marvellous ways comes into contact with 
Hegel of the nineteenth century and his predecessors in philosophy”1.  
Furthermore, as F.A. Staudenmaier put it in his renowned work (highly 
appreciated by his colleagues and critics) J.S. Eriugena und die Wissenschaft 
seiner Zeit, the emergence of Eriugena, called by him “a wonder of history”, is 
unsusceptible to explanation “by the conditions of his time and the environment 
he was put in.  He created the future, and therefore remained a solitary figure 
among his contemporaries”2.  And in unison with this, Th. Christlieb even more 
vigorously added that “by his anticipation of the main idea of the latest 
philosophy” Eriugena “went ahead of his time by a thousand years”3.  
     Despite these vehement testimonies to what seems to be most intriguing in 
quite a mysterious phenomenon of the intellectual history of Christendom called 
‘Eriugena’, there is surprisingly no much interest among the present-day 
Eriugenian scholars in what makes Eriugena’s thought akin to the German 
idealism agenda or, as said, its “main idea”.  Werner Beierwaltes’ The 
Revaluation of John Scottus Eriugena in German Idealism
4
 remains almost the 
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exceptional work of the kind in the vast literature on Eriugena published since 
the Society for the Promotion of Eriugenian Studies (SPES) was founded in 
1970.  Perhaps, A.I. Brilliantov is right when, referring to Schlüter’s words, he 
admits that those who have grasped the depth and vigour of Eriugena’s 
speculation are the exceptional few, which the same C.B. Schlüter explained by 
the difficulty of access to Eriugena’s system for the reason of its close affinity 
with Hegel’s dialectical monism5.  As for Beierwaltes’ work, quite unique in its 
attention to German idealists’ enthusiasm for Eriugena’s contribution to 
Christian philosophy and theology, it does not go however so far as to examine 
the close affinity of his thought with Hegel’s dialectic.  Instead, Beierwaltes 
seeks to distinguish Eriugena’s approach from that of German idealism in order 
to argue for his deep indebtedness to Neo-Platonist metaphysics, resulting in 
what the German scholar calls “Eriugena’s objectifying Platonism” that “stands 
against a posited objective idealism”6.  And this makes the implications of 
Beierwaltes’ work quite archetypal for Eriugenian studies7 but, in my view, 
unfair to Eriugena himself.  Any attempts to neglect the role of dialectic in 
Eriugena’s system and subdue it to the schematism of Neoplatonic metaphysics 
are misleading and counterproductive.  Even an appeal to the Neoplatonic 
understanding of dialectic, if such were made to secure a deeper insight into 
Eriugena’s discourse, would prove to be of little help. 
     Indeed, as follows from the Enneads (a collection of Plotinus’s separate 
treatises set in a certain order under this generic name by his disciple Porphyry), 
the father of Neoplatonism understood dialectic as a method or discipline of 
reasoning that aims to give proper definitions to all things.  While approaching 
them, dialectic defines, according to him, “what each is, how it differs from 
others, what common quality all have, to what Kind each belongs and in what 
rank each stands in its Kind” to be real8.  In a sense, therefore, dialectic appears 
to Plotinus to be a mode of distinction of a particular thing from other ones, 
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resulting in ascertaining the distinctive qualities common to them all, in which 
they might be brought together, as assumed, to their unity.  This is consequently 
the way leading the mind from the particular to the general (or, as termed by the 
Enneads, from the ‘lower’ to the ‘higher’) until it is believed to arrive at the 
ultimate unity which, understood as the ‘highest’, cannot nevertheless dispense 
with the ‘lower’ that ever remains posited outside it, and thus is thought to co-
exist with its opposite
9
.  Beginning with a distinction, this kind of dialectic 
keeps in fact resting upon the distinction as such, legitimises it, and because of 
this never brings the mind any closer to the knowledge of the real (all-
embracing) unity, which is opposed to nothing outside itself and wherein all 
distinctions and dichotomies between the opposites are truly  overcome.  From 
this treatment of the opposites maintaining them immutable in their distinction, 
it is quite evident that – unlike Eriugena’s understanding of the constructive role 
of contradiction (which makes his vision of dialectic akin to that of Hegel’s) – 
Neoplatonism does not even imply to resort to contradiction as a means of 
breaking through to the true knowledge of unity by getting the opposites duality 
overcome.  No speculations on Eriugena’s indebtedness to Neoplatonic 
metaphysics could therefore be fair or justified in depth.  As seen from the 
Enneads’ conception of ‘dialectic’, it suggests nothing other in fact than a 
mechanism of attaining the finite knowledge of ‘what it is’ type; the infinite 
knowledge of ‘that it is’ type, a possibility of which Eriugena’s dialectic is 
entirely focused on
10
, remains beyond the Neoplatonic reach.  
Rediscovery of Eriugena 
     Characterizing much of the interest in Eriugena among the Christian 
philosophers and theologians of Post-Hegelian Germany
11
, Beierwaltes   writes 
as follows: “The philosophical preoccupation with Eriugena in the nineteenth 
century may be styled a rediscovery, since his ideas, having been obscure and 
silent for a long time, came to life again by virtue of new philosophical 
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impulses and were questioned and discussed intensively.”12  “It was assumed”, 
he continues regarding the reasons of this ‘rediscovery’, “that Eriugena had 
overcome the opposition of the eternal and natural world, that he had justified 
his belief philosophically and had united inseparably philosophy and 
Christianity, faith and knowledge, and thus had first founded a speculative 
theology”13.  In particular, F.A. Staudenmaier, whom Beierwaltes calls 
“theologian and philosopher in one”, was among the first who considered 
Eriugena “the father of speculative theology” and found in him “the germ of all 
present philosophy” (i.e. the idealism of the Post-Hegelian age), largely focused 
on “the problem of the unity of philosophy and theology, faith and knowledge, 
reason and revelation”14.  And this is the point that struck German scholars 
most: what seemed in bringing philosophy and theology together an innovative 
breakthrough towards the cardinal reconsideration of the doctrines and practices 
of Christian faith, turned out in fact to be a thousand year old agenda 
articulately formulated by Eriugena in the ninth century.  Speculative theology 
was thus reasonably understood by German thinkers to be the ground where all 
innovative tendencies in Christian scholarship and Eriugena encountered.  As 
Werner Beierwaltes points out, this is the theology that “attains its end in 
constituting the unity of the divine and human spirit, in establishing the real 
oneness of revelation and reason in their deepest life and being, and in 
reconciling the incarnation (i.e. the second creation) with creation”; and this is 
how this theology understands salvation to be “fully achieved”.15  
The Neoplatonism issue 
     Rightly acknowledging thereby the “epoch-making achievement” of the 
ninth-century thinker, Werner Beierwaltes however (erroneously, to my mind) 
finds it to result from Eriugena’s adherence to a Neoplatonic model of the 
“hierarchical difference between modes of being or natures (naturae)”.  “This 
hierarchical difference”, he insists, “is determined decisively by a Neoplatonic 
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element: God is absolutely transcendent (‘supra omnia’, ‘nihil omnium’ – 
nothingness of all), even if he must be thought in all, being the ground of all”16.  
Moreover, Beierwaltes believes that Eriugena’s system is constructed 
“according to a Neoplatonic ground-plan.  The rhythm of the whole follows the 
triadic structure of πρόοδος  μονέ  ἐριστροφήThe elements of the triad are 
conceived as concretions of God’s cosmological operation and of the sacred 
history originated by him”17.  It is likely a certain resemblance seen from this 
between the Neoplatonic ἐριστροφή and Eriugena’s reditus (not infrequently 
interpreted in the Eriugenian studies as a cosmological reversio
18
) that compels 
Beierwaltes to make a wrong assumption.  According to him, the doctrine of 
emanation may not unfairly be found befitting Eriugena’s doctrine of creation.  
Understood as the Word’s incarnation in the world followed by the reversion of 
this world (for its “final perfection”) “into its original state”, emanation, the 
scholar thinks, may well match Eriugena’s vision of creation, which is believed 
to squarely rest upon the “philosophical model” of processio followed by 
reversio - this is, the progression of all things from the source of their being 
followed by “the return of the effected into its efficient cause, or the reversion of 
the many into its origin, the One”.19  
    Be it the case however that a judgement by appearance could lead us to a 
valid conclusion, would a certain resemblance between the two approaches 
really make any sense of Eriugena’s conception?  Would it be appropriate at all 
with regard to his dialectically coherent system to think of processio and 
reversio in terms of temporality?  Finally, would it be fair to apply the triadic 
structure of the universe to the fourfold division of Nature offered by Eriugena?  
To my mind, the answer is quite obvious: no matter how attractive a 
metaphysical schematism might seem to be, it is in fact utterly irrelevant to a 
dialectically coherent way of thinking of the living whole, and for this reason 
can hardly be imposed upon Eriugena’s discourse.  Indeed, to the extent the 
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triadic “rhythm of the whole”, as the Neoplatonic metaphysics suggests, is 
thought of in terms of temporality (so that processio and reversio are 
understood to follow one another), this scheme of succession proves to be 
inapplicable to the dialectic of unity developed by Eriugena.   
      According to this dialectic, the one Principle, that gives rise to everything, 
may only be truly known when understood as neither decreasing nor getting 
exhausted, but remaining ever identical to itself, i.e. to the proper nature of 
oneness.  In other words, while bringing everything forth into existence, the 
Principle actually retains its all-embracing oneness (outside which there is 
nothing), and therefore cannot be abandoned by anything at all.  In this sense, 
processio can only be coherently thought of as being at the same time reversio, 
since nothing alien to the one and self-identical Principle can ever be brought 
into being.  As the true beginning of all, the absolute Principle is only 
conceivable as the one that unfolds itself and therefore returns to itself at the 
same time.  For this reason, the true Principle is properly known (through a 
dialectical treatment of contradictories perfectly intrinsic to thinking of the 
whole) as the real Unity, which is not unfairly said to be simultaneously the 
Beginning and the Middle and the End.       
     Unlike this dialectically monistic view of unity, however, Neoplatonism 
tends to discriminate between unity and multiplicity by setting them apart (as 
appropriate to the dichotomy between eternity and temporality), and thus 
remains captive in fact to a metaphysically dualistic approach to what is only 
declared to be the One.  “The transcendent ‘One’ of Neoplatonists”, says E.N. 
Trubetskoy, “does not conquer the mundane reality, and the contemplative 
mysticism of their philosophy gets on with a deep dualism.  Neoplatonism gets 
cleaved asunder by the contrast between the remote divine unity on the one side, 
which is transcendent, supersensual, and absolutely incorporeal, and the matter 
on the other, which is hostile and alien to the divine reality.  As the principle of 
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everything imperfect and evil in the world, this matter resists the Godhead.  It is 
not made by Him, but is equally eternal and cannot be internally transformed or 
annihilated by Him.  Between heaven and earth, the Divine and material there is 
irreconcilable enmity; discord of the conflicting principles, and strife and split 
lie there at the heart of the entire existence.”20  
     As follows from the Enneads, the intelligible world of unity and the sensible 
world of multiplicity do not simply differ but oppose one another.  Eternity and 
temporality are the opposite principles appropriate to each of the two worlds 
respectively, and thus (when metaphysically separated) making them mutually 
confined or excluding.  Understood like these, the eternal never leaves the One, 
the immovable and immutable,
21
 whereas the temporal is by contrast associated 
with motion and change.
22
  As Plotinus further clarifies, being “at rest within 
rest with the One” (or the Principle) is eternity.23  To the ever-lasting Being 
understood as the absolute ‘rest’ it is intrinsic, however, that it “can have no this 
and that”, because “it cannot be treated in terms of intervals, unfoldings, 
progression, extension”, and for this reason “there is no grasping any first or last 
in it”24.  Apart from this motionless and unchangeable Being, therefore, there 
must be something else that would host a variety of transient things understood 
as the world of flux, lying outside the Principle of being and, in this sense, 
found to be opposed to It.  That is why what is assumed in the Neoplatonic 
system to oppose the eternal Principle is understood to belong to the temporal, 
and for this reason it is postulated to be nothing other than the “essential 
existence of generated things” that “seem to lie in their existing from the time of 
their generation to the ultimate of time after which they cease to be…”25  As a 
result, along with the dichotomy between the eternal and temporal, being and 
non-being prove likewise to be rigidly set over against one another as the 
diametrically opposite entities.  This inevitably means, however, that the 
absolute Unity, claimed by Neoplatonists to constitute the focal point of their 
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metaphysics, is put at risk by the very division of the entirety of existence into 
the mutually opposed realms of being.  Deeply implanted in their reasoning, this 
division is actually taken on board by Neoplatonists as almost a legitimate 
principle of their complementative (and therefore essentially non-dialectical) 
vision of the whole, according to which, as they assume, the supreme and 
indivisible One could occupy the ‘highest’ level of being to reign over the 
‘lowest’ one, associated with the inferior status of manifold things.  
     As follows, in order to avoid apparent inconsistencies of their logic and to 
amend the substantial defects of their metaphysical construct of the universe 
(which turns out to be fraught with disruptions in the connection between the 
One, or the Prime Principle, and the world of generation), Neoplatonists seek to 
secure the link between the opposite extremes of existence.  This is why, as 
evident from the Enneads, a certain intermediary is to be placed in between.  
The intermediary element of this kind, additionally postulated by the 
metaphysical system in support of the integrity of its hierarchical model of 
being, is assumed to promote the transmission of eternal forms to the world of 
transient things and thus to allow the latter, by receiving the orderly forms, to 
take definite shapes.
26
 
     This auxiliary agent of the cosmological process of generation introduced by 
Plotinus is what he calls “the Soul of the All”27. It “holds mid-rank among the 
authentic existences”28 and is supposed to connect the eternal and the 
temporal
29
. Nevertheless, instead of bringing the extremes together, as expected 
of its operation, the mediator – being twofold by its own nature (which is said to 
be engaged either in contemplating the superior Intellect or leaning to the 
inferior bodies
30
) – comes in fact to bring about the dissemination of division 
across the entire universe.  The final results of this quasi-mediation (actually 
maintaining the extremes in their mutual confinement) prove to be something 
opposite to what was there at the start of the Soul’s downward movement and 
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pertained to the Supreme Good – namely, such opposites of the absolute 
Principle as the formless matter and evil
31
, which remain beyond the Soul’s 
reach at the periphery of existence.  In consequence of this, the Neoplatonic 
conception of emanation becomes utterly incompatible with the biblical 
doctrine of creation and, accordingly, with Eriugena’s dialectically coherent 
approach to it in attempt of building a consistently theological system, firmly 
based on the truth of Goodness lying – as conspicuously revealed by the 
opening chapter of the Book of Genesis – at the very heart of the whole of 
creation.   
     Indeed “aiming at the completion of the universe”, the Soul gets involved, as 
Plotinus suggests, in a descent “to its own downward ultimate”32, gradually 
progressing further and further away from the Principle itself, and thus 
degrading towards the levels of being of lesser perfection
33
.  And as the author 
of the Enneads further argues, “the movement of a being in abandoning its 
superior is running out to serve the needs of another: hence there is no 
inconsistency or untruth in saying that the soul is sent down by God…”34  The 
dialectical approach to thinking consistently of the substantial unity of creation 
would however strongly disagree with Plotinus’s understanding of ‘consistency’ 
and ‘truth’ implied here and, above all, with the two constitutive ideas of his 
hierarchically-structured vision of reality giving rise to the metaphysics of 
emanation itself, which may be expressed as follows: 
1. The generated things are meant in the course of emanation to abandon the 
Principle of all beings (so that “the Soul of the All” is understood to be 
sent down by God, as if the One could ever be transcended or there could 
be anything whatsoever beyond His reach); 
2. The outgoing process of emanation is thought to be carried out through 
the downward movement of the Soul that complies – through a number of 
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successive stages – with the decrease of the primal perfection, of which 
G.Reale fairly says as the exhaustion of Good
35
. 
     In other words, the dialectical view of creation (entirely focused on its 
substantial unity) would strongly disagree with a metaphysical understanding of 
the generation of things as being started from without
36
 and therefore brought 
about in defiance of the fundamental principle of Goodness (or the absolute 
Self-Identity) constituting the very basis of creation, when coherently seen in 
accordance with the Genesis account.  In particular, as a process of bringing the 
corporeal world into being (by giving an orderly form to the matter), emanation 
is understood, according to the Enneads, to proceed away from Good and, as a 
result, to approach Evil
37
.  This scandalous understanding of the process of 
generation as resulting in what is opposed to its beginning is a direct implication 
of a non-dialectical treatment of contraries as equally substantial entities on 
which Plotinus builds his argument.  According to him, “Evil is of necessity, for 
there must be a contrary to Good”.  “To essential existence”, he further argues, 
“would be opposed the non-existence; to the nature of Good, some principle and 
source of evil”.  This particularly means that “to the content of the divine order, 
the fixed quality, the measuredness and so forth – there is opposed the content 
of the evil principle, its unfixedness, measurelessness and so forth: total is 
opposed to total.”38  So that, apart from the absolute Good there must also be 
acknowledged in accordance with this way of reasoning (metaphysically setting 
the contraries apart) the existence of the absolute Evil, which is assumed to be 
manifest “together with the derived evil entering something” that is not itself (or 
devoid of good)
39
.   
     Despite the apparent inconsistency of his thinking of the One, on account of 
which the Prime Principle (or the Supreme Good) proves actually to be opposed 
to the other (and therefore becomes confined and substituted in its operations by 
an auxiliary mediator), Plotinus does not seem however to be confused by the 
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implications of his reasoning.  Instead, he continues to insist on applicability of 
the metaphysical vision of the totality of existence (consisting, in his opinion, of 
the contraries added up) to the conception of the generation of the universe.  
“But why does the existence of the Principle of Good”, the author of the 
Enneads argues, “necessarily comport the existence of a Principle of Evil?  Is it 
because the All necessarily comports the existence of Matter?  Yes: for 
necessarily the All is made up of contraries: it could not exist if Matter did not.  
The nature of this Cosmos is, therefore, a blend; it is blended from the 
Intellectual-Principle and Necessity: what comes into it from Good is good; evil 
is from the Ancient Kind which… is underlying Matter not yet brought to order 
by the Ideal-Form”40. 
     As a result, by the very logic of his reasoning Plotinus is compelled to admit 
that along with the Prime Principle of all there does co-exist another Principle, 
which is “Matter in its potency”41, the dwelling place of Evil42.  And thus he has 
to acknowledge in fact nothing other than a failure of his attempt to deduce a 
coherent system of thought reflecting upon the absolute nature of the only 
Principle of all that is posited to be the One.  That is why almost in despair, 
appreciable in his intention to introduce additional postulates to the constructed 
system (as it is the case with Matter as the eternally co-existing Principle), the 
father of Neoplatonism tries to save the situation (though making it even worse 
in fact) by suggesting what he calls “another consideration establishing the 
necessary existence of Evil”.  “Given that The Good is not the only existent 
thing”, he says, “it is inevitable that, by the outgoing from it or, if the phrase be 
preferred, the continuous down-going or away-going from it, there should be 
produced a Last, something after which nothing more can be produced: this will 
be Evil”43.  Thus the explicit strategy of a non-dialectical separation of the 
opposites (making them co-exist or follow one another, as if they were 
appropriate to the reality of mutation) inevitably results in converting processio 
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into the temporal cosmological movement, in which the beginning and the end 
are set apart as the polar extremes.  “As necessarily as there is Something after 
the First”, the Enneads read, “so necessarily there is a Last: this Last is Matter, 
the thing which has no residue of good in it: here is the necessity of Evil”44.   
     It is clear from this that a process of generation, which begins from Good but 
ends with establishing Evil in existence (that happens on account of Good’s 
deficiency, resulting from its exhaustion in the course of degrading towards the 
inferior levels of being), may have nothing in common with creation.  For it is 
essential to creation that Good never decreases but dominates in it through and 
through, bringing the entire creature to greater perfection of the Image of God, 
so that no discrepancy between God’s will and being is seen in what has been 
made by Him.  With regard to creation, therefore, the Beginning and the End 
may only be inseparably one, and processio and reversio, accordingly, may only 
be properly thought of as being simultaneous.  In this sense, a coherently 
understood doctrine of creation is amenable to dialectic alone, and those who 
assume, as mentioned above, that Eriugena’s thought adheres to the Neoplatonic 
vision of the hierarchically-ordered universe should be found falling into 
delusion.  The metaphysical doctrine of emanation
45
 befits neither the biblical 
account of creation nor Eriugena’s dialectical view of it, developed, as the 
present inquiry will show, into a coherent system of theological thinking. 
     All this consequently means that the Neoplatonic hierarchical model is just 
inapplicable to Eriugena’s system, simply because in the reality he is looking 
for there is no hierarchy at all.  Hierarchy and division, as they occur in the 
Periphyseon (the thinker’s opus magnum), are exactly what Eriugena seeks to 
overcome as categories appropriate to a metaphysical way of thinking, taking its 
departure from the assumption of what he calls the fundamental division. That is 
the division of the whole into opposites, beginning with those of being and non-
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being, which, in his conviction, is utterly incompatible with infinity of the true 
Being, solely appropriate to God in His Unity.  
Anti-hierarchy argument 
     Despite its seeming resemblance to the Periphyseon’s doctrine of division of 
the universal reality into species of Nature, proceeding from the infinite God 
through the primordial causes to the finite things and coming back to God again, 
the Neoplatonic “hierarchical difference” between the levels of being as a model 
of universe is in fact essentially inappropriate to Eriugena’s vision of creation.  
In the fourfold division of Nature developed in the Periphyseon there is 
implanted a dialectical ‘mechanism’ of overcoming all division through the 
integrity of all the contraries, leading to affirmation of the indivisible unity of 
God’s infinite being, as appropriate to the one and true God in Whose reality 
there is no hierarchy or coercion (causation from without), but Love alone.  As 
for the Neoplatonic idea of the “hierarchical difference”, however, it is 
“decisively determined”, as mentioned above, by God’s absolute 
transcendence, which in fact is nothing more than just a metaphysical 
conception of God resulting from the mind’s divisive attitude to reality.  By no 
means therefore does it apply to the way Eriugena treats the infinity of God’s 
being, of which Beierwaltes leniently says as “the apparent ambivalence of 
Eriugena’s dialectical thought” concerning the immanence and transcendence of 
God.
46
  “Eriugena’s attempt”, he admits, “to consider God at once both 
absolutely in and above world and man remains ambivalent”.47 But this 
‘ambivalence’ (or to be fair, the dialectical approach) is exactly the point where 
the Neoplatonic emanation significantly differs from Eriugena’s vision of 
creation, according to which, as Baur points it out, “only in the unity with the 
finite could the infinite be truly infinite”48.   
     To Eriugena, the universe of creation (i.e. reality as it substantially is) cannot 
be known otherwise than in a dialectically coherent way, when it is understood 
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to proceed from the universal Principle of all and stay within it at the same time.  
Coming forth and back may only be truly known, i.e. known as being 
appropriate to the substantial reality of the universal Principle, when they are 
taken simultaneously (but not one after another), and therefore dialectically 
conceived by means of contradiction.  Processio and reversio should not be 
understood as separate motions, but as taking place in the reality of the infinite 
whole at one and the same time.  Otherwise, they would be simply inapplicable 
to the reality coming forth from the universal Principle of all, understood by 
theology as that of creation.  That is the reality which, as said, is inconceivable 
(and therefore unknown) without contradiction at all.  Indeed, in its truth the 
universal may only be known as giving rise to everything particular and 
remaining at the same time abandoned by nothing.  This is the cardinal 
contradiction lying at the heart of the theology of God’s Oneness, an articulate 
expression of which constitutes the major objective of the project Eriugena 
undertakes in his opus magnum.  The profoundly dialectical nature of 
Eriugena’s discourse is consequently where his system fundamentally differs 
from any other attempts, like those of the Neoplatonists’, to approach the same 
truth of God’s Oneness by building up metaphysically structured models of 
reality.  A proper understanding of dialectic as it works in the Periphyseon
49
 
should therefore safeguard Eriugena from any erroneous assumptions about (as 
well as false accusations of
50
) his allegiance to the Neoplatonic agenda.  The 
hierarchical order of being, inherent in the Neoplatonic metaphysics, is utterly 
alien to Eriugena’s dialectical approach to the reality of the whole; and this 
principal difference between the two systems of thought makes them altogether 
incompatible and irreconcilable. 
     A close reading of Eriugena’s own text (regrettably not often used in 
Eriugenian studies as a tool for a better understanding of the speculative 
profundity of his thought) very quickly convinces us of the fairness of this 
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conclusion.  While discussing in particular his vision of creation, Eriugena finds 
it crucial to emphasise that nothing whatsoever may properly subsist in the 
created reality by abandoning the Principle of all beings.  A dialectical reading 
of the Areopagite (whose thought likewise has often been exposed to 
misinterpretation in the light of the Neoplatonic hierarchical metaphysics) does 
substantiate this truth, and Eriugena enthusiastically includes the thinker’s own 
words in the Periphyseon’s text.  Thus, as the text reads, “‘when the theologians 
say that the Immutable goes forth into all things…’ ”, such a “‘motion of His is 
to be piously understood not as carrying away, or as an alienation from oneself, 
or an exchanging, or as a turning round, or a motion in place…, but as God’s 
bringing into essence and containing all things, and … as His self-identity 
holding together the middle and the extreme parts, the container and the 
contained, and as the return of those things which have come forth from 
Himself into Himself’” (523b-524a)51.  This means that, to Eriugena, it is of 
great importance to understand first of all that the universe of creation as a 
whole can by no means be opposed to the Creator
52
, because nothing 
whatsoever in it, unlike the Neoplatonic vision of emanation
53
, can actually be 
understood to subsist outside the One God.  It would be utterly wrong therefore 
to assume concerning the infinite being of God, Eriugena argues, that there 
might be “another thing apart from Him and outside Him.  For in Him are all 
things and outside Him is nothing” (517b).  Not improperly should God be 
known for this reason as “the Limit of all things beyond which nothing 
proceeds” (516a).  “For if another thing which is not Himself”, the author of the 
Periphyseon further argues, “is understood to be with Him, or if there is 
something accidental to Him, then surely He is neither infinite nor simple – a 
thing which the Catholic Faith and the reason must firmly deny.  For they 
confess that God is infinite and more than infinite – for He is the Infinity of 
infinities – and simple and more than simple – for He is the Simplicity of all 
simple things – and they believe and understand that there is nothing with Him, 
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since He is the periphery of all things that are and that are not and that can be 
and that cannot be and that appear to be either contrary or opposite to Him…” 
(517b).  
     From this holistic vision of the Divine being, it is clear therefore that in the 
reality of creation there is no room at all for anything to be affected from 
without or to be subordinate to any outer force ( be it even the supreme power 
of the Sovereign).  And the reason for that is very simple indeed: nothing 
external, as seen above, is allowed to co-exist with the totality of Being – 
neither outside nor within that which is believed and understood to be infinite 
and simple.  Hence, it would be logically erroneous to impose a hierarchical 
order of being upon the reality of the infinite whole, where God never “moves 
beyond Himself, but from Himself in Himself towards Himself” (453a).  
Moreover, it would be wrong to try to ascribe a hierarchical perspective to 
Eriugena’s vision of the infinite reality as it substantially is “by itself and 
through itself and in itself and for itself” (454d).  Indeed, the author of the 
Periphyseon finds it entirely inappropriate to conceive of the Divine reality of 
creation in terms of higher or lower or intermediate places.  According to him, 
“these names do not proceed out of the nature of things but from the point of 
view of one who observes them part by part.  For there is no up and down in the 
universe, and therefore in the universe there is nothing either higher or lower or 
intermediate.  These notions are rejected by a consideration of the whole, but 
introduced by attention to the parts…” (467a). 
     It follows then that, neither hierarchy nor coercion dominate in the reality of 
the absolute whole, but Love alone.  “Love is a bond and chain”, Eriugena 
holds, “by which the totality of all things is bound together in an ineffable 
friendship and indissoluble unity” (519b).  Love is the fundamental principle of 
Christian faith; and Eriugena enthusiastically accepts it, applying the whole 
rigour of his philosophical reasoning to radically reconsider in accordance with 
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this principle the way the entire universe appears to us.  Thus he seeks to bring 
our vision of reality, and accordingly the mode of our existence, into perfect 
conformity with what has been revealed to us as the eternal Truth.  In this sense, 
Eriugena is indeed a profoundly Christian thinker; and it is utterly unfair to 
mingle his system of thought with that of Neoplatonism, deeply rooted in a pre-
Christian religious tradition and based on the fundamentally different 
methodological principles, appropriate to a non-Christian type of mentality. 
     After all these elucidations concerning the apparently hierarchy-averse 
dynamics of Eriugena’s thought, I find it wholly inappropriate to associate his 
system with the Neoplatonic agenda and to keep considering it along the lines 
of the hierarchical metaphysics, which regrettably has become quite an 
archetypal tendency in Eriugenian studies since the foundation of SPES
54
.  The 
statements erroneously acknowledging Eriugena’s loyalty to a hierarchically 
structured approach to reality have long been accepted by Eriugenian scholars 
as almost a commonplace
55
.  Thus, discussing the five modes of being offered 
by Eriugena in the opening part of the Periphyseon among the constitutive (and 
in many respects problematic) elements of his system, John O’Meara, 
deservedly reputed to be one of the leading founders of SPES, particularly 
suggests: “In the system of Eriugena the most important of these modes of 
being is the second, i.e. that according to a thing’s place in a hierarchy”.56  
     Such is the prevalent tendency in the Eriugenian studies up to the present 
and, perhaps, for many years onwards.  As Hegel says, metaphysics, the 
genuine source of the hierarchical universe, has been overcome in the history of 
thought only, but not in the practice of everyday reasoning applied to all aspects 
of human activity including science.
57
   And although Dermot Moran insists that 
the hierarchical order of being as it develops in the Periphyseon should rather 
be considered as a product of human mind than an outcome of the cosmological 
process, his appeal to mind-centred subjectivism as a way of dismantling the 
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hierarchical division does not do justice to the real depth of the problem.  “For 
Eriugena”, Moran argues, “the hierarchical order of nature is in fact a product of 
mind, and is absorbed and transcended by the mind of the spiritually liberated 
person, the Pauline homo spiritualis”.58  By saying this, however, the scholar 
misses the point that if the mind’s transcendence implemented by the 
“spiritually liberated person” is understood in a purely subjective (apophatic-
like) manner, then the very truth of infinity of the absolute being is put at risk, 
and the shortcomings of the hierarchical metaphysics as a paradigm of thinking 
remain insuperable.
59
   
     Indeed, in the above statement it remains unspecified whether the mind that 
produces “the hierarchical order of nature” and transcends it is one and the 
same or of different types (at least, in terms of methodology used).  The readers’ 
impression may therefore be that not the mind but the types of personality it is 
supposed to belong to are different, namely those of the spiritually ‘liberated’ 
and ‘unliberated’ ones.  If so, and the mind mentioned is meant to pertain to 
different subjects (or types of personality), then this mind must simply be 
likewise subjective, no matter whether it is understood to produce or transcend 
the hierarchical order of being.  It consequently means that the ‘transcendence’ 
mentioned can only be a subjective procedure carried out by a subjective mind.  
The fact however is that nothing objective can be overcome (transcended) by 
the subjective, as well as the finite by the infinite, until both remain mutually 
countered and are not seen from the perspective of the absolute to be absorbed 
by it.  By its very definition (and therefore proper nature), a subjective mind can 
be nothing else but a mere counterpart of the objective reality.  Despite any 
claims, therefore, the subjective mind cannot actually pertain to “the spiritually 
liberated person”, who is meant to be the image and likeness of God and whose 
independence is supposed to be in conformity with the absolute freedom of the 
infinite whole.  Nevertheless, in spite of these dialectical subtleties of 
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theological thinking, Dermot Moran believes that “Eriugena’s system, while 
seeming to provide an objective hierarchical metaphysics of order, actually 
presents a subjectivist and idealist philosophy, in the sense that all 
spatiotemporal reality is understood as immaterial, mind dependent, and lacking 
an independent existence; and also in the Hegelian sense, whereby all finite 
reality is understood to require infinite reality for its full intelligibility and 
completion.”60 
Anti-subjectivism argument 
     Moran is not alone in looking at Eriugena’s system from a subjectivist 
perspective.  Ferdinand Ch. Baur
61
 likewise acknowledged the subjectivist 
character of Eriugena’s discourse, though, unlike Moran, he was very far from 
appreciating it as a merit of the system the medieval thinker developed.  
“According to F. Ch. Baur’s critique of Eriugena”, Beierwaltes says, “neither 
the process of incarnation and resurrection nor the creation takes place 
objectively, since Eriugena does not think them idealistically throughout.  And 
thus the proceeding from God and the reversion into God cannot be taken as 
two different momenta.  In the creation and self-incarnation God has not 
proceeded from himself, and the reversion is equally without result; both 
motions can only be distinguished by the thinking mind, and they are thus only 
distinguished subjectively”62.   Baur is confident that in Eriugena we are dealing 
with an explicit subjectivism; and it is this subjectivism that, according to him, 
does not allow Eriugena’s system to be consistently idealistic.  As Beierwaltes 
further elucidates Baur’s position, it is resolutely critical of Eriugena’s so-called 
subjectivism: “The process of God, expressed by Eriugena, is not an objective 
process…; God’s self-mediation and consequently the idea of the Son and the 
Spirit and the idea of the Trinity and the four natures also, belong merely to the 
subjective consciousness of the construing mind.  God’s being, described as 
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process, remains abstract, un-mediated in itself; the thinking mind fails to 
achieve for himself the mediation of the process.”63   
     Similarly to Moran’s, Baur’s argument concerning Eriugena’s ‘subjectivism’ 
does not seem ungrounded.  It is true that the stages of the ‘process’ resulting in 
the hierarchical order of being are in fact nothing more to Eriugena than a 
product of the mind; because, and it is essential to his view of creation, no 
particular beings abandon objectively the universal Principle of all.  It is the 
mind indeed that separates these particular beings from the source of their 
existence and – denying thus the very possibility of their participation in the 
infinite nature – places them outside the universal Principle, as if it is normal to 
them to leave their Creator.  This is however the case when the mind, being 
corrupted (deceived and misled) by senses, develops a wrong vision of reality.  
The major task of theological thinking, as Eriugena sees it, consequently 
consists in the restoration of a sound vision of reality to be known as creation, 
and thus in bringing all things created (including human being) back to the 
original unity of the substantial reality that is said to be “by itself and through 
itself and in itself and for itself”.  The return to the pristine state of unity, lost in 
the result of the mind’s corruption (symbolically expressed by the scriptural 
story of Fall), is therefore seen by Eriugena in the way of the restoration of the 
mind’s dignity, attainable through the proper operations of right reason, 
perfectly fit for being in union with the substantial order of reality as it truly is. 
     This restoration of the mind is however not merely an epistemological 
(subjectivist) motion that simply contrasts with the historical or cosmological 
(objective) one, but is the restoration of the real wholeness, and in this sense is a 
purely spiritual act of being at one with the absolute whole.  The 
epistemological agenda, as Eriugena understands it, is that of the mind’s 
conformity to the true being.  It goes therefore hand in hand with the ontology 
proper, the prime concern of which is the way the true (infinite) being can be 
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coherently thought of
64
 so as to let all humans, thus radically transformed, be 
actually at one with the true Being itself
65
.  Not unfairly therefore is this return 
to the universal unity called by Werner Beierwaltes the “act of salvation or the 
soteriological return of the world”, by which all beings return to the Principle 
not “‘naturaliter’, i.e. by a cosmological process”, but by grace (gratia)66, when 
the whole of being finds itself in perfect union (or harmony) with God Himself 
Who, in Eriugena’s words already mentioned, never “moves beyond Himself, 
but from Himself in Himself towards Himself”.67  These different types of the 
return are what Eriugena distinguishes as the general and special ones, meaning 
by them respectively the cosmological and spiritual motions; and it is 
apparently the latter one that is to be identified as the focal point of his 
systematic thought.  This is the return that takes place not in the ‘objective’ 
world of physical objects which are opposed to the subjective mind (claiming 
power of its sense-dependent experience over the rest of the world), but in Spirit 
as the living whole, in whose ubiquitous unity there are neither opposites nor 
division.  The cosmological (‘general’) and spiritual (‘special’) types of return 
should therefore be properly understood as appropriate to different perspectives 
of reality.  And these perspectives are directly related to different types of mind, 
which can perhaps be best distinguished after Kant as those of Verstand and 
Vernunft, or the subjective and spiritual mind.  As a staunch Christian thinker 
who is immensely concerned about the way salvation (or the return to the 
substantial reality of the infinite whole) is brought about, Eriugena can therefore 
be best understood, to my mind, in the light of his intellectually thoroughgoing 
struggle for a cardinal change of the paradigms of thinking, without which the 
proper depth of the truth of Revelation remains hardly accessible.   
     So Baur is definitely right when he critically says of Eriugena that, according 
to him, “the proceeding from God and reversion into God cannot be taken as 
two different momenta”.  But the German theologian is profoundly wrong when 
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says that Eriugena subjectively approaches these ‘objective’ processes, and for 
this reason accuses him of subjectivism.  In fact, Eriugena is not a subjectivist 
but a dialectician, and his approach to the infinity of God’s being is not 
subjective but dialectical.  Dialectic indeed does not permit us to treat contraries 
separately, in a ‘first – then’ manner, but requires them to be taken 
simultaneously.  Only thus, taken in their integrity, do the contraries prove to be 
appropriate to the reality of the whole as it truly is, while proceeding from the 
universal Principle of all and never abandoning it.  Proceeding from Himself, 
the infinite God never moves beyond Himself, but only unfolds Himself or 
manifests Himself.  And in this sense, God stays within Himself, remaining 
identical to Himself or, as it were, ever returning to Himself.  The ‘proceeding’ 
and the ‘reversion’, as far as they are considered with relation to the infinite 
being of the absolute whole, are inseparable, and can only be properly known 
therefore as taking place simultaneously.   
     This is how the infinite being is coherently thought of and becomes close to 
those who are prepared to be transformed by the renewing of their minds.
68
  
God moves nowhere; it is us who move in our integral (i.e. dialectically 
disciplined) mind that, like a living Spirit, brings us into conformity with the 
reality of the One.  Just as in the Parmenidian ontology, so it is in the ongoing 
history of dialectic, passing through Eriugena up to Hegel, that thinking and 
being are understood to be not two different things but one and the same
69
.  And 
this is the point that finds its conspicuous expression in Hegel’s cardinal idea of 
unity of the historical and logical, i.e. of the principle inseparability of 
temporality and eternity in our – as the patriarch of dialectic emphasises – 
ascent to God.  According to dialectic, the Other of God cannot be understood 
as subsisting ‘objectively’, and therefore remaining immediately given to the 
mind as something substantial.  So that, as Hegel suggests in his Logic, although 
nature (or creation) can be considered as the Other posited by God, it does not 
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mean however that both nature and God co-exist as substances.  “When we say, 
‘Consider nature, for it will lead you to God, and you will find an absolute final 
purpose’”, Hegel explains, “this does not mean that God is mediated, but only 
that we make the journey from an other to God, in the sense that God, being the 
consequence, is at the same time the absolute ground of what we started with, so 
that the position of the two is reversed: what appears as the consequence also 
shows itself to be the ground, while what presented itself as ground to start with 
is reduced to [the status of] consequence.  And that is precisely the path of 
rational proof.”70   
     The dialectical reformation of the mind or its restoration to the proper 
rational motion, as Eriugena calls it
71
, is actually what brings all human beings, 
according to him, to life of dignity in the reality they originally belonged to.  A 
vision of this dialectical reformation of the mind – revolutionary by nature, 
scale, and implications – lies at the very heart of Eriugena’s endeavour of 
approaching and rethinking the Christian theology of salvation; and I would like 
to show by the present inquiry into the meaning of the Periphyseon’s text where 
and how in Eriugena’s discourse dialectic comes to work. 
The major and minor tasks 
     In the light of the above given arguments, it is not hard to see how crucial 
dialectic is to the entire of Eriugena’s project.  Yet, in my view, this dialectic is 
not sufficiently investigated in Eriugenian studies in terms of its centrality and 
innovative role for the doctrine developed by Eriugena.  In particular, dialectic 
is not considered at all as a paradigm of thinking in contrast to metaphysical 
thinking.  At best, endlessly repeating each other, scholars keep talking about 
Eriugena’s “use of a sophisticated dialectic with moments of progression and 
recollection”72, though understanding these ‘moments’ in a non-dialectical 
manner of the “mutually complementary” counterparts’ temporal succession.  
They tend therefore to relegate Eriugena’s dialectic to a kind of method just 
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applicable to the mind’s “natural activity”, “with its outgoing and returning 
movements, its affirmative and negative capabilities”73.  And thus the scholars 
demonstrate no interest in contradiction as the fundamental principle of 
dialectic, which alone, when properly treated, allows to consider the contraries 
in their unity.   
     As a result, dialectic comes to be interpreted by the Eriugenian scholars in 
line with certain presuppositions largely related to what Moran calls “a negative 
dimension” (developed by the Neoplatonist philosophy and apophatic 
theology)
74
, but not in accordance with what is actually found at work in the 
whole of Eriugena’s text itself.  Not infrequently therefore do researchers’ 
misunderstanding of his dialectic go as far as the assertion that it discovers “the 
divisions” as “the basic structure of nature herself”75.   Seen in the light of the 
so-called negative dialectic traditionally associated with the Neoplatonic-
Dionysian apophaticism, the division of ‘nature’ into the ‘essential’ and 
‘superessential’ as its mutually contrasting (and even opposing) parts is 
normally understood by the metaphysically-oriented researchers to be the way 
of contemplating the entirety of reality.  Aiming to cleave to the area of 
transcendence and, therefore, resting upon the divide between being and non-
being as the contrary parts of existence (standing, as it were, for the alternative 
realities), such an expressly metaphysical vision of reality applies neither to a 
coherent approach to knowing God’s Oneness as the absolute (all-embracing) 
unity nor to Eriugena’s search for the way of thinking the infinite as the 
undivided and unconfined totality of being.  When apophatically treated, the 
finite is supposed to be negated and overcome as something unsubstantial and 
incompatible with the infinite nature of the Supreme Principle of all.  In fact, 
however, after being apophatically denied, the finite remains set over against 
the infinite as such and thus maintained in its independent existence as 
something consubstantial with its counterpart. 
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     While trying to “see what transcends the sense-realm” (or the area of finite 
things) and, for this purpose, to lay aside “all the representations of sense” 
(appropriate to the immediate perception of the finite)
76
, the apophatic 
‘dialectic’ remains captive, as seen above, to a what-type of knowledge since 
the principles of the via negativa were first formulated by the Neoplatonist 
thought.  As a result, the negative ‘dialectic’ has to recognise the transcendent 
(that surpasses the realm of finitude) to be ineffable and incomprehensible.  By 
doing so, the apophatic thought proves therefore to be primarily concerned not 
as much about the way of thinking (and knowing) the infinite as about the way 
of speaking of it.  As apophaticism in general suggests with regard to our 
approach to the infinite, “we hold it not so as to state it but so as to be able to 
speak about it.  We can and do state what it is not, while we are silent as to what 
it is…”77.  The apophatic definition, therefore, “could be only ‘the indefinable’: 
what is not a thing is not some definite thing.  We are in agony for a true 
expression; we are talking of untellable; we name, only to indicate for our own 
use as best we may.  And this name, The One, contains really no more than the 
negation of plurality…”78.  The One and many are thus understood to be 
mutually countered, in the result of which the Unity as such becomes in fact 
utterly unthinkable and unapproachable.  All this, hence, makes the apophatic 
agenda essentially irrelevant and inapplicable to the principal task of Eriugena’s 
anti-division project, and for this reason it should not be engaged in depth 
within the framework of the present investigation of the Periphyseon’s dialectic 
as of the way of thinking coherently of God’s Oneness.  As a paradigm of 
thinking constituting the very basis of Eriugena’s speculative approach to 
Christian theology, this dialectic, unlike the ‘negative’ one, seems not to draw 
the attention of the Eriugenian scholars at all, which is quite unfair to his epoch-
making achievements and counterproductive for any further advanced studies of 
his legacy.   
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     I find it very important therefore, and see it as the major task of the present 
work, to uncover the dialectic which we are really dealing with in Eriugena 
when closely and critically read his Periphyseon, and above all its Book IV, the 
most difficult and perhaps least studied among all other parts of the main 
treatise.  This is a kind of approach which, I believe, allows us to realise that at 
the basis of the dialectic sought there lies what might be not improperly called 
the cardinal contradiction, for it really determines the entire course of 
Eriugena’s reasoning.  This is undoubtedly the contradiction that from the very 
outset of the Periphyseon is meant by its author to take the shape of the unity of 
the first and fourth forms of Nature, and thus to be articulated in the form of a 
paradoxical statement about God, according to which He is understood to be the 
one who does and does not create at the same time.  And the reason why this 
contradiction is supposed to be cardinal and determine Eriugena’s train of 
thought is quite simple.  By formulating the contradiction, Eriugena has no 
intention to explain how God creates the universe and dwells within Himself.  
What Eriugena is really after and seeks to achieve by thinking dialectically is an 
understanding of how salvation is actually brought about or, in other words, 
how human beings return from their captivity in the world of finitude to the 
substantial reality of creation and union with God, i.e. how they can truly be
79
.  
In short, speaking in terms of the arguments presented above, it would be not 
unfair to conclude that the thing Eriugena is really interested in is not a 
cosmological but spiritual dimension of creation, where the spiritual liberation 
of the entire human being comes true.  
     Indeed, as it will be seen from the analysis of Eriugena’s text and conception 
unfolding in Chapters III-VII, it is a radical transformation of the human mind 
that secures its (and accordingly human being’s) way back to the substantial 
reality of God’s creation.  Actually, it is the dialectic of the universal and 
particular that, according to Eriugena, provides the way of both tackling the 
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ontological dichotomy (between being and non-being) and thinking consistently 
of the totality and infinity of God’s being.  From this perspective, it will also be 
clear therefore that, as a paradigm of thinking deeply implanted in Eriugena‘s 
discourse, dialectic effectively promotes the mind’s progress towards knowing 
the truth of God’s Oneness and, as a consequence, real adoption of the salvific 
truth revealed by Christ.  That is why it will not be hard to understand how the 
dialectical conception of unity, as it evolves in the Periphyseon, gives 
Eriugena’s readers an opportunity to radically reconsider the metaphysical view 
of creation that the theological reflection traditionally relies on.  From a 
coherently dialectical point of view, God and creation cannot be set apart.  
Speaking more specifically, according to Eriugena’s dialectic, the reality of 
creation cannot be conceived otherwise than in the way of being inseparable 
from the universal Principle that gives rise to all things, but itself is abandoned 
by none.  This is a dialectical expression of the unshakable truth, and it is 
ignored solely by the mind corrupted by senses and therefore following the 
metaphysical pattern of the ontological dichotomy, called by Eriugena the 
fundamental division.  Contradiction between the universal and the particular 
(like the one above) is absolutely essential to the dialectic coherently 
understood; and our analysis will show that Eriugena’s discourse strongly 
appeals to dialectical contradictions and is actually based on their proper 
treatment. 
     This kind of inquiry into Eriugena’s thought, the depth of which is only 
amenable to a methodological tool of close reading of the dense text of his 
voluminous Book, will definitely allow us to justify the validity of Noack’s and 
Schlüter’s vision of a striking affinity between Eriugena’s system and Hegel’s 
dialectical monism, as stated at the beginning of this Introduction.  It will also 
help us to suggest some possible solutions to a variety of concomitant tasks of a 
minor sort, which however – when considered from the perspective of the 
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promotion of a deeper understanding of Eriugena’s legacy – prove in fact to be 
as important as the major one.  Among these minor tasks that the present work 
deals with in addition to the major one, I would feature the following: 
1. Recognition of a good deal of affinity between Eriugena’s discourse and 
that of his Islamic contemporaries (notably, Allaf and al-Nazzam), who 
developed their dialectical ideas within the Mu’tazilah tradition of a 
philosophically disciplined approach to the truth of God’s Oneness: 
making claim in connection with this that al-Nazzam’s engagement with 
Parmenides’ Periphyseon and his resistance to a possibility of a dualistic 
interpretation of its ontology might have provoked Eriugena’s innovative 
approach to Christian theology with a view to suggesting a mode of 
overcoming dualism as the main obstacle on the way to the Truth 
revealed. 
2. Suggestion of a possibility of having the Periphyseon’s structure 
reconsidered with reference to five modes of understanding of being (and 
not to the forms of Nature, as usually believed), which would allow us to 
associate these modes with the genuine subject-matter of each of the five 
books of the main treatise. 
3. Reinterpretation of the fourfold division of Nature not in the sense of a 
basic structure of Eriugena’s system, but as a means of the introduction of 
dialectic to the body of Christian theology by refutation of Augustine’s 
metaphysical vision of a hierarchical threefold model of the universe. 
4. Formulation of reasons for the necessity of reconsidering the entirety of 
Eriugena’s system from the perspective of an anti-division project, by 
virtue of which it could be recognised as a historically significant step 
towards developing a coherent theology of God’s Oneness, utterly 
incompatible with any attempts of its metaphysical interpretation in terms 
of division of the infinite being into opposites. 
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The work outline 
     From the account of the tasks that the thesis sets itself, it is clear that the 
research undertaken here aims to logically reconstruct the way in which 
Eriugena’s thought seeks to provide a coherent theology of God’s Oneness, as 
appropriate to the truth revealed by Christ and expressed in writing by St. Paul 
and St. John.  According to this truth, God is really the One Who is at one with 
the entire reality of His creation, for He never acts from beyond His being and 
produces nothing alien to Himself.  As a result, nothing whatsoever may be 
understood to fall out of God’s creation (unless its substantial order is 
maliciously broken by a corrupt will going counter to it), because outside Him 
Who is the One nothing at all may subsist.  All this consequently means that all 
human beings with no exception, as part of God’s creation, may truly be known 
as His children, coming forth into being from the only Father of all.  Essential 
to the theology following the truth revealed is, therefore, a new vision of 
creation, which is to be brought into conformity with a dialectical understanding 
of the universality of the Principle of all particular beings.   
     From the perspective of the truth revealed, creation should no longer be seen 
as the world in its appearance (i.e. as a conglomerate of finite things as they are 
immediately given to the senses), but as the substantial reality where the infinite 
and finite are not mutually countered, and the universal and particular are not 
separated from one another.  The advanced and coherent theology, as Eriugena 
envisages it, should start not with God Himself (i.e. with the assumptions 
concerning His being, which would simply reproduce the errors of metaphysics 
preoccupied with predicating attributes of the invisible essence), but with the 
way in which God’s unity can be consistently thought of so as to allow the mind 
(and, hence, the entire human being) to actually be at one with the whole of the 
substantial reality.  In other words, the new theology that Eriugena is concerned 
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about would insist that the One God cannot be truly known unless humans are 
capable of being at one both with their genuine nature (where the essence and 
existence are inseparably one) and with Him in Whom there is no discrepancy 
between His will and being.   
     Not unreasonably, therefore, the agenda of the new theology, as it comes to 
the fore in Eriugena’s discourse, might take up the shape of the following 
twofold expression: 
God can only be known from the perspective of the true reality; 
so to be able to know God, human beings should get into the true reality. 
     With regard to this expression (signifying that the ultimate knowledge and 
the true being are inseparably one), at least two interdependent questions arise 
to clarify the notions constituting the epistemological-ontological core of the 
advanced (or philosophically disciplined) theology, at the heart of which there 
should lie a strong appeal to what Eriugena calls a proper rational motion and 
understands as the most essential movement of human nature.  The questions 
meant here may be formulated as follows: 1) Why knowledge?  2) How should 
the true reality be understood?  
     In its ultimate sense, knowledge is a clear vision of the invisible, which is, 
obviously, unattainable without thinking in paradox.  God is not immediately 
present to the visible world of finite things and can therefore be only known (or 
thought of) as the infinite that comprises all things, being in and beyond them at 
the same time. 
     As for the true reality that ever is while remaining undivided from within 
and unconfined from without, it should be coherently understood as the absolute 
or self-identical Being that is neither preceded nor followed by non-being.  This 
is, hence, the reality of self-disclosure (better known to the faithful mind as the 
reality of creation), where nothing external can subsist on its own, i.e. without 
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being indivisibly whole (infinite in itself) or intimately connected to its 
innermost essence and thus determined by it. 
     To be part of the absolute whole (or belong to the infinite Being), human 
beings should, clearly, be whole in themselves (or restored to the self-identical 
integrity of their genuine nature), so that no discrepancy between their inner 
essence and outer existence (the mind and its visible manifestation or 
incarnation in flesh) could be found in them.  This is the way to participate in 
the substantial order of creation and, hence, to really know the invisible God or 
to subsist indeed among what Eriugena calls “the Divine things”.  As the 
criterion of the profoundly understood unity of Knowledge and Being, Truth 
should therefore become the focal point in the mind of those who uncover the 
infinity of their self-identity and thus come close to the secrets of immortality 
and complete transformation of their life.  This is the Truth that is understood to 
be the cornerstone of the coherent theology as it develops within Eriugena’s 
discourse to lead the faithful to their salvation (or liberation from the captivity 
in the transient world of finitude) and their righteous life in the rightly-ordered 
reality of creation (or self-disclosure), in which the infinite God is adequately 
manifest and therefore really known. 
     Consideration of some of the central issues raised by Islamic philosophy (as 
seen in the context of the predestination controversy) and Cappadocian 
theology, Heidegger’s and Parmenides’ ontology, Plato and the dialectical 
approach to contradiction as such is not undertaken within the framework of the 
present project with reference to the historical evolution of their doctrines.  As a 
matter of fact, it is undertaken for purely logical reasons and proceeds with a 
view to highlighting a number of crucial turns in the train of thought that leads 
us to resolving a methodological task of reconstruction of the inner logic of 
Eriugena’s discourse and, along with this, to identifying the cardinal 
contradiction as the basic and formative principle of his system, in which 
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philosophy and religion, as we shall see it later, are understood to be one and 
the same.     
     From the Mu’tazilah tenets of the Divine Unity and First Obligation (which 
seem to have immensely influenced Eriugena’s views on freedom and 
predestination, good and evil), this consideration progresses towards a brief 
analysis of the universalist approach to the totality of God’s being, suggested 
by Gregory the Theologian in continuity with the fundamentals of the Pauline 
theology.  In particular, Gregory’s interpretation of the Tetragrammaton brings 
us close to the problem of the interconnectedness of being and time and, as a 
consequence, to the point that Heidegger’s hermeneutical ontology is largely 
focused on, which in turn convinces us that no profound and coherent ontology 
can avoid the issue of temporality.  Moreover, a scrupulous analysis of the basic 
notions of this kind of ontology allows us to better understand that in so far as 
being and time are consistently thought of in their unity, the intimate connection 
of both transcends the horizon of the empirical existence and opens up a 
prospect of being beyond the limits of time.  The dialectic of temporality and 
eternity, as it develops in Plato’s thought, further deepens our understanding of 
the relationship between the universal and particular and proceeds towards a 
clearer vision of the non-dialectical character of Parmenides’ approach to the 
totality of Being.  The latter, and especially a danger of a dualistic 
misinterpretation of the ontology of the absolute whole, finally brings us to the 
agenda of Eriugena’s dialectical monism (with its focus on the dialectical 
treatment of contradictions), which allows us to concentrate on reading his texts 
with a view to reconstructing a methodologically innovative approach to 
Christian theology.  The dialectic of the universal and particular, deeply 
implanted in Eriugena’s Periphyseon, turns out to be a methodological key to 
the whole of his system and, at the same time, an effective means of having it 
reconstructed as a coherent conception. 
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          As a result of this logically determined consideration, it would be not 
improper, I think, to qualify the entire project as a work of philosophical 
theology.  Such a status of the work would perfectly comply with the very 
substance of Eriugena’s own discourse, theologically systematic and 
philosophically disciplined by nature.  Largely stimulated – as the Periphyseon 
perspicuously shows – by his thoughtful interpretation of the first three chapters 
of the Book of Genesis, the novelty of Eriugena’s approach to Christian 
theology apparently consists in its coherently philosophical integrity, essential 
to which is a strong appeal to thinking dialectically of the substantial unity of 
the entire reality of creation.  
     The inquiry undertaken in the present work is focused on such Eriugena’s 
texts as: 
1) The Periphyseon, Books I-III80; 
2) The Periphyseon Book IV81; 
3) Treatise on Divine Predestination82; 
4) The Voice of the Eagle83. 
     The work includes seven chapters bound up with one another by the 
following central ideas they are focused on: 
1. God cannot be known as a finite being, and cannot therefore be 
thought of by means of predicating attributes of His essence. 
2. The infinite is only conceivable by means of contradiction 
dialectically treated. 
3. Understood as the universal Principle of all, God admits of nothing 
else outside His infinite being, so that the reality of creation can 
only be known as being inseparably one with its Creator. 
4. The substantial order of the infinite reality is such that the 
particular proceeds from the universal, and not otherwise; this is 
the order that is manifest to the human mind in its proper rational 
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motion, when conceived in a dialectical way, according to which 
the particular does not abandon the universal Principle while 
proceeding from it.   
5. Contradiction becomes a means of thinking (and knowing) the 
universal unity when contradictories (that contradiction consists of) 
are considered as being simultaneously true.   
6. Knowledge of the infinite, attainable solely through the mind’s 
complete transformation in accordance with the dialectical 
discipline of thinking, gets the entire human nature restored to its 
integrity, and thus brings it to being at one with the universal 
reality as it truly (infinitely) is in its unity. 
7. The infinite being of the One God is essentially indivisible within 
itself, and therefore is understood to be at once the Beginning and 
the Middle and the End; this consequently means that only that 
which uncovers its true (infinite) nature, so as to actually become 
thereby the image and likeness of God, can truly be, i.e. be 
perfectly at one with the universal reality of the One. 
     This sequence of ideas (appropriate to the order of the work’s chapters) may 
not unfairly be suggested, to my mind, as an outline of the main stages through 
which develops a coherent theology of God’s Oneness, as Eriugena understands 
it and presents by his Periphyseon’s conception. 
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CHAPTER I 
Eriugena: personality and origin 
Vision 
 
     Eriugena is a thinker who said aloud that true philosophy and true religion 
are one
1
.  And the world heard this in the mid-ninth century, when Christendom 
was still in its infancy, and when a possibility of building God’s kingdom on 
earth was still believed to be a realistic social project in the Carolingian Gall
2
. 
     Having found himself at the centre of a new historical undertaking of 
building up a Christian kingdom in the West of   Europe (he appears in the royal 
court of Charles the Bald around the year 847), Eriugena sought to reconsider 
the way creation was traditionally understood.  To him, it could not be severed 
from the Creator and opposed to Him, because it is the reality that takes its 
origin from the Universal Principle which, due to its infinite universality, can 
never be abandoned by anything coming forth from It. It is the corrupt mind 
(the one subject to the irrational motion or entirely captive to the dictates of 
senses) that makes things leave the Principle of their being and take their place, 
as it were, outside It.  Thus the corrupt mind gives rise to the world of finite 
things which, like a veil made of sensible fantasies, covers up the substantial 
reality that subsists in unity with the ultimate Principle of all.  Finding 
themselves in such an illusory world, human beings have to lead a false life or 
search for the way back to where they truly belong by their genuine nature 
brought forth into being by one and the same Principle of all. 
     In this search for the way out, Religion and Philosophy, as Eriugena saw 
them, must go hand in hand, indeed, because they have one and the same 
subject of their interest – namely, the Ultimate Reality; and the objective, or the 
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basic question they are both concerned about, is that of the way human beings 
can actually subsist in it.  Thus Religion and Philosophy do meet together, while 
providing the proper goal for the human soul’s aspiration and the tool for 
having this aspiration brought about, which, as Eriugena persistently convinces 
us, is all about the restoration of the human mind to its proper rational motion. 
     The articulation of this fundamental vision of the meaning of human life, 
profoundly religious and philosophical at the same time, must have sounded 
very revolutionary for the ninth century – at the dawn of a new era and new 
expectations of human life.  Nevertheless, the most amazing thing about all this 
perhaps is that it sounds very much the same at the outset of the twenty-first 
century, when the human world is facing a dilemma of its further degradation 
and complete annihilation or spiritual regeneration and movement towards a 
new horizon of being.  To be or not to be is the perennial dilemma of Hamlet, 
haunting humanity all the way through its historical drama.  Does Eriugena 
bring us any closer to its solution?  This is the question to be answered by those 
who feel call for searching the Truth.   
Background 
     John Scottus Eriugena is undoubtedly a prominent and at the same time a 
mysterious figure in intellectual history.  He appears in Gall (the territory of 
modern France), literally speaking, out of the blue around the year 847, and 
likewise suddenly disappears after the year 877.  The height of his intellectual 
might, the depth of his thought, and the scope of his erudition are extraordinary.  
He is a philosopher and theologian, translator and commentator, poet and 
educator.  His knowledge of Greek and Greek Fathers is quite unique in the 
West of those days.  His monumental works On Divine Predestination and, 
above all, the voluminous Periphyseon are out of comparison with anything else 
of the kind.  No one like him was ever known to the West between Augustine 
and Anselm, that is, for a span of about six hundred years.  The brilliance of his 
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mind strikes many, as much amongst his contemporaries as among the 
illustrious scholars of the following generations.  Like a rock, he is said to rise 
above the empty plain, surprisingly enough anticipating many of the crucial 
turns and developments of thought of later days, up to the Post-enlightenment 
and the age of Romanticism, which deservedly won him, as mentioned above, a 
reputation of the “Hegel of the ninth century”.  Despite all this, however, on the 
horizon of the ninth century Europe Eriugena, seen from the perspective of the 
magnitude of his system, remains a solitary and enigmatic figure.  How he 
could suddenly emerge among the Carolingian scholars who were just taking 
some faltering steps on their intellectual path, where he did come from, from 
what intellectual background – remains a mystery.   
Sources 
     For about two centuries (actually, since the post-Hegelian time in Germany) 
Eriugenian studies have been trying to shed light upon this mystery, upon the 
sources of Eriugena’s thought and the intellectual tradition it might be 
associated with, but hardly anyone could say for sure nowadays that this riddle 
has been unravelled. 
     Perhaps, one of the misleading assumptions was and still is, since researchers 
have been gathered under the aegis of SPES, to approach this problematic issue 
from speculations upon the meaning of Eriugena’s name.  For some reason, it is 
strongly believed by many that his nomen gentile Scottus and cognomen 
Eriugena can explain much.  In particular, it is assumed that these two parts of 
Eriugena’s full name allow scholars to firmly bind up his fleshly and intellectual 
origin with both the Celtic area (Ireland or probably Scotland) and the Celtic 
spiritual tradition, normally associated with a network of Irish monasteries 
settled in mainland Hibernia and widely spread across the Continent
3
.  The truth 
about all these speculations is however that the meaning of the cognomen 
‘Eriugena’ does not seen to be as clear as that of the nomen gentile.  As John 
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O’Meara suggests, it might indicate either Ireland (meaning then ‘the Irishman 
born in Ireland’) or some other individual locations in the Celtic world.  The 
meaning of the name is in fact so uncertain that the range of possible 
interpretations may go as far as Schaar Schmitt’s solution to the riddle.  “Schaar 
Schmitt”, O’Meara admits, “took Eriugena to be equivalent to the Greek 
Erigenes, meaning ‘born in the East’4.  To my mind, the latter version of the 
name would sound quite plausible and relevant to what we are actually dealing 
with in Eriugena.  Given his unique expertise in the Greek language and Eastern 
thought that came not from the monastery schools in Ireland, why would it be 
illogical to assume that a young man could travel to the East, live there for some 
time and, when the time was ripe, come from over there to the Carolingian Gaul 
as a mature scholar?  Should not the main name be proper to the experience of 
the second, spiritual, birth as an intellectually advanced personality comes 
through in the process of his or her formation?  To me, this is precisely the case 
with the name of John Scottus Eriugena, the Irishman born in the East.  If so, 
however, then the problematic issues of the origin of his thought as well as the 
way of his thinking and the objectives of his mission in the Carolingian Gaul 
should definitely be seen from a different perspective. 
     As for the ‘sources’ of Eriugena’s system, almost all key figures of Christian 
thought that flourished both in the Latin West and the Greek East prior to 
Eriugena are normally reckoned among them.  Not much has actually changed 
in this area of Eriugenian studies since a solid inquiry into the matter by the 
Russian theologian and scholar A.I. Brilliantov, The Influence of Eastern 
Theology on Western Theology in the Works of John Scottus Erigena
5
, first 
came to light in St. Petersburg in 1898.  Offering a profoundly systematic 
analysis of the theology of Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor in 
comparison with the Augustinian elements of Eriugena’s thought6, Brilliantov’s 
book hitherto remains, in scholars’ opinion, “perhaps the best research on the 
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theological views and literary work of Erigena, one of the most intriguing 
religious thinkers of the Middle Ages”7.  The whole gallery of authorities – 
including, in addition to those mentioned, Ambrose, Epiphanius, Basil the 
Great, Gregory the Theologian and, of course, Dionysius the Areopagite – are 
fairly nominated by the prominent Russian scholar among Eriugena’s 
predecessors
8
, whose impact on him who was well familiar with their writings is 
indisputable at all.  Since then however it has become a norm in Eriugenian 
studies to treat these authors as the direct ‘sources’ of Eriugena’s own thought.  
And this tendency has turned in fact into a kind of preoccupation with 
identifying the ideas that seem to be ‘borrowed’ by Eriugena from his 
predecessors, which, in my view, is wrong, unfair and counterproductive.   
     Eriugena appeared at the Carolingian royal court as a scholar of high 
reputation, who enjoyed the king’s favour and was deeply respected by his 
colleagues.  He was certainly a person capable of making his own contribution 
to the Carolingian scholarship; his expertise in the subtleties of advanced 
thought undoubtedly allowed him to say something new indeed.  In the situation 
Eriugena found himself in the Palace school (obviously not the major centre of 
sophisticated learning), it was quite natural for him, I believe, to refer to as 
many Christian authorities as possible to elucidate and substantiate his position, 
especially for those who might find it unfamiliar and challenging
9
.  No wonder 
therefore that the Christian authors, particularly those whom he carefully read 
while translating, at the king’s request, from Greek into Latin, could be broadly 
quoted by him for this purpose.  In this sense, I assume, any attempts to 
underestimate the originality and innovative character of Eriugena’s thinking 
can result in diminishing the magnitude of his system and, as a consequence, 
discourage any further development of Eriugenian studies.  It would be likely 
more constructive therefore to look at the evolution of Eriugena’s thought from 
the perspective of a possible direct influence on it, i.e. from the perspective of 
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the intellectual climate in which Eriugena could really grow up as a profound 
thinker, skilled both in theology and philosophy.  Such an environment, or a 
scholarly community, could, clearly, be formed by the contemporaries of a 
similar intellectual might, who likewise set themselves the task of acquisition of 
the highest truth of faith.  Surprisingly or not, but on the fringes of 
Christendom, where perhaps the Nestorians settled next to the Muslims
10
, such 
an environment did exist, precisely when a gifted young man called John 
Scottus could have some good reason to appear there
11
. 
The Eastern turn 
     “In broader cultural terms”, Dermot Moran writes, “the ninth century in fact 
marks the beginning of several centuries of Islamic dominance in the fields of 
philosophy and science.  The centres of intellectual learning and the heritage of 
Greek thought moves from Alexandria to Baghdad, where Al-Kindi (c.800-877) 
developed the first major Neoplatonic metaphysics, adopted to Islam”12.  
Meaning furthermore a certain affinity between al-Kindi’s and Eriugena’s 
thought, Moran also suggests that a comparative analysis of the two systems 
could bear good fruit.  “It would be interesting”, he argues, “to compare the two 
Neoplatonic systems of Eriugena and Al-Kindi, as they were almost exact 
contemporaries”13. 
     In continuity with this, I would suggest however that the results of such a 
comparison of the two systems
14
 could be more than ‘interesting’: they will 
completely change our understanding of the origin of Eriugena’s thought.  
Indeed, even the overall impression of the First Philosophy, al-Kindi’s major 
work on the “knowledge of the First Truth Who is the cause of all truth”15, is 
absolutely striking.  The central themes discussed in the treatise are essentially 
congenial to those of Eriugena.  The universality of the Principle outside which 
there is nothing; the alternative kinds of perception and accordingly the 
alternative perspectives of the mind; the ‘eye’ of intellect and search for a ‘non-
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representational perception’ overcoming the ‘blindness’ of intellect; ‘possible’ 
and ‘impossible’ contradictions; principle incompatibility of the order of the 
universe, its rest and motion, with the ‘first-then’ pattern16 – all these notions of 
al-Kindi are likewise the basic ideas constituting the very structure of 
Eriugena’s discourse displayed in his Periphyseon. 
     How could it happen that the Islamic and Christian thinkers could stand so 
close to one another?  The answer, I think, is very simple – it is to be found in 
the very circumstances that stimulated an active intellectual interaction between 
members of different religious traditions present in the cultural environment of 
Baghdad of the ninth and the following centuries.  Lack of dogmatic pressure 
and ecclesiastical hierarchy in Islam helped a great deal to those who believed 
in the universal truth common to all faiths and esoteric teachings to develop 
contacts between Muslims, Christians, and Jews and treat them as equals
17
.  
Search for “the inner meaning of the Sacred Scripture”, lying at the heart of all 
religious traditions, brought them all together
18
.  Representatives of all religions 
and philosophical schools were, for example, warmly welcomed at the scholarly 
debates regularly held in Baghdad by the Mu’tazilites, who were famous in 
those days for their strong appeal in the search for truth not to authorities but to 
reason alone
19
 (meaning by this that even sacred writings should be read with 
the mind’s ‘eye’).  
     It is this attitude of reason to truth and authority that, in his Crisis of Western 
Philosophy, Vladimir Soloviev takes for the starting point of Eriugena’s 
thought.  Its central postulate can be formulated, according to the Russian 
philosopher, as follows: if reason is right, it cannot contradict truth; so that if the 
church doctrine (auctoritas) is true, it cannot disagree with right reason (recta 
ratio); otherwise, the auctoritas is false and needless
20
.  From this point of view, 
reason alone cannot disagree with authority, and in this sense it is responsible 
for both its own rectitudo and veritas auctoritatis; otherwise the latter, that is 
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supposed to communicate truth, would be simply meaningless.  Therefore, 
according to Eriugena, auctoritas can only derive from recta ratio, but not recta 
ratio from auctoritas; for the auctoritas unjustified by recta ratio proves to be 
impotent
21
.  This finally means that the religious dogmas can neither be 
regardless of reason nor alien to it.  And Eriugena, as Soloviev sees him, was a 
passionate exponent of this belief.  But how he came to it – whether through the 
debates organised by the Mu’tazilites or through his careful reading of the 
Christian authors – we do not know for sure.  What we do know is that he 
suddenly, as if out of the blue, appeared in Carolingian Gaul about the year 847 
and likewise suddenly disappeared about the year 877.  And these are precisely 
the dates of the beginning and the end of persecutions of the Mu’tazilites.  The 
persecutions began under Caliph Mu’tawakkil, after he assumed power in 84722, 
but came to a halt after the death of Ya’qub ibn Ishaq al-Kindi in 877. 
     To my mind, it cannot be just a miraculous coincidence that these two 
crucial dates perfectly match the intellectual biography of Eriugena.  Rather 
they shed light upon the genuine background to his evolution and thus allow us 
to understand better how and why in the body of his system philosophy and 
theology come together.  This means that after almost fifty years of enthusiastic 
studies under the aegis of SPES we come at last to realise that a vast terra 
incognita still lies ahead of us.  Perhaps, over all these years we had been 
moving in a wrong direction while trying to explain the origin and evolution of 
Eriugena’s thought solely by the conditions of the Carolingian cultural context.  
A broader view of the cultural history, spreading well beyond the boundaries of 
the Carolingian West, gives us an opportunity not only to better understand the 
reasons for his knowledge of the Greek sources, but also to come closer to the 
point where we could turn round and, facing East, begin a new journey to the 
Eriugena unknown.  The first step on this way should then, clearly, be an insight 
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into what the Mu’tazilah doctrine was all about and how it might help a young 
Christian from the Celtic West to find his way to the truth of God’s Oneness. 
The Falsafah agenda 
     The philosophical approach to the matters of religion, as found at work in 
Eriugena, allows its upholders to succeed, as they assume, in overcoming the 
contingency and particularity of the religious experience.  This is the experience 
which largely rests upon the senses – that is, sensible images and 
representations that always take the shape of individual, separate things, as they 
are borrowed from the transient world of appearance immediately given to the 
mind in perception, and therefore are used as metaphors (or symbols) of 
something sublime and hidden, normally treated by those involved in the 
religious experience as something mysterious, ineffable and incomprehensible.  
To philosophical inquiry, deeply concerned about finding the way of 
approaching the ultimate reality, this is a problematic issue to decide how far 
the sensible images and representations claimed to be metaphors and symbols of 
the infinite reality are actually compatible with it.  On this decision it further 
depends how far the truths conveyed through the sensible images and 
representations generated in the religious experience and transmitted through it 
can be understood to match the Divine revelation.  This is the approach which 
lies at the very heart of Eriugena’s discourse and can be well discerned 
throughout the major of his works written in Gaul. 
     The first big project Eriugena found himself involved in on the Carolingian 
soil was his treatise On Divine Predestination, written in response to the debate 
that broke out in the circles close to the royal court.  Though requested by those 
in charge of the intellectual climate in the kingdom to defeat their opponents, 
Eriugena produced a text which made many feel puzzled, for it was found by 
them to challenge some of the central beliefs adopted by the Carolingian church 
and society.  These discrepancies with the official beliefs, nevertheless, appear 
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to us to be of great importance, since they, firstly, give reason to assume that the 
author’s views on the matter (and it may well be, the entire outlook) might have 
been not of the Carolingian origin.  Secondly, in many respects these 
discrepancies with the Carolingian church beliefs turn out to be, surprisingly 
enough, congenial to something else that had been developed by then quite far 
away from the Carolingian Gaul – namely, in Baghdad under Muslim caliphs.  
And those religious and philosophical views, the close affinity with which 
Eriugena so unexpectedly reveals in his attitude to a complex of issues related 
to the debate on free will and fate, were successfully developing in quite a 
systematic way within the framework of the so-called Mu’tazilah tradition that 
flourished in the Middle East in the period of the second half of the eighth and 
the first half of the ninth centuries, reaching its climax by 830s – 40s, during the 
reign of caliphs al-Mamun and al-Mu’tasim. 
      Mu’tazilah was a school of Islamic theology where reason and philosophical 
learning were warmly welcomed, and where reflection on orthodox beliefs 
developed in close cooperation with rational inquiry, for to the Mu’tazilites 
reason and revelation did not counter but complemented one another
23
.   Wasil 
ibn‘Ata (699 – 748) is unanimously considered to be the founder of this 
movement
24
, who strongly believed that theological thought should primarily 
focus on the truth of the Divine Unity, so as to let its pious adherents hold to 
this focal point as that of departure in their intellectual journey, the nearest 
destination of which is the infallible truth of the Divine Justice
25
.  God is 
unconditional Good, and cannot be held responsible for the existence of evil in 
the world.  It is the human being who is the author of all wrongdoings, and is 
therefore to blame for any evil stemming from the errors of his acts.  As al-
Shahrastani put it, “The Mu’tazilis unanimously maintain that man decides 
upon and creates his acts, both good and evil; that he deserves reward or 
punishment in the next world for what he does.  In this way the Lord is 
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safeguarded from association with any evil or wrong or any act of unbelief or 
transgression.  For if He creates the wrong, He would be wrong, and if He 
created justice, He would be just.”26 
     A strong appeal to reason, so much characteristic of the Mu’tazilites’ 
teaching since the beginning of the movement, became a thoroughgoing turn in 
the development of Islamic theology that gave a new impetus to the ongoing 
scholarly debate.  At the heart of the Mu’tazilites’ standpoint, out of which the 
whole spectrum of their views derived, there lay the doctrine of the first 
obligation: “Mu’tazilis believed that the first obligation of humans, especially 
adults, in full possession of their mental faculties, is to use their intellectual 
power to ascertain the existence of God, and become knowledgeable of His 
attributes”27.  It is vital for those who really accept the truth of the Divine Unity 
(and adhere to it in their practical life) that the essence of their nature – which 
has no other source of its origin save God alone Who is the One – cannot be 
neglected: “One must wonder about the whole existence, that is, about why 
something exists rather than nothing.  If one comes to know that there is a being 
who caused this universe to exist, not reliant on anything else and absolutely 
free from any type of need, then one realises that this being is all-wise and 
morally perfect.  If this being is all-wise, then His very act of creation cannot be 
haphazard or in vain.  One must then be motivated to ascertain what this being 
wants from humans, for one may harm oneself by simply ignoring the whole 
mystery of existence and, consequently, the plan of the Creator.”28 
 
     In Islamic theology the doctrine of the first obligation that Mu’tazilites so 
resolutely entrenched in debates with their opponents
29
 is known as wujub al-
nazar, i.e. the obligation to use one’s speculative reasoning to attain ontological 
truths, essential for a mature attitude to faith in the One God.
30
  Such faith, in so 
far as it is conscious and consistent, cannot dispense with a deep understanding 
(or abundantly clear contemplation) of the Divine unity, the universal scope and 
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distinctness of which are provided by the vigour and coherence of speculative 
thinking
31
 of the infinity of being, free from its dichotomy into opposing 
extremes of being and non-being.  “It is speculative reasoning (al-nazar)”, R.C. 
Martin points out, “which leads to knowledge of God, because He is not known 
by the way of necessity (daruratan) nor by the senses (bi l-mushahada).  Thus 
He must be known by reflection and speculation.”32 
The Mu’tazilah key concepts 
 
     The views of Mu’tazilah were being formed and articulated in the course of 
theological debates they found themselves directly involved in from the very 
outset of their movement.  One of the central issues of those ongoing debates 
was that of predestination and free will
33
, which also entailed such closely 
related issues as whether evil is created by God and whether the attributes of 
God given in Qur’an are to be interpreted literally or allegorically. 
       The Mu’tazilites in particular insisted that the doctrine of the freedom of 
human will may well be referred to the Prophet Muhammad himself, since they 
upheld to the belief that man is to be judged by his deeds.  Their opponents (the 
school called jabaria) in turn insisted on the entire predestination as a contrary 
vision of the relationship between human beings and God, and held their 
fatalistic views by arguing that man is not responsible for his actions, for they 
ultimately proceed from God.  Surprisingly enough, these opposite views and 
the problematic dilemma they posed may have derived from one and the same 
source, namely, the Qur’an itself: “That is, the Qur’an refers to this issue in a 
manner which stimulates thought on the subject.  Because some verses clearly 
indicate that man is free, not coerced in any of his acts.  On the other hand, there 
are verses which, with equal clarity, indicate that all things depend on the 
Divine Will.”34 
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     The content of these debates was later summed up by Allaf (748-840)
35
 in a 
number of key notions, including justice, unity, promise, threat, and the middle 
position, which he termed as the “Five Principles” of the Mu’tazilah.36  These 
principles, giving an outline of the whole scope of the Mu’tazilah teaching, are 
usually listed as follows: 
1) Divine Unity (al-Tawhid); 
2) Divine Justice (al-Adil); 
3) The Promise and Warning (al-Wa’d wa al-Wa’id); 
4) The Intermediate Position (al-Manzilah Bauna al-Manzilatayn); 
5) Advocating the Good and Forbidding the Evil (al-amr bil ma’ruf wa al-
nahy’an al munkar).37 
     The first, and therefore the most fundamental, of these principles points to 
the very heart of the Mu’tazilites’ belief, which is, as obvious for Muslims, all 
about their strong conviction of the absolute unity of God.  What is however 
distinctive of this central Mu’tazilites’ belief is the emphasis they make in their 
particular vision of the Divine Unity.  As a matter of fact, it is understood by 
them not as much as God’s uniqueness or singularity (when in contrast to 
polytheistic beliefs, out of many gods only one is chosen for the true one, while 
others are rejected as being false), but as His oneness.  In other words, 
according to the Mu’tazilah principle of the Divine Unity, God is believed to be 
one not because He is assumed to be a solitary being, but because He is 
understood to be all-embracing absolute being, apart from Whom nothing else 
at all can be permitted to exist outside and alongside Him, be it considered as 
proceeded out of Him or eternally co-existing with Him. 
     This specific Mu’tazilah vision of the Divine Unity, which apparently sought 
to bridge the gap between God and the creature and was therefore conducive to 
having cardinally reconsidered the relationship between the two, did challenge 
popular sentiments about God and His creation, for which it seemed quite 
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normal to set them apart and thus, by setting them over against each other, to 
keep believing in the supreme, utterly matchless and immutable God 
Almighty.
38
   So the Mu’tazilah thinkers were fortunate enough that the 
complexity of the problem of unity required of them  a great deal of profundity 
and consistency of reflection and made them strictly follow the lines of the 
philosophical discourse.  This, at least for the time being, safeguarded them 
from a breakout of popular discontent and allowed to develop their views within 
the framework of Islamic theology until the implications of their beliefs
39
 
became clear, both to the rulers and public.
40
   
     The way the Mu’tazilites approached the issue of Divine Unity took the 
shape of speculative investigations of the nature into the divine attributes, the 
existence of which was found to be logically illegitimate on account of their 
distinction from the Divine essence and thus was subsequently denied.  Thus, 
Allaf, an outstanding dialectician who is said to have effectively used dialectical 
arguments while converting people to Islam from the grip of old religions
41
, 
sought to overcome any dualism in the views of divinity, and with regard to this 
argued that the divine qualities “are none other than the divine essence and 
cannot be separated from it”42.  In particular, while tackling the pre-Islamic 
eastern beliefs, according to which Light and Darkness are “the ultimate 
principles of the universe”, Allaf refuted any attempts to undermine in theory 
the totality of the Divine Unity by dividing the ultimate reality in two and 
inaugurating the opposite principles as mutually dependent ontological entities 
to be imposed upon what in reality is whole and indivisible.  A non-dialectical 
vision of the opposites set over against each other, he believes, is utterly 
incompatible with the truth of the Unity of divinity. 
     The One God, according to Allaf, may only be known (when dialectically 
approached) as the “Necessary Existent”, i.e. the Self-determined Being that is 
caused to being by nothing else, apart from itself, and therefore is opposed by 
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nothing or, in other words, has no competing rivals
43
.  Accordingly, He is also 
the One Who admits of no dichotomy within Himself, which might be 
conceived as a discrepancy between His will and acts
44
, or as qualities found 
separated from His essence, when associated with its manifestations among 
finite things.   
     As a result, in his vision of the Divine unity Allaf “accepts such attributes as 
are one with the essence of God, or one may say, accepts such an essence as is 
identified with the attributes”45.  The two are not separated but regarded as one.  
So that, as Mir Valiuddin argues, when God is said to be the knower, it does not 
mean that knowledge is found in the essence of God, but that knowledge is His 
essence.  Likewise power and life, when applied as attributes to powerful and 
living God, should be understood as His very essence.  In the same way, al-
Shahrastani interpreted the identity of divine essence and attributes in terms of 
the perfect adequacy of the latter to the former, and went even further to having 
attributes denied altogether.  For when, according to him, God’s knowledge is 
understood to be His very essence, it can in fact signify only one thing – 
namely, that God knows with His essence and not with His knowledge, i.e. 
through His essence only and not through knowledge, that might be understood 
as something accidental or ascribed from without. 
     It is therefore this denial of attributes considered as accidental qualities that 
allows us to conclude that the existence of what Allaf called “the Necessary 
Existent” must be understood as none other but its very essence.  Accordingly, 
knowledge and any other attributes whatsoever should properly be understood 
not as those just applicable to God’s being (as if the properties either accidental 
to or even inherent in it), but as precisely the way God actually is while making 
His innermost essence adequately manifest.  And this lack of discrepancy 
between essence and existence, as ascertained by the Mu’tazilites, is where they 
believed the real ground for the true unity is.
46
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     Among the nearest implications of this Mu’tazilites’ understanding of one of 
the central tenets of their belief there can easily be seen such doctrines as those 
of advocating the Good and the so-called first obligation, both of which were 
already mentioned as a hallmark of the Mu’tazilah.  That explains a great deal 
concerning the extraordinariness and prominence of their teaching. 
     In the light of their vision of the Divine Unity, according to which nothing 
whatsoever can be understood to subsist outside the Divine being (i.e. in the 
way contrary to that of the Divine subsistence), it seemed to be clear to the 
Mu’tazilites, and they tried to convince others of this47, that in order to truly 
serve God so as to really please Him, human beings are to strive for being at 
one with Him, and for this are obliged to do actually nothing else but to make 
sure that – in consonance with the way the Divine reality is – the innermost 
essence of their nature comes to be adequately manifest.  This is what allows all 
human beings to live in reality as it truly is, where everything goes on while 
remaining one with its proper nature originating from the sole source of all 
beings, and thus to lead the true life of those who belong to God’s creation.  
This is consequently what was exactly expected by the Mutazilah of human 
beings when serving God, in so far as they are supposed to be faithful indeed 
and remain consistent in their faith in the One God.  For in Him Who is the One 
there is no discrepancy between essence and existence, i.e. the hidden and the 
manifest.  Furthermore, along with Him, as mentioned above with respect to the 
Mu’tazilites’ view of God’s Oneness, nothing contrary to His nature can ever 
subsist, nor can it proceed out of Him.   
     From this it is not hard to see how crucial was the denial of subsistence 
outside God for the conclusions the Mu’tazilites drew from it.  First, it allowed 
them to establish the futility of any dualistic attempts to challenge the unity of 
God’s self-determined being by introducing illegitimately a variety of auxiliary 
or complementary principles, be they simply intermediary agents or adversary 
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rivals.  Above all, however, this denial was true about the entire creation, with 
no exception for human beings: humans do not subsist outside God’s being 
unless the senses, deceiving and misleading the mind, succeed in convincing 
them of the contrary.  The mind purified, i.e. liberated from the dictates of 
senses, is where human beings and God meet.  For it is not senses but the mind, 
when recovered from its latent and suppressed state, that allows all humans to 
embrace the infinity of being and thus to become fit for receiving the truth of 
God’s Unity. 
     Moreover, it is exactly a proper attitude to the mind inherent in human 
beings that, unlike the senses that see God nowhere, allows them to occupy the 
right place within the reality of God’s creation, and not outside it, so as to 
conform to the truth of God’s being countered by nothing.48  In fact, as the 
essence of their nature that makes all humans distinct among the whole creature, 
the intellectual power cannot be understood otherwise than being a God-given 
gift, that is, the essence originating from the source of all essences.  Therefore, 
to be part of God’s creation, this essence must be adequately manifest, as the 
very order of creation would require it
49
.
 
 Otherwise, as long as the essence 
remains just a potential hidden in the secret recesses of human nature, it will be 
merely neglected and nipped in the bud.  The Mu’tazilites’ doctrine of the first 
obligation (wujub al-nazar), derived from their understanding of the Divine 
Unity, aims to remind human beings about their duty to really follow the truth 
of faith accepted, and for this purpose to get the hidden potential of their nature 
fully realised.  The “full possession of their mental faculties” crowned by 
speculative reason (al-nazar), capable, as said before, of attaining ontological 
truths (i.e. those of absolute being and unity communicated by the sacred 
scripture) is consequently where the Mu’tazilah saw the way for all humans to 
conform to the Divine subsistence.  The actual existence of human beings must 
be fully adequate to the essence inherent in them and hidden deep inside their 
58 
 
nature.  Their existence, in other words, must be fully determined from within, 
by their essence.  This is the way things go in the reality of the Divine Unity.  
All efforts human beings make to let the essence of their nature manifest itself is 
actually what enables them to live righteously and, hence, to please God 
indeed.
50
                                                              
     From all this it is also clear how the doctrines of the Divine unity and first 
obligation come to be bound up with another aspect crucial for the Mu’tazilites’ 
teaching and counted among its fundamental Five Principles, namely, the 
doctrine of advocating the Good.  As the absolute Good and Justice, God cannot 
be, according to Mu’tazilah, the author of evil; evil is of human origin.  It is 
precisely the deviation from the essence of their nature that makes human 
beings go astray, that is, contrary to the way things go in the God-centred 
reality.  This deviation, when it is falsely assumed that existence can dispense 
with essence, becomes therefore the cause of all wrongdoings and, hence, of the 
existence of evil in the world.  All this gives the Mu’tazilites reason to maintain 
– as mentioned at the beginning of this brief survey – that all evil existing in the 
world is produced by human deeds when they, as the acts of “unbelief or 
transgression”, break God’s will.  What else becomes furthermore clear in the 
light of the Mu’tazilites’ understanding of humans’ first obligation to the One 
God is that evil as such proves in fact to be rooted in a wrong assumption that 
humans make about a possibility of living in defiance of their essential nature.  
That is the assumption about a possibility to live while neglecting the essence 
that lies at the very heart of their nature, and remains hidden there unless 
manifest in the mind rigorously applied, as said above, to attaining the 
ontological truths communicated through the sacred scripture. 
     Advocating thus the absoluteness of Goodness of Divinity, some 
Mu’tazilites, like al-Nazzam (d. 845)51, found this principle so cardinal for their 
beliefs that resolutely went that far as to assert that God has no power over evil.  
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In particular, he said that “when evil or sin is the attribute or essence of a thing, 
then the possibility of occurrence of evil or the power to create it will itself be 
evil.  Therefore, it cannot be attributed to God Who is the doer of justice and 
good.”  Moreover, he continues to argue, “if God has power over evil, it will 
necessary follow that He is ignorant and indigent.  But this is impossible…”52  
When closely examined, the argument that brings al-Nazzam to this conclusion 
develops as follows: “If God has power over evil, then the occurrence of evil is 
possible… Now, God might or might not have had knowledge of the evil which 
occurred.    If we say that He did not have the knowledge of it, it would 
necessarily follow that He was ignorant; and if we say that He did have it, it 
would necessarily follow that He was in need of this evil; for had He not been in 
need of it, He would not have created it.  … It is definitely true that God is all-
wise; so when any evil is caused by Him, it necessarily follows that He needed 
it, otherwise He would have never produced it”.  The conclusion consequently 
is that “since it is impossible to think that God needs evil, it is impossible to 
think that He creates it.”53  
     Thus, though the Five Principles of their teaching, and especially through al-
Nazzam’s radical denial of God’s power over evil, the Mu’tazilites expressed in 
a thoroughgoing manner their firm belief in the Divine Unity.  According to this 
belief, the absolute, self-sufficient, being of God does not admit of the existence 
of anything else apart from Him Who is the One, and speculative thinking (al-
nazar) is the only means (or gateway) through which it is given to human beings 
to know this truth.    
                               The predestination controversy 
      Al-Nazzam’s argument, as seen above, brings us close to understanding how 
Eriugena might have found himself involved in the predestination controversy 
that broke out some time later amongst the Carolingians.  This controversy 
sheds light upon the unique (in terms of the Carolingian scholarship) approach 
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of Eriugena to the complex of problems raised by the debates.  “It is from the 
surviving texts of the predestination debate”, writes Dermot Moran, “that we 
gain the most testimonia concerning Eriugena, and the overall picture emerges 
of a rationalist scholar, well equipped in the liberal arts and also in Scripture, 
willing to follow his own mind (italic is mine – S.S.) on the great theological 
problems of the day”54  
     Eriugena’s treatise De divina praedestinatione55 (followed by his  
contemporaries’ criticism) is his first appearance on the historical stage from 
nowhere: “The predestination controversy marks the first written evidence we 
have of Eriugena’s life and activity”56.  Showing in terms of argumentation a 
sort of theoretical supremacy over the contemporaries, this treatise also provides 
a clue to a better understanding of Eriugena’s background. 
     Though the circumstances that encouraged the predestination debates 
breakout, remain unclear
57
, it is known for certain that it was monk called 
Gottschalk who triggered the controversy.  A troublemaker in the eyes of many, 
Gottschalk was dedicated to studies of Augustine (the indisputable authority for 
the Carolingians), and brought to the fore what he thought to be found in De 
civitate dei as Augustine’s doctrine of double predestination, the preliminary 
principles of which were assumed to have first been formulated in the course of 
dispute with the Donatists and Pelagius in De libero arbitrio (AD 395).  The 
polemical origin of Augustine’s doctrine retained in itself many traces of 
ambiguity
58
, however, which could only stimulate further strife, when its key 
notions were uncritically used in the context of the ninth-century theological 
debates
59
.  As an expert in theology and the liberal arts, Eriugena was requested 
to oppose Gottschalk (and others, like Prudentius, Lupus, Florus, and 
Ratramnus, who supported him and maintained that Augustine did actually 
teach a double predestination) and to write a work clarifying the problem
60
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     According to Devisse, Eriugena “had no impact at all on his contemporaries 
because his arguments were so removed from them as to be 
incomprehensible”61.  As a result, Hincmar, who employed Eriugena for the 
task of refuting the opponents, “was unhappy with this intervention on his 
behalf and was quick to disown it.  Others – Prudentius and Florus – attacked 
Eriugena severely”62.  This criticism, however, could hardly be found to be 
constructive, since it did not go any further than conceited accusations of 
Eriugena of being vaniloquus et garrulous.  All this means that both the 
premises and argumentation presented by Eriugena in the treatise were 
completely unfamiliar and even alien to the Carolingians, who saw in his work 
nothing more than just pultes Scottorum (Jerome’s phrase used against 
Pelagius)
63
, admitting thereby in fact their failure to understand it.   
    Why however were the views conveyed in Eriugena’s treatise contrary to 
what was expected of him, on the one hand, and so unusual that they caused a 
great deal of fury among his opponents, on the other?  Among the “remarkable 
and unusual features in Eriugena’s tract” Moran identifies the following three: 
“First of all, his argument is based on careful metaphysical and dialectical 
reasoning about the nature of God, good and evil.  Second, he argues that the 
superiority of his own position is based on his more thorough understanding of 
the liberal arts, which gives him a better basis for the correct interpretation of 
the authorities.  Third, Eriugena’s position offers an assessment of the human 
place in the universe, seeing this world as an opportunity given to human nature 
to perfect itself.”64  As a result, by contrast to the position of those upholding a 
double predestination theory, Eriugena’s vision turns out to be , as Moran puts 
it, “extremely optimistic: Salvation is available to all.  Even if our flawed moral 
judgment fails us, grace is available.  Furthermore, Eriugena’s God does not 
merely not know evil, He did not create hell.  Human sinfulness is responsible 
for creating its own hell”65.  
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     This belief in God’s ‘lack of knowledge’ concerning evil is quite remarkable 
for Eriugena’s standpoint.  This is likely one of the major things which made 
the Carolingians, both sponsors and opponents, especially furious with 
Eriugena.  It is however this belief, utterly alien to the Carolingian theology, 
that reveals a close affinity between Eriugena’s convictions and those of 
Mu’tazilah, and al-Nazzam’s in particular. 
     While denying Gottschalk’s views on double predestination (which he 
borrows, to the amazement of many leaders of the Frankish church, from 
Augustine himself), Eriugena is aware of the novelty of his own approach and 
“apologises in advance to those who think he is being heretical by denying 
God’s knowledge in this area”66.  He does not seem to care much about a 
possible shock that his views might cause.  To him, it is much more important 
“to demonstrate, using his own citations from Augustine, that there is no 
predestination towards evil, because in the strictest sense God could not be said 
to know evil at all”67. 
     The roots of the predestination controversy are believed to go back to De 
libero arbitrio, where Augustine attacked Pelagius, who thought that human 
free will was directly involved in salvation
68
.  By contrast to Pelagius’s views, 
Augustine is said to have tended “to overemphasise the total human dependence 
on God’s grace, thus supporting the view that we are predestined by God and 
are not free to act otherwise”69.  And though this was the prevalent tendency in 
Augustine’s views on predestination (that might be not unfairly explained by 
the extremities of any polemics), in fact they were not as simple as that.  As 
Moran admits, in the same De libero arbitrio (II. XX. 54), “Augustine had 
argued that human will can choose either higher or lower things.  Owing, 
however, to the weakness of fallen nature, it generally tends towards lower 
things, that is, towards the pleasures of the body rather than the goods of the 
soul”70.  Moreover, it was not easy either for Augustine to decide whether the 
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inclination to the lower was natural (and therefore inevitable) or voluntary.  
Despite these uncertainties of his beliefs, however, Augustine gradually “moved 
to the more extreme position that human beings were totally dependent on 
divine grace for every action and decision.  In this sense, some are predestined 
by God’s will to be saved, other are predestined to be damned.  The individual 
cannot save himself, since his nature is essentially flawed…”71.  
     This is exactly what Gottschalk articulates in his writings (later, in 849, 
burned on condemnation by the synod of Quierzy) and presents as his 
explication of Augustine.  In particular, he argues that “predestination is in fact 
twofold” – that is, ad vitam and ad mortem, to beatitude in heaven or damnation 
in hell, “and there is nothing they can do to change this”72.  The impact of this 
twofold predestination on humanity – and here Gottschalk follows what he 
explicates from De civitate Dei, where the evolution of Augustine’s views on 
the matter reached its climax – is that it comes to be divided “into two groups, 
civitates: the elect, led by Christ, and the damned, led by the Devil”73. 
     Eriugena, the dialectician and theologian of God’s Oneness, could, clearly, 
by no means agree with a theory challenging the truth of the divine unity.  All 
the more he was requested by bishops Hincmar and Pardulus (the party that the 
king himself sided with) “to oppose Gottschalk”, whose influence grew so fast 
among the church leaders that many of them came to support his views.  Thus, 
for example, bishop Prudentius argued in his Epistola ad Hincmarum et 
Pardulum (PL CXV. 971-1010) that Augustine “did actually teach a double 
predestination”74.  So Eriugena came to fore, as bishop Pardulus of Laon 
explains in his letter to the church at Lyon, “to write a work clarifying the 
problem”75.  
     Vehemently rejecting the doctrine of double predestination put forward by 
Gottschalk in his explication of Augustine’s views, Eriugena finds it to be a 
mere misunderstanding of what is in fact there in Augustine and explains 
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Gottschalk’s error by his “lack of education in the liberal arts”76.  An apparent 
subtlety of the distinction that Augustine draws between the two kinds of 
freedom available to human beings – that is, libertas (freedom proper) and 
liberum arbitrium (freedom of choice) – eludes Gottschalk77, which inevitably 
results in making him fall into delusion and offer a theory that in effect was 
largely based on an erroneous interpretation of Augustine’s actual views, 
sometimes ambiguous and problematic.  That is why to pursue the task of 
refutation of what had in fact become the upshot of misreading the authority, 
Eriugena tries – along with the articulation of his coherent vision of the Divine 
Unity – to clarify the profundity and complexity of Augustine’s thought of the 
matter.  This is the approach which, he believes, enables him to arrive at a clear 
conclusion – put in the Epilogue to the treatise and revealing therefore the 
genuine objective of the whole undertaking – that there is “no double 
destination or two destinations or one divided into two parts…”78.  
     The premise Eriugena chooses to proceed from in his argument against 
Gottschalk’s theory of double predestination is the statement of God’s Unity, 
pivotal for his understanding of God’s being: God is una substantia79.  This is 
actually the basic vision, the development of which in the course of his 
argument does allow Eriugena not only to reject as illegitimate an appeal to 
division, be it applied to an understanding of God’s being or His selective 
attitude to the creature.  It also allows him to articulate his optimistic 
understanding of salvation as being available to all humans on account of their 
freedom, thoroughly concurrent with that of the absolute self-determined being. 
     The freedom of the absolute being of una substantia that depends upon 
nothing apart from itself (since nothing is there beyond it) is where love alone, 
not coercion affecting it from without, reigns through and through, being in fact 
a specific type of causality, universal to the entire reality of creation and 
operating as the power of interaction and interconnection, making everything 
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bound together from within.  To be saved, therefore, i.e. to live in harmony and 
union with Him Who is absolute freedom and all-embracing love, one is to be 
free – that is, liberated from captivity to the world of appearance, which is 
thought to be sustained by forces external to it.  Indeed, nothing whatsoever can 
be free when governed from without;  likewise, understood as sustained by 
external forces, the realm of appearance has nothing to do with the reality of 
creation as it truly is while being at one with Him Who is the One.  As a wrong 
vision of the surrounding reality, the world of appearance is imposed upon the 
creation by the corrupt mind like a veil that covers up its true face.  Spiritual 
liberty thus is where and how God exercises his power over the whole creation 
and lets all humans become awakened from illusions of the mind misled by 
exterior senses.  This is consequently where and how all human beings become 
able to return to the reality where they originally belonged and where life ever-
lasting is.  This is finally the reality that lies just at hand, but is hidden until 
those misguided by the dictates of senses (i.e. remaining in bondage to sin) turn 
their back on it and lead a life of the flawed nature, finding themselves confined 
among the things divided and the opposites set apart. 
     As mentioned before, Eriugena was well aware of the novelty of his 
approach to the predestination issue, so that he even found it reasonable to 
apologise in advance to those Carolingians who might suspect him of heresy.  
What that novelty was about may easily be understood from what has just been 
said above with regard to the premise of his argument, and therefore not 
unfairly be defined as the ontological approach.  In consonance with this, while 
commenting on 390c and 394c of Eriugena’s treatise On Divine Predestination, 
Dermot Moran admits that since the language we employ to speak of God 
cannot be used literally “because He is incorporeal and corporeal signs cannot 
adequately express His nature”, the latter can be “best referred to by the single 
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word esse”, which allows us to realise that God “is existence”, whereas “evil, by 
contrast, does not exist”80. 
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CHAPTER II 
 
Parmenides’ ontology: The cradle of dialectic 
 
The ontological approach 
 
     The direct engagement with ontology in the course of debates over the divine 
matters, especially those going so far as the denial of God’s knowledge of evil 
and even its existence in His presence, seemed to be really a new development 
in the Carolingian West.  But this was not the case in the culturally and 
doctrinally more advanced East, both Christian and Muslim, where 
Cappadocians and Mu’tazilites have equally made considerable progress on the 
way to a deeper and more consistent understanding of God’s Oneness.  An 
ontological approach to God’s nature, so much a characteristic of both schools 
of religious thought, is consequently where the Eastern influence on Eriugena’s 
discourse comes to light.  As a matter of fact, this influence can easily be traced 
back not only to his immediate contemporaries within the Mu’tazilah 
movement, particularly to Allaf and al-Nazzam (whose prime ideas are 
explicitly present in Eriugena’s view on predestination), but also to the 
Christian tradition as it must have been found at work in the Middle East of his 
time.  Two Gregories, Nazianzenes and Nyssenes, appear to be those key figures 
through whom the Cappadocian legacy had reached Eriugena, making an 
immense impact on the principles of his speculative theology
1
. 
     Gregory Nazianzus (the Theologian) was one of the Christian theologians of 
the East who first inaugurated the ontological approach as the most appropriate 
to a coherent treatment of God’s nature.  In his later works of 380-383 (Oratio 
30, 38, and 45) he holds God to comprise “the whole being,” because He is 
Himself being of the whole
2ю   In Oratio 30 (18: 14-18), he says in particular: 
“We are seeking the nature to which being as it is on its own pertains and has 
nothing to do with anything else; this being as a whole is what indeed is specific 
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to God, and it is neither confined nor disrupted by anything else, neither prior to 
Him nor after, for it neither was nor will be”3.  In The Word on Epiphany 
(Oratio 31. 23:10-11), Gregory further expounds the meaning of being the 
whole: “Always God was and is and will be or, better to say, has always been.  
For “was” and “will be” are segments of our time and transient nature, but 
Being always is.  And this is how He calls Himself while talking to Moses on 
the mount, for He comprises in Himself the whole of being, which neither 
began nor will end up, like a limitless and unconfined sea of being that exceeds 
any notion of time and nature, but is slightly outlined by mind alone – though 
quite uncertainly and insufficiently – not from what He is in Himself but what is 
there around Him, approaching the truth by shedding representations alien to 
it”4. 
     Thus, according to Gregory, God’s nature may not improperly be 
approached from the perspective of being as a whole (ὅλον τὸ εἶναιwhich also 
means that all being may only be understood as subsisting in God (ἐν 
αὐτῷFor Christian theology this is quite a thoroughgoing vision of God’s 
being which promotes the truth that there is no ontological abyss separating God 
from His creation.  In other words, this is the vision that allows us in fact to heal 
the illicit (merely imaginative) chasm between the two and to understand the 
reality of creation as included (though not in the form of its immediate 
appearance to senses) in Him Who is the universal Principle of all.  And this is 
very much so, and cannot be otherwise, because nothing particular can ever 
abandon the universal nor subsist outside it.   What is however even more 
extraordinary about this overtly universalist approach is that it comes down not 
only to the Cappadocians, the first systematisers of Christian orthodoxy in 
whose writings the very foundations of Christian theology were being laid 
down, but also to St. Paul’s legacy, where a coherent explication of Christ’s 
unique teaching first came to light. 
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     Indeed, the basic statement of Gregory’s universalist approach, “All things 
are possessed by God inside Himself”5 does comply with those of the Pauline 
theology, to which universalism and the total inclusiveness of God’s being are 
out of the question.  As Paul puts it in particular, God “is not far from each one 
of us.  For “In him we live and move and have our being”…” (Acts 17, 27-28).  
It is hard to imagine therefore that Gregory could ignore Paul as the source of 
his thought and inspiration – that very Paul, for whom “there is no God but one” 
(I Cor. 8, 4).  In his Word on the Holy Light (Oratio 39, 12: 2-3), the Theologian 
quotes one of the key passages from Paul’s writings, claiming thereby his direct 
indebtedness to the tenets articulated by the Apostle: “…for us there is one God, 
the Father, from whom are all things and for whom we exist, and one Lord, 
Jesus Christ, through whom are all things and through whom we exist” (I Cor. 
8, 6).   
     It is undoubtedly the Pauline theology therefore from which Gregory 
deduces the fundamental principle of a system of theology to be raised up – that 
is, the ontological approach to God, Whose absolute nature is only susceptible 
of knowledge when consistently conceived in terms of all-embracing being that 
ever is from itself and through itself and for itself.  “For from him and through 
him and to him are all things,” says Paul (Rom. 11, 36), whom Eriugena, a 
spiritual heir to the Eastern theological tradition, will later persistently call the 
Apostle.  Thus he certainly recognised the centrality of the figure of Paul to 
Christian thought and paid a tribute to the bundle of ideas pivotal to the Pauline 
theology.  Among those prime things, taken by Eriugena on board his 
speculative theology, there no doubt was a far reaching universalist insight into 
being that unceasingly is from itself and by itself and through itself and for 
itself, as well as an anthropological optimism following from this insight.  On 
account of the existence of all things inside the universal being, this optimistic 
view allowed to actually claim the humanity’s kinship to God as that of His 
70 
 
offspring (Acts 17, 28-29).  To Eriugena, this was the theology that opened to 
human beings a prospect of theosis and being at one with God the Father 
through the cardinal change of the way of perception of reality they live in.  “Do 
not be conformed to this world,” says the Apostle, “but be transformed by the 
renewing of your minds, so that you may discern what is the will of God – what 
is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom. 12,2). 
     Along with this, the compliance of the ontological approach to God with the 
biblical tradition goes even much deeper and is perfectly evident in Gregory’s 
interpretation of the Tetragrammaton.  Like many other Byzantine theologians, 
the Cappadocian father did not know Hebrew, and for this reason in his 
scriptural studies  referred to the Septuagint, where God’s name is conveyed at 
Ex. 3,14 as ὁ ὤν, which he understood as “He Who was and is and will be or, 
better to say, has always been”6.   
Being and time 
     Due to this interpretation of the Tetragrammaton, the ontological approach 
renders even more concrete by acquiring a new dimension that the senses (by 
focusing on things that come and go) perceive as temporality, but reason – 
while enjoying the holistic view of being that expands to the utmost of its 
capacity – understands as eternity which never ceases to be.  This furthermore 
means that in its fundamental sense the ontological approach to divine matters 
would hardly be conceivable at all when dispensing with the idea of 
interconnectedness of being and time.  It is the understanding which has 
survived throughout the intellectual history from Plato and Greek Fathers until 
the present day as something cardinally intrinsic to any profound ontology, 
coming up anew in the focus of Heidegger’s philosophy known as one of the 
most recent ontologies of the kind “possible only as phenomenology”.7   
Similarly to the Cappadocian view of the all-embracing being outside which 
there is nothing, Heidegger’s ontology sets up, though within the limits of 
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human reality, the perspective of being that can only be seen from within and 
therefore understood as self-assertion in the world or, better to say, self-
disclosure, termed as Dasein
8
.  Understood like this, Dasein appears to 
Heidegger as a kind of transition from the state of concealment to that of 
unconcealment.  This is an understanding which, in a broader view transcending 
the constraints of the anthropocentric world, can also quite perfectly match the 
truth that in the reality of creation – when seen from the midst of its wholeness 
– there should be no transition from non-being to being.  And this is rightly so, 
in so far as the creation is consistently understood to be the reality of God’s self-
disclosure, and not of making out of an uncertain nihil, as if subsisting 
alongside God as something substantially different and even alien to Him.  In 
other words, creation is the reality where everything comes into being ex Deo, 
that is, from Him Who ever and everywhere is, so that nothing else is there 
apart from Him
9
.  
       Thus in their sharing of both the same pattern of self-disclosure and the 
inner perspective of their being self-determined, Dasein and Creation agree 
however mutually they differ by their scale: whereas the latter conforms to the 
infinity of God’s being, the former is correlated with the finitude of human 
existence.  Due to this considerable distinction, they acquire, respectively to 
each, essentially different dimensions of their length – that is, eternity and 
temporality.  It is consequently here, in the difference between these two 
dimensions of reality, that the fundamental difference between humanity and 
divinity is convincingly evident.  If however a belief in One, ubiquitous and 
indivisible, God is true so as to constitute the foundations of the civilized world, 
it would be not unfair to call into question the chasm between humanity and 
divinity.  A number of challenging questions, addressing the principle 
impossibility of finding anything else subsisting on its own outside One God, 
would be quite inevitable then: How do these extremes of endlessness and 
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termination, indivisibility and fragmentation, continuity and disruption, unity 
and disparity, rest and motion occur?   Are they mutually complementary or 
exclusive?  Can they be reconciled or there is nothing in common between 
them? 
     Following the logic of Sein und Zeit, one may rightly conclude that its 
author’s answer to the questions like these would be rather positive than 
negative.  To overcome the chasm in question (which ultimately is the one 
between temporality and eternity), human being should, as follows from what 
Heidegger suggests, be brought to conformity with the order of creation, where 
Logos precedes anything whatsoever coming into being; for it is through Him 
that all things, according to the Scripture, are brought into existence from God.  
“He was”, the Scripture says, “in the beginning with God.  All things came into 
being through him, and without him not one thing came into being” (Jn. 1, 2-3).  
Not unfairly should the creation be understood therefore as both the 
embodiment and revelation of Him Who was in the Beginning and will be in the 
End, because He always is with Him Who ever is, remaining inseparably the 
Beginning and the Middle and the End that, as the wholeness subsisting 
immutably in and for itself, is neither transcended nor abandoned by anything 
whatsoever.  For again, as the Scripture puts it, the light – God’s first utterance 
in the Genesis account (Gen. 1,3), and therefore the very foundational 
manifestation of Logos, giving, so to speak, shape to the absolute Being that 
ever is in and for itself – “shines in the darkness, and the darkness did not 
overcome it” (Jn. 1,5).  The entire creation thus proves simultaneously to be the 
embodiment and manifestation of Logos, clearly seen in the light of the unity of 
Being, where light is not mingled with darkness.  So that the movements of 
embodiment and revelation may not improperly be described in Heidegger’s 
terms as those of concealment and unconcealment, bringing thus together again 
the reality of creation and that of Dasein, where self-disclosure equally takes 
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place, filling up the realm of primary light with life and meaning.  “What has 
come into being in him” (Logos), says the Scripture, “was life, and the life was 
the light of all people” (Jn. 1, 3-4).  
     In this way, Heidegger, who in his discourse seems to deliberately avoid any 
influence of dogmatic thinking overloaded with a pre-given content of 
systematic theology, brings the readers of Sein und Zeit close to a vision that it 
is self-disclosure of Logos where the Logocentric reality of creation and Dasein, 
the area of human existence, can tally with one another.  Being in fact the 
element of language where Logos is found at work while arising from the secret 
recesses of human nature, Dasein actually proves to reproduce the same self-
disclosure pattern of creation.  In accordance with this concealment-
unconcealment pattern, Logos, inherent in human being as the innermost word, 
passes the same way from its embodiment (concealment) to its full and adequate 
manifestation (unconcealment), when nothing hidden remains in the light of the 
Logos revealed, so that even “the things in themselves” break open, shining 
with their meaning
10
.   Dasein is, as it were, a closed area, where no knowledge 
from without is let in.  This is where the inner perspective of being develops, 
and the only kind of knowledge available here is that of seeing from within.  
Logos, in the words of Heidegger, is “a specific mode of letting something be 
seen”11. Accordingly, the knowledge appropriate to this mode of vision from 
within but cardinally different from the conventional type of knowledge, when 
it is believed to be delivered by senses from without, is interpretation
12
.  As a 
matter of fact, it is by interpretation, not by empirical experience, that the Logos 
concealed in the innermost depths of Being is brought to light so as to be clearly 
seen in the meaning of beings.   
     Thus, as a mode of being perfectly conformed to the pattern of self-
disclosure (that may only be properly understood, when consistently conceived, 
as ultimately belonging to the substantial reality of creation), Dasein proves to 
74 
 
transcend the empirical existence as such, which human beings find themselves 
immediately enveloped in while trusting their sensual perceptions as a source of 
reliable knowledge.  Moreover, it actually proves to be opposed to empirical 
existence, not as to something substantially existing, but as to being in fact a 
product of vision.  As the world is packed with finite things, the empirical 
existence does not take its origin from the infinite Being of beings.
13
  Despite 
any attempts to take it for the reality of creation (which is normally the case 
with those uncritical beliefs that tend to separate God from His creation by 
placing the ontological abyss between them), the world of finitude turns out to 
be simply produced by a certain mode of vision – namely, the vision from 
without, to which things only appear to come into being from nothing and pass 
away into nothing again.  A great deal of imagination, therefore, comes to be 
involved in building up such a world: in order to be completed, it needs, 
paradoxically enough, to be divided by imagination in two – be it 
counterbalanced by ‘the next-worldly’ realm or that of ‘nothing’.  In this way, 
the existence of this world immediately given to the senses is self-assuredly 
found to look justified and rooted in some unknown principles, merely hidden 
beyond the boundaries of appearance. 
     Hence, the inner perspective of Dasein is where the human mind is allowed 
to break through the illusory construct of the world and to see it anew – namely, 
as the totality of the indivisible Being that comprises all particular beings.  This 
is the Being seen in the light of Logos that is said, as mentioned above, to be a 
specific mode of letting something be truly seen.  In the perspective of Logos 
arising from the depths of Being, the reality does come to be seen, in 
Heidegger’s words, as “the pure transcendence”14.  No externals can exist in it 
on their own, i.e. apart from their connection with the internal, or in other 
words, from what is there inside themselves.  The truth of the substantial being 
revealed in the Tetragrammaton would simply not allow that: the innermost 
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essence and its manifest existence, as follows from Ex. 3, 14, are one and can 
by no means be separated.  This is the very foundation of the true infinity of 
God’s being, outside which nothing else can subsist. 
     This fundamental unity is consequently where the meaning of all existence is 
brought to light: in the absolute being there is no discrepancy between the inner 
and its adequate manifestation, so that the existence itself and the meaning of 
what it exists for are in it inseparably one.  No particulars of the empirical world 
are therefore excluded from the absolute reality of “pure transcendence” that 
substantially is and has nothing to do with the abstract identity or sterile 
indifference; they simply shed their hard shells of the sensibles, becoming 
thereby, so to speak, transparent to the light of Logos and a new type of 
knowledge appropriate to it.  That is why Logos is rightly understood by the 
phenomenological ontology (as it is proposed by Heidegger) to penetrate as 
deep as “the things in themselves”15: interpretation, as suggested above, proves 
to be that type of knowledge which allows human mind to see things really 
anew – that is, from the perspective of their meaning or, better to say, the 
meaning of their existence. 
     This is the knowledge that is further defined by Heidegger’s ontology as the 
transcendental one, which is meant to replace the conventional understanding 
of knowledge as such, referring to the external experience as the source of its 
origin.  Indeed, while pivoting about what is not unreasonably called veritas 
transcendentalis
16
, it not only exceeds the limits of the empirical experience, but 
also drastically changes the entire vision of reality by getting itself concurrent 
with the perspective of Creation, taking its departure from the Being of beings, 
where any beings can adequately be seen through the Meaning of the Word 
only.  This is consequently not the knowledge that deduces the universal Being 
from all particular beings, making it into an overall sum of all particulars.  On 
the contrary, in line with what has been established by the Kantian apriorism, it 
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follows the order where – by contrast to the evidence provided by empirical 
observation – the universal precedes the particular.  In this way, the perspective 
of the mind proves cardinally changed or, to be precise, inverted
17
, when 
compared to the sensual experience with its straightforward engagement with 
the particulars.  Veritas transcendentalis thus becomes a means of amending the 
mind that goes as far as bringing it into conformity with the substantial order of 
creation as the reality of self-disclosure, where all particular beings are brought 
to light from the universal Principle of being and, for this reason, acquire the 
meaning of their existence to the extent they remain within the totality of the 
universal and indivisible Being as the means of its manifestation. 
     Thus, what Heidegger calls “universal phenomenological ontology” should 
not improperly be understood as “taking its departure from the hermeneutics of 
Dasein…”18.  This hermeneutics, aimed at “an analysis of the existentiality of 
existence”, is in fact nothing else but “the interpretation of the Being of 
Dasein”, since – he argues – “as a being that has the possibility of existence”, 
“Dasein has ontologically priority over all other beings…”19. 
     As a ‘science’ that by its very nature always aims to search for the universal 
by studying the particular, the ‘universal’ ontology likewise resorts to purely 
cognitive means of approaching the particular phenomena while trying to find 
the universal Being behind them.  This ontology is not at all a kind of 
imaginative knowledge of the transcendent that seeks to look beyond the 
immediacy of perceptions by simply defying their validity and introducing a 
fictitious world of new imagery, which would prove in fact, when carefully 
considered, to be nothing other than just an extrapolation of the sensible beyond 
its legitimate boundaries.  On the contrary, while aiming to break through into 
the universal Being unavailable to senses or, in other words, to restore 
cognitively the missing links in the invisible chain of the substantial order of the 
reality of self-disclosure (where the universal always has priority over all 
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particular beings), ontology is said to appeal to “an analysis of the existentiality 
of existence”, defined by Heidegger as the major means and objective of 
hermeneutics
20
.  Thus by virtue of analysis why something exists rather than 
nothing, ontology and hermeneutics are brought together into a single whole to 
promote insight into the true nature of both, which is likewise the case with 
Eriugena’s approach (as it should be with any other ontology proper) to the 
biblical interpretation with its characteristic appeal to ἀή as a cognitive 
means of following the order of creation and bringing about the return of 
human being to the reality as it truly is.
21
   
     This choice of ‘analysis’ for a decisive methodological tool appropriate, as 
Heidegger understood it, to the task that the ontology of the universal sets itself 
does not seem accidental.  Indeed, in terms of the transcendental knowledge 
again, this is a mode of cognitive approach which, in contrast to what Kant 
called a ‘synthetic judgement’22, does not expand the knowledge of things by 
adding to it something new that is borrowed from an external experience, but 
does simply explicate what is already latently present in the notions of things 
involved in the mind’s cognitive attitude to them.  So that, when applied to “the 
interpretation of the Being of Dasein”, this kind of analysis allows hermeneutics 
to discern behind the phenomena the meaning of notions that bring things into 
the focus of its cognitive approach.  In this way, looking for the meaning 
inherent in the notions of things a priori present to the cognitive experience, 
hermeneutical analysis does take an opportunity to ascertain what precedes the 
presence of existents and what subsequently they exist for, so as to disclose 
thereby nothing else in fact but the meaning of their existence.  This is, 
furthermore, how – through the knowledge subject to veritas transcendentalis 
and focused on what ontologically has “priority over all other beings” – the 
Logos itself, that is believed to precede all particular beings while giving rise to 
them, eventually comes to light in the space of Dasein opened from within.  
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And along with it, the proper order of existence, in accordance with which the 
universal precedes the particular, gets restored and revealed, letting thereby the 
Being, previously hidden behind the appearance of particular things, become 
unconcealed and present to the coherently religious mind, to which nothing can 
come into existence (or to the fore of presence) otherwise than from the 
universal Principle of all.   
     Not unfairly therefore is ontology qualified by Heidegger as “the science of 
the Being of beings”23, and hermeneutics, that lies at the heart of this ontology, 
is understood to be a “historical interpretation”24.  Indeed, as clearly seen above, 
it is similar to science as such in that ontology starts out by studying the 
particular as it is given at present.  Unlike conventional science, however, it 
searches for the universal not in line with a temporal sequence, as empirical 
knowledge by contrast would most likely do while associating the idea of 
exceeding the limits of transient being with a spurious infinity of duration and, 
for this reason, trying to reconstruct a full history of the particular present at a 
given moment, extending the immediacy of its appearance by investigating the 
antecedent past and forecasting the nearest and following future.  In its pursuit 
of the universal that transcends the constraints of all confined beings, ontology 
instead, as said before, resorts to hermeneutics to secure – through the contrast 
between the present and the past that is always fraught with loss of immediacy – 
a short cut to its chief objective of finding the universal by disclosing the 
meaning of existence. 
     In short, what empirical knowledge seeks to get from extending the limits of 
the particular through the historical reconstruction perfectly conformed with the 
temporal dimension of reality, ontology achieves in an analysis of the meaning 
through a historically inverted view of the particular exercised by an 
interpretive approach to it.  Differentiation between the present and the past 
does allow hermeneutics to look into the meaning of existence (and, hence, into 
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the substantial order of the reality), in which both the antecedence of the 
universal and the whole of its progression to the particular is preserved: from 
what is unconcealed at present, it is clear to the interpretive view what was there 
concealed in the past and what it actually existed for.  As susceptible of 
interpretation, i.e. that kind of knowledge which in contrast to the conventional 
one perfectly conforms, as discussed above, to the reality of self-disclosure, this 
meaning of existence proves to manifest itself through the meaning of things 
that is conveyed by their generic notions and borne throughout the whole of 
their existence, from its very beginning up to the end.  This is consequently the 
meaning that first shines forth through the contrast the ‘historical interpretation’ 
ascertains between the present and the past so as to further bring through it, as 
the ground of their identity, both the present and the past and the future into a 
single and inseparable whole.  
     Thus in the ontology primarily concerned about the conformity to the 
substantial reality where the universal precedes the particular, which alone 
enables it to tackle the questions why something exists (comes to exist) and 
what is the prospect (possibility) of its existence, temporality as such gets 
overcome.  Moreover, it is in the ontology of this kind that the fundamental 
truth articulated by the Tetragrammaton comes to be thoroughly apprehended – 
namely, the truth that the true infinity of the reality of self-disclosure, according 
to which the innermost essence and its adequate manifestation are inseparably 
one, cannot be conceived otherwise than in the way of transcending the 
temporality, appropriate to transient beings only.  Both temporality, with its 
division of existence into separate segments of time, and infinity spuriously 
understood as an endless duration prove here to be irrelevant to the substantial 
reality of self-disclosure, where Logos brings all things to the light of being. 
     Indeed, in the light of the universal meaning this ontology uncovers, neither 
past nor future are any longer hidden behind the horizon of empirical existence 
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as something remote from the present; for no contingencies of the flux of things 
seen from without matter any more to the transcendental knowledge.  And it 
cannot be otherwise, unless the perspective of sensual perception is taken for 
granted as the only true perspective of reality.  In so far as the reality is properly 
conceived of as that of self-disclosure (that is solely amenable to the mind 
liberated from the dictates of senses and therefore restored to its capacity of 
cognitive thinking
25
), nothing particular in it can ever be understood to subsist 
on its own, independently of the universal.  The very pattern of self-disclosure 
implies that the universal never moves away from itself while giving rise to 
anything particular: preceding all particular things, the universal actually moves 
nowhere else apart from itself, that is, to its own manifestation through the 
particular; for it is undeniably true that nothing else can ever subsist outside the 
universal, genuinely absolute and infinite.  This consequently means that 
nothing particular can actually subsist apart from or alongside the universal.  It 
can truly subsist only when staying in and with the universal, being intimately 
connected with it; and this connection is what is realised in the meaning of 
existence, through which the universal itself comes true. 
     As a result, the universal ontology of self-disclosure (which not unfairly 
should also be understood as the ontology of Creation) safely arrives at paradox 
that has always been implicitly present in its approach to the absolute self-
identical Being, but only at this point of discourse renders fully explicit and can 
no longer be avoided.  As a matter of fact, overcoming temporality does not 
mean its substitution by the opposite, eternity.  Neither of them can properly be 
conceived as remaining merely opposed to one another, i.e. as only temporal 
and only eternal.  As the mutually excluding extremes, they would simply turn 
into abstract categories applicable only to rationally abstract constructs of 
reality.  Nor can they however be treated in a metaphysical manner as the 
complimentary counterparts that make up a single whole, when added together.  
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They are the opposites that are to be treated dialectically – that is, by means of 
paradox dialectically understood.  In accordance with this treatment, both 
opposites are considered to be simultaneously true so as to let them be 
completely transformed into a single whole freed from the one-sidedness of 
mutually confined extremes and available only to a new vision of reality as it 
truly, infinitely, is.  Temporality and eternity, according to this vision, may only 
be truly known when conceived in their unity: the universal precedes the 
particular and at the same time stays within itself.  Time and eternity are 
inconceivable as being separated from and opposed to one another.  Likewise, 
change and immutability, motion and rest are mutually inseparable in a coherent 
vision of Being as a whole.  So that, what is there in the Beginning, may only be 
truly known as being at the same time in the Middle and in the End.  Nothing 
whatsoever falls out of the reality of the absolute self-identity, unless the mind’s 
misconception of being (understood as rigidly opposed to non-being) forces 
human beings to let things leave it, making thus humans themselves live an 
illusory life in a fictitious world. 
Temporality and eternity 
     Quite unsurprisingly therefore does Heidegger refer to Plato’s ontology at 
the very outset of his Sein und Zeit, finding in it a good example of ontology 
being essentially dialectical with a view to approaching the substantial order of 
the Logos-based reality.  “That is why,” he admits in the opening part of the 
monumental work, “the ancient ontology developed by Plato becomes 
“dialectic””26.  Indeed, temporality and eternity dialectically seen in their unity 
may easily be found to lie in the focus of Plato’s ontology, as it is likewise the 
case with Gregory’s ontological approach to God and his interpretation of the 
Tetragrammaton considered above.  
     Thus, for instance, in the Timaeus Plato articulates the truth that the eternal 
being cannot be conceived in terms of duration only, when time is understood to 
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be divided into separate segments.  According to him, a coherent view of the 
whole also implies that of the ever-lasting presence, making the opposite 
perspectives actually into the modes of vision of one and the same infinite 
reality, unless they are illegitimately set apart to be applicable to different and 
separate realms of existence – namely, those of becoming and immutability.  
“These are all parts of time”, Plato writes, “and the past and future are created 
species of time, which we unconsciously but wrongly transfer to the eternal 
essence; for we say that he” (i.e. God) “‘was’, he ‘is’, he ‘will be’, but the truth 
is that ‘is’ alone is properly attributed to him, and that ‘was’ and ‘will be’ only 
to be spoken of becoming in time, for they are motions, but that which is 
immovably the same cannot become older or younger by time, nor ever did or 
has become, or hereafter will be, older or younger, nor is subject at all to any of 
those states which affect moving and sensible things and of which generation is 
the cause.  These are the forms of time, which imitates eternity…” (Timaeus, 
37c – 38a).27   
     This distinction between the duration and presence does not mean however 
that temporality and eternity should be treated as the principles of the two 
different realities mutually countered.  They should rather be considered as the 
different dimensions or, better to say (as suggested above), the modes of vision 
of one and the same reality which need to be reconciled.  And the ever-lasting 
presence, as follows from Plato’s train of thought, may come to be the meeting 
point, where they do not simply encounter or mingle, but become reconciled in 
a single and indivisible whole.  Eternity is not merely the opposite of time, its 
negation or absence.  Nor is it time simply brought to a complete halt.  Neither 
of them defies the other or prevails over it; rather both, when available to a 
dialectically coherent vision of the whole, transform into something of a new 
quality of their unity, which alone is compatible with the infinite reality as it 
truly, unceasingly, is. 
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     Indeed, as the patriarch of all philosophers keeps arguing in the 
Parmenides
28
 in line with a dialectical view of the universal whole (that 
precedes the particular and at the same time never moves away from itself), the 
absolute wholeness may only be truly known as being simultaneously in itself 
and in the other.  And this is not unfairly so; since comprising all parts with no 
exception, the whole yet remains fully present in none of them, being thus at the 
same time in all parts and beyond them (Parmenides, 152c – e)29.  The eternal 
whole therefore cannot be known otherwise than in the way of being 
simultaneously identical to itself and different from itself (Parmenides, 146a).  
So that, according to the profoundly dialectical view of the universal being 
developed by the ‘ancient ontology’ of Plato, time and eternity can never be set 
over against one another.  In so far as the universal whole is seen as being 
simultaneously in itself and in the other, it is fairly understood to be in time and 
beyond it.  If the whole however, being divided into parts, is assumed to be 
separated from the other and thus seen as being successively in itself and in the 
other as two different states, then it is understood to change and be in time only, 
which would be appropriate to finite things alone that come into being and pass 
away.  Temporality and eternity are, no doubt, always at one and hence, once 
the whole of being is really concerned, should never be set apart and over 
against one another (Parmenides, 152a).  As separated and mutually opposed, 
they are equally false and irrelevant to the reality of the absolute whole.  This 
latter may only be known as ever subsisting at present – not the present which 
lies between the past and future, but the present through which everything 
involved in becoming does pass (Parmenides, 152e)
30
. 
The totality of Being 
     The dialectical vision of wholeness of being offered by Plato was historically 
a considerable step ahead in developing ontology.  Among his immediate 
predecessors who had also made a substantial contribution to the development 
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of ontology, and even initiated it as an area of philosophical expertise, was 
another Greek genius Parmenides, an illustrious founder of the Eleatic school, 
not unreasonably associated with the beginnings of metaphysics in what will 
later become a European intellectual landscape.  Discussing his importance to 
the history of thought, Hegel in particular points out in the Vorlesungen über die 
Geschichte der Philosophie: “Seeing in it an ascent to the realm of the ideal, we 
have to admit that it is from Parmenides that philosophy in a proper sense of the 
word takes its departure.”31 
     What gives Hegel reason to estimate so highly the role of Parmenides for the 
subsequent evolution of philosophical thought is undoubtedly his attempt to 
articulate the truth of the universality of Being, in a sense that “being alone does 
exist, whereas nonbeing does not at all”32.  Being, according to Parmenides, is 
really absolute,
33 ubiquitous and unceasingly present.  It “neither was nor will be 
but is,” says he, “has always been wholly now and indivisibly one” 
(Periphyseon 8: 5 – 6).34  From this, it is to be recognised as a firm truth that 
beyond being there is nothing,
35
 meaning that outside one and indivisible being 
nothing else can ever be recognised to subsist.  By this categorical denial of the 
substantiality of ‘nothing’ in favour of the totality of ‘being’, Parmenides means 
to suggest, in Hegel’s view, that – regardless of the shape the negative as such 
may take – it would be a big blunder to assume that the opposite of being could 
actually subsist or, speaking plainly, nothing could be taken for something.  The 
delusion concerning the dichotomy between being and nonbeing therefore 
consists, as Hegel holds, in having both counterparts mutually differed or 
mingled up, as though they were of the same value as something equally 
substantial
36.  “Never shall this prevail, that Unbeing is,”37 says Parmenides in 
his Periphyseon.
38
 
     No wonder therefore that Parmenides finds it immensely important for the 
explication of his philosophical standpoint to clearly distinguish two different 
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views of the totality of Being, which he calls the Way of Truth and the Way of 
Delusion, actually meaning by them the opposite ways of approaching the 
reality as such.
39
  The totality of Being cannot be really understood, according 
to him, to result from its full distinction from nonbeing or, as it were, from a 
sum of being and nonbeing.  By contrast to such a delusion when being is 
assumed to co-exist with nonbeing, the truth requires that by no means can the 
latter be admitted of lying alongside the former; for the total Being, as 
Parmenides sees it, allows no rival to co-exist with itself and challenge its 
totality.  In other words, the undeniable truth Parmenides wishes to insist on 
requires that the totality of Being cannot be reduced to that of the multitude of 
finite things, simply because nonbeing (that makes things confined and torn out 
of the wholeness of being, as if placing them outside it) is utterly not.
40
   
     Despite this truth, however, those whom the Greek philosopher calls 
‘mortals’ (i.e. the ones who find themselves living among finite things that 
come and go, and therefore conform their lives to the pattern of transient nature) 
tend to divide everything into contraries such as light and darkness, life and 
death (Periphyseon 8, 53 – 54)41, putting thereby the very existence of theirs at 
risk of negation and taking the multitude of finite things (limited by nonbeing) 
for the being as it really is.  They keep setting apart the opposites found in the 
surrounding world that is immediately given to them through their senses, 
falsely ascribing an ontological status to the opposites relevant to the empirical 
(sensually experienced) dimension of existence only.   And so doing, these 
‘mortals’ go so far as to divide even the principle of all things into competing 
agents (like those of ‘earth’ and ‘fire’), which, they believe, allows them to 
attain the knowledge of what they call ‘natural phenomena’42 and thus to take an 
allegedly proper place in the world resulting in fact from their own faulty 
assumptions.  Following this Way of Delusion, the ‘mortals’ eventually arrive at 
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a vision of the Universe, in the middle of which “they place a goddess who 
governs all things.”43  
     Thus the two ways of approaching the reality, being in effect the two 
different perspectives of the mind in its cognitive attitude to what may be 
understood as ‘real’, do legitimise rival visions of one and the same reality, 
giving rise to alternative world pictures: one is infinitely one and indivisible, 
unceasingly remaining everywhere within itself; the other is split up into 
opposite principles and is identified with the flux of finite things.  The first is 
exposed to thought, for, as Parmenides puts it, ‘to be’ and ‘to be thought of’ are 
one and the same (Periphyseon 2: 3)
44
; the second is produced by senses or, to 
be precise, by the mind misled by senses.  And many prominent classics of 
antiquity, while commenting on Parmenides’ understanding of the origin of the 
alternative visions of reality, do agree about the epistemological nature of this 
distinction.  Particularly, Aristotle holds in his Metaphysics (987b) that the unity 
of being, as Parmenides understood it, is known to reason alone, whereas the 
multitude of things may only be perceived through senses
45
.  And rightly so; for, 
as Diogenes Laertius suggests, Parmenides liberated thought from “the 
deceptive imagination”46: “He called reason to be the criterion of truth; in 
senses, he said, there is no accuracy.”47  Not unfairly does Sextus Empiricus 
conclude therefore that, according to the author of the Periphyseon, “one should 
trust not senses but reason alone”.48  
     By all these testimonies to the respective discernment of reason and the 
senses lying at the heart of Parmenides’ discourse, we are given to understand in 
fact that the essential difference between the rival world pictures central to his 
ontology may be thoroughly explained by different types of epistemology 
involved in making them up.  For the distinction of the alternative visions of 
reality, it is crucial to understand whether reason or senses are chosen for the 
means of a cognitive attitude to it and, consequently, whether it is universality 
87 
 
of thought or contingency of sensual perception that are to be taken for the 
prime source of knowledge.  Accordingly, it is also important to decide whether 
the knowledge itself should be focused on particulars of the empirical existence 
or aimed at the infinity of wholeness (where even the particulars are seen anew 
in the context of their integrity), without which a coherent faith in One God (but 
not a deity of imagination, like the ‘goddess’ mentioned above) is hardly 
possible at all.   
     It is needless to say which of the two sides of this dilemma Parmenides 
chooses.  Following the logic of the twofold structure of the Periphyseon, it is 
not hard to discern his critical attitude to the mind’s reliance on senses and 
subjection to their dictates.  To him, the prevalence of senses over reason can 
only be understood as “the way of non-being” leading to nowhere else but 
dispersion of the unity of being in the flux of transient things.  This is what he 
calls ‘the Way of Delusion’, “the illusory way” upon which, as M. Wolf puts it, 
“people enter under the pressure of their habit to rely on sensual perception”49.  
And if Parmenides speaks of this illusory way in detail, he undoubtedly does so 
with the only intention of having it resolutely rejected as the erroneous one.  His 
genuine aim is to establish the Way of Truth as the only proper way of 
approaching the true Being that opens up before the mind a panorama of the 
infinite and immutable whole, where no room for the opposite (that is not) can 
ever be found.  The simplicity of this approach, as seen in the Periphyseon, is 
abundantly clear: “The solution is there – whether it is or is not.”50  By this 
unambiguous manner of articulating the truth, Parmenides means to suggest that 
it is possible indeed to affirm the totality of Being by categorically denying the 
existence of anything else apart from it: Being is, but non-being (i.e. the 
opposite or the other as such) is not. 
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     Thanks to Simplicius however, who wrote about Parmenides’ attitude to the 
opposites and contradictions they form, it is fairly easy to understand that the 
way of treating “the absolute being” cannot be as simple as that.  Indeed, its 
totality, required by the Way of Truth, cannot be merely postulated in an 
‘either-or’ manner; it should rather be properly conceived.  This implies that the 
opposite of the total should neither be merely discarded nor forbidden but 
dialectically overcome.  It further means that the totality of Being can only be 
affirmed when its opposite is found by dialectical thought (fearless of 
contradictions resulting from metaphysical dichotomies) to be appropriate to the 
reality of finite things but utterly irrelevant to the infinity of the totality, when 
the latter is consistently thought of (and therefore beheld by the mind’s eye, as 
Eriugena calls it) as the absolute whole.  No truth can simply be declared; it can 
only be known, and therefore neither received nor imposed from without but 
attained from within the free mind (or, speaking in terms of Diogenes, reason 
liberated from the sway of senses) through being properly conceived.  Truth is 
neither a precept to be adhered to nor a dogma to be taken for granted; it is a 
cornerstone of freedom (Jn. 8, 32), and as a cardinal epistemological-
ontological category it firmly stands for the unity of knowledge and being.  
The opposites and contradiction 
     In his commentary on Aristotle’s Physics, Simplicius describes Parmenides’ 
attitude to the opposites and contradictions they give rise to as follows: “That 
contradictory statements cannot be simultaneously true, he says in the verses 
where he reproaches those who identify the opposites…”51.   From this 
impossibility of treating contradictory statements as being simultaneously true 
(which alone constitutes the very nature of contradiction as such), it follows of 
necessity that on the Way of Truth – that is, the way of approaching the totality 
of Being which truly (everywhere and always) is – contradiction is utterly 
unacceptable to Parmenides.  And this further means that the ontology he offers, 
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though majestically philosophical by nature, is nevertheless apparently non-
dialectical in its method, which considerably diminishes its validity.   
     A profoundly philosophical approach to Truth, being an attempt at 
establishing the unity between thought and the whole of existence, cannot 
actually dispense with dialectic as a specific discipline of the mind, which is in 
fact responsible for nurturing this unity and therefore intrinsic to philosophy as 
a type of knowledge.  By embracing the diametrical opposites of existence 
(being and non-being), dialectic seeks the way of bringing them together so as – 
through overcoming their collision – to consistently conceive the totality of 
Being and thus to know it.   On this way to Truth (or perfect conformity of both 
human mind and life to the infinite Being that unceasingly is), an appeal to 
contradiction and its proper treatment – with a view to overcoming the finitude 
of existence split into the opposites of being and non-being mutually confined – 
becomes therefore altogether unavoidable.  Thus Hegel, the unsurpassed 
authority in dialectic who deeply saw both the merits and weakness of 
philosophical thought in its infancy (and yet highly appreciated, as said before, 
Parmenides’ contribution to its birth), conspicuously admits in the very first of 
all theses to his doctoral work: “Contradiction is the criterion of truth; lack of 
contradiction is the criterion of delusion”52.   
     As an effective tool to bring oppostes to collision and revealing thereby their 
irrelevance to the reality of the whole (where nothing one-sided and confined 
can actually subsist), contradiction gives in fact an opportunity to reconsider the 
relationship between the polar (finite) opposites and find the way to the infinite 
hidden behind them.  It may thus become an epistemological means of breaking 
through the finitude of the world of appearance into the true Being, which alone 
the universal (ontologically valid) truth is appropriate to.  Not unfairly therefore 
should contradiction be understood as a mode of overcoming any division into 
opposites (like that into being and non-being, qualified by Eriugena as the 
90 
 
fundamental one), illegitimately imposed upon the reality by the mind following 
a non-dialectical (non- contradictory) way of thinking.  In this sense, 
contradiction promotes the mind’s progression towards the knowledge of Truth, 
which is basically the truth of the absolute wholeness and, hence, of the perfect 
conformity of human mind (and being) to the unity of the whole.  Accordingly, 
dialectic proves to be a paradigm of thinking where the way of bringing 
everything back to the unity of the original wholeness goes through; for it is in 
dialectic that the constructive role of contradiction is fully realised to put to an 
end the sway of the corrupt mind inclined to destructive dichotomies resulting 
from setting the opposites apart.  As such, dialectic is consequently none other 
but a discipline of thinking, by virtue of which not only the mentality itself but 
also the whole of human life (of which the mind’s operation is the most 
essential and distinctive part) becomes transformed, becoming inseparably one 
with the universal whole – that is to say, brought in effect to conformity with 
the perspective and the very order of reality that comes forth into being from the 
one and universal Principle of all.  This is the vision of dialectic which really 
helps us to understand what Eriugena means when he identifies dialectic, as we 
shall see it later, with being both the order that right reasons, as he calls it, 
adheres to and the art of living.  And it is exactly by contrast with the 
Parmenidian attitude to contradiction that Eriugena’s coherent understanding of 
dialectic can be effectively explicated as lying at the very heart of his deeply 
theological discourse. 
     As it is clear from the aforesaid, remaining a staunch upholder of the holistic 
view of Being, Parmenides is nevertheless convinced that its totality can be 
unproblematically affirmed in a non-contradictory way, as if its truth might 
simply be established by the denial of what is contrary to being and on this 
account is classified as false.  And he actually does so when he suggests that 
‘Being is’ but ‘Non-being is not’, assuming thereby – as Simplicius testifies to it 
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– that by no means can two contradictory statements be admitted of being 
simultaneously true.  This means that, according to a non-contradictory 
approach, of the two contradictory statements – such as ‘Being is’ and ‘Non-
being is’ – only one can be chosen for true, whereas the other is found to be 
utterly irrelevant to any sort of relation with being and therefore invalid or false.  
But does such an approach to the opposites in an ‘either-or’ manner, according 
to which one of the contraries is just preferred to the other, really lead to an 
affirmation of the all-embracing totality of Being or, instead of this, leave it 
merely confined?  Is it possible indeed to hold anything whole when one of the 
opposites is simply neglected but not superseded?  Does such an apparently 
non-dialectical treatment really open, as Parmenides believed, the way to Truth, 
which, as said before, can only be known but not merely postulated or 
appointed? 
     From the dialectical point of view, utterly intolerant to any inconsistencies in 
approaching the whole, the simplest and the clearest answer to all these 
questions is obviously ‘No’.  The entire ontology from Plato to Heidegger 
convinces us of this.  While insisting on the interconnectedness of time and 
eternity (ever-lasting presence), both ancient and contemporary ontology, as 
previously considered, are perfectly explicit about the principle impossibility of 
treating these two visions of reality (appropriate in fact to its different 
dimensions) either in a rationally abstract or metaphysical way, when they are 
respectively misunderstood to be either the mutually opposed extremes or 
complementary counterparts that, in like manner to constitutive components, are 
allegedly assumed to make up a single whole.  Being as a whole (that 
unceasingly is) and its negation (non-being) that makes the ever-lasting 
presence disrupted and confined, should not be accordingly understood as 
something separate and set over against one another, as if either could subsist on 
its own.  Otherwise, both time and eternity, and along with them being and non-
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being, will prove to be equally untrue, i.e. irrelevant to the substantial reality as 
it truly is in its absolute wholeness.  Being as a whole, outside which nothing 
else does subsist, is not the one that comes and goes; it, as Parmenides rightly 
says, ever is.  And in this sense indeed, non-being is not.  However, to really 
adopt the truth of the totality and eternity of Being conveyed thereby, it must be 
comprehended.  And for this purpose, cognitive thought must resort to 
contradiction, by virtue of which, when properly treated, temporality is not 
merely forbidden but dialectically overcome as being solely appropriate to finite 
existence resulting from a sensual perception of reality.  Truth is revealed in and 
through the mind, i.e. through its right attitude to the infinite reality of the 
absolute whole.  And it is the dialectical contradiction alone which opens the 
Way of Truth and allows the mind in effect to restore its proper relation with the 
reality as it truly is behind its sensible appearance.  
     All this gives us to understand that it is not actually enough for ontology as a 
profoundly coherent discipline of philosophical knowledge simply to establish 
the truth of the totality and eternity of Being, as Parmenides did.  Nor is it 
important for it to know what Being as such is, for that would be appropriate to 
knowing external objects only.  What really matters to ontology is how this 
totality and eternity of Being can be consistently thought of and thus become 
known, so as to bring human beings to conformity to it and let them thereby 
participate in it.  So when proposing that ‘Being is’ but ‘Non-being is not’, and 
thus deliberately trying to avoid contradiction as being incompatible, in his 
view, with Truth, Parmenides, alas, is missing the point: in this way the truth 
claimed is not actually approached.  In order to really know two crucial things 
about the truth stated by the Greek philosopher – that is, to know the true Being 
as the totality and eternity – it is important to understand not what totality and 
eternity are as abstract objects given to a knower in perception and therefore 
seen by him or her from afar; but how they can be conceived so close to their 
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true nature that a knower might find him-or herself involved in (and embraced 
by) the real totality and real eternity. 
     As a matter of fact, it is impossible to know what the totality is, i.e. what it 
consists of and how many things it should include to be total; for, as it was seen 
in Plato’s Parmenides, no matter how great the number of particular things 
included in it, the totality is fully present in none of them and therefore always 
remains beyond them.  Likewise, it is impossible to know what eternity is, i.e. 
whether it is a state of immutability and complete rest or an endless duration or 
anything else.  What is really possible to know, by contrast to all this, is how the 
totality uncovers itself in all its depth and breadth when fully distinguished from 
the opposite, which is to be ‘nothing’ (that is, non-being understood as nothing); 
for the totality may only be truly known as the one outside which nothing 
whatsoever is found to subsist, because beyond it, as total in the truest sense of 
the word, there is utterly nothing.  Likewise, the eternity of Being may be 
properly known as completely different from temporality (and hence 
confinement and mutation), when in its distinction from all finitude (where it is 
confronted by the opposite) being is found not liable to transition into non-
being. 
     The truth of Being, identical in its totality to itself, is inconceivable (and 
consequently unknowable) therefore apart from being distinguished from the 
other, which further means – as Plato suggested in the Parmenides (146a) 
examined above – that, since outside the totality nothing else does subsist, the 
eternal whole cannot be truly known otherwise than in the way of being 
identical to itself and different from itself at the same time.  Only thus can that 
be properly approached which ought to be known as the totality that precedes 
any particular things and at the same time, comprising them all, stays within 
itself, ever remaining identical to itself and irreducible to the multitude of the 
particulars that never can abandon it.  When in contrast to this holistic view, 
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however, the contraries are simply torn apart, as it is the case with Being that is 
and Non-being that is not, then nothing actually happens to the knowledge of 
Truth: puzzled by this division and squeezed between the confronting opposites, 
thought comes to a complete halt on the threshold of Truth, admiring its 
magnificence but never entering under its dome. 
     In order for thought to be enabled to step into the dwelling of Truth, the 
confronting opposites must be brought together so close that their collision 
would spark new light of a new perspective of the mind, which shines through 
the darkness of ignorance.  This means that, formulated as contradictory 
statements, they must be presented to the mind in the form of contradiction.  
Hence, if the primary thesis inviting the truth is ‘Being is’, then the opposite 
statement should be related to being as well and take shape of a negative 
proposition (antithesis) ‘Non-being is’.  Only as such, can thesis and antithesis, 
when taken together, make up a contradiction, which looks as simple as follows: 
Being is;                                                                                                                                      
Non-being is.  
     The immensity of the problem expressed by this contradiction is, however, 
hidden behind its deceptive simplicity, for it holds the keys to the narrow gate 
leading to the realm of eternal Truth.  The way this contradiction is treated is 
indeed of tremendous importance for the entire evolution of thought and, as a 
consequence, of human condition.  This is the point on which it depends 
whether thought, rejecting contradictions as sheer nonsense or signs of delusion, 
goes astray along the broad way of fantasies, producing a fictitious world of the 
man-made reality apt for illusory life only; or – recognising in contradictions a 
critical point the paradigm of linear (non-contradictory) thinking may reach – it 
dares to press ahead to fearlessly face challenges of dialectical thinking, 
clearing the way of all stumbling-blocks of antinomies that used to be seen (and 
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finally classified since Kant’s first Critique) as insoluble and prohibitive to any 
further progress of knowledge. 
The dialectical understanding of contradiction 
     One of the first challenges on the way ahead that the mind has to face in its 
pursuit of the infinite whole (which alone truly, i.e. unceasingly, is) consists in a 
dialectical understanding of contradiction.  From an instrument of strict 
prohibition of exceeding the limits of empirical evidence, contradiction must be 
turned into a means of embracing the opposite extremes of existence, by virtue 
of which thought is enabled to break through all-dividing temporality to eternity 
of the real whole and thus to bring the entire human being to living in 
conformity with it.  The key to this cardinal revaluation of the role of 
contradiction is in the way its constituent elements, that is, contradictory 
statements, are considered.  Unlike the Parmenidian approach that Simplicius, 
as indicated above, testifies to, according to which contradiction as such is 
diligently eliminated by setting the contradictory statements apart, the 
dialectical view implies that both thesis and antithesis are to be simultaneously 
taken into consideration.  All the more, they are implied to be considered not in, 
so to speak, ‘either-or’ manner, when of the two contradictory statements only 
one is chosen for true whereas the other is rejected as being false; but in ‘both-
and’ manner, when both statements are recognised to be simultaneously true.  
To thought, that has accustomed itself to adhere to a straightforward principle of 
non-contradiction, such a bizarre way of treating the mutually excluding 
statements must look too extraordinary to be true.  Nevertheless, it is this 
dialectical view that does allow thought to coherently conceive the totality of 
the eternal Being, and thus – by overcoming the gravity of temporality that 
makes the unity of being dispersed in the flux of finite things – to liberate 
human beings, whom Parmenides calls ‘mortals’ from their bondage to finitude 
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and, hence, the illicit form of existence (the corrupt life) among the transient 
things of the world of appearance. 
     When – in contrast to Parmenides’ attempt to avoid contradiction by 
formulating, as seen in Hegel, two tautological statements ‘Being is’ and ‘Non-
being is not’ – dialectic gets focused on the contradictories taken in their unity, 
it seeks to realise the truth of the totality of Being, in accordance with which the 
latter is only conceivable as being at the same time identical to itself and 
different from itself.  For this reason, the flattening tautology ‘Being is’, 
expressing the totality’s identity, needs to be deepened as far as to let it 
articulate its truth in a more adequate and perfect way as that of self-identity.  
Not unreasonably, therefore, it needs to be counterbalanced by such a 
paradoxical statement as ‘Non-being is’.  By this paradoxical expression 
breaking up all linear connections between thought and reality, the tautological 
thesis is challenged by the contradictory antithesis and, as a result of this, the 
whole contradiction is set in motion.  Thus thought is allowed indeed to 
concentrate on the truth of identity plainly conveyed in the form of tautology 
and, proceeding in this way, to conceive (and know) this truth not as an empty 
abstraction (rationally extracted and therefore severed from reality), but as the 
profoundly ontological truth, utterly inseparable from the being itself.   
     From this it is clear that in order that the true identity of the whole might be 
really grasped as that outside which nothing else may subsist, the notion of 
‘non-being’ should be let into play, but in a very cautious and subtle way.  And 
this is actually what a dialectical treatment of the contradiction is all about.  In 
particular, in so far as the contradiction is sought to be resolved (so as to let the 
mind step forward towards a new dimension of reality altogether incompatible 
with the finitude resulting from the mutual confrontation of the opposites), 
‘non-being’ should not be simply excluded from being, when forbidden to exist 
or understood to oppose it.  The ‘non-being’ should rather be conceived in such 
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a manner that, when assumed to be included in the whole (since nothing at all is 
supposed to remain outside it), the self-identical wholeness would neither be 
shattered nor defied. By no means should its enclosure into the whole of being 
therefore be confused with an attempt to assign an ontological status to it. Like 
Parmenides, who reproaches those trying to identify being and non-being, Hegel 
as well warns those inconsistent in their thinking against falling into error of 
taking ‘nothing’ for ‘something’ when being and its counterpart, as said before, 
are intended to be mutually differed or mingled up, as if they were something 
con-substantial.  Like a fatal virus, such an error infects thought, bringing it to a 
parochial vision of reality through the finite definitions appropriate to finite 
things only and based on the clear divide between being and non-being, which 
may solely result from the assumption of their equal con-substantiality.  In 
contrast to this, dialectic with its subtle treatment of these fundamental 
opposites safeguards thought from making the pernicious blunder of reducing 
the infinite whole to a finite being (countered by non-being) and provides a 
remedy for restoration of a sound vision of reality as it truly (unceasingly) is 
while taking its origin from the universal Principle of all and never leaving it. 
    That is why it is crucial for dialectic as a paradigm of thinking that brings the 
human mind into conformity with the totality of the eternal Being to insist on 
considering the contradiction as consisting of the contradictory statements that 
are simultaneously true.  Otherwise, if only one of the contradictories is true 
(i.e. meaningfully correlated with the being coherently thought of in its 
unconfined totality), then contradiction does not occur.  On the other hand, if 
the contradictories are considered not simultaneously but separately, e.g. in 
succession to one another (as it might appear to be the case with being’s 
transition into non-being in the course of its mutation), then neither of them 
proves to be meaningful and therefore relevant to the truth of the eternal totality 
of Being, though they may seem true with regard to the finite existence in which 
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things are understood to come into being and pass away.  Such a separation of 
the opposites (and the appropriate contradictories), leading to the loss of truth 
and to seeming alone, instead of clear vision of reality in the light of the true 
knowledge of it, proves in fact to be nothing other than the Way of Delusion at 
work that Parmenides so vehemently warns us against.  This is actually the way 
by which the senses – as his Greek commentators quoted above remind us – 
deceive the mind; and while doing so, they mislead the mind so far as to make it 
believe that being can be followed by non-being as quite a legitimate phase of 
the changing existence.  Following this way, the mind goes far away indeed 
from the true Being as it unceasingly is in its totality.  Guided by a distorted 
vision fitting the confined beings only, this mind is inevitably brought to its 
wrong assumptions concerning the transient nature of reality, which it readily 
imposes upon the surrounding world perceived through the dictates of senses, 
making it into the realm of temporality packed with finite sensible objects. 
Self-identical being  
     By no means, therefore, should the basic principle of the simultaneous truth 
of contradictories be disregarded once any cognitive contradiction (and above 
all the cardinal one about which dialectical ontology pivots) is meant to be 
properly tackled and resolved.  This is how the self-identical Being can truly be 
known when conceived to be distinct from the other (non-being) but not 
confined by it.  Indeed, as the all-embracing totality, Being cannot be identical 
to itself as being unless it is distinct from its other (non-being).  In fact, 
however, it can be distinct from nothing apart from itself, since its totality is 
confronted by nothing else.  Hence, Being is self-identical in so far as it is at the 
same time different from itself only, so that nothing whatsoever alien (or 
opposite) to it can be found at all within or outside its totality.  Accordingly, 
being and non-being cannot be truly known as lying alongside one another, be 
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they assumed to stay within or outside the whole;  for the whole can neither be 
divided from within nor confined from without.       
     All this gives us to clearly understand that the principle of the simultaneous 
truth of contradictories, when applied to the dialectical resolution of the 
ontological contradiction, should not allow us to misinterpret the relationship 
between being and non-being by virtue of their separation.  In particular, neither 
of them should be understood as followed by the other, which complies, as seen 
above, with a temporal sequence in the course of mutation only.  Nor should 
they furthermore be understood as being posited alongside one another, as 
would, for instance, be the case with the application of the via negativa in 
theology that – despite the apophatic affirmation of the supremacy of the 
infinite over the finite – actually results in having both counterparts (as if 
appropriate to different levels of being) mutually confined and, therefore, 
inadequate to the true infinity of the real whole.  The infinite cannot be properly 
understood as consisting of the opposites added up in like manner to the 
complementary components, nor can it be truly known as simply exalted over 
the finite that remains, as it were, to co-exist with it.  The infinite whole, as said 
above, is neither divided from within nor confined from without.  It means that 
the true Being, infinite in its totality, does not contain being and non-being, but 
is a single and indivisible whole. 
       This is true, however, unless the mind comes to trust the senses as reliable 
sources of knowledge and, for this reason, finds it legitimate to reduce the 
whole of being to a conglomerate of finite things as they appear to the mind 
when immediately given to it through the sensual perception.  Should it be the 
case that the mind falls victim to the dictates of the senses and, as a 
consequence, to a parochial vision of being, it has to erroneously associate the 
infinity of the divine with pure negativity of the transcendent.   Apophatically 
approaching it however by negating the immanence of “all existence”53 
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(relegated, as mentioned, under the pressure of sensible evidence to the 
existence of finite things), the mind is actually compelled to locate the infinite 
of the divine nowhere else but beyond the limits of being.   As a matter of fact, 
gradually denying all finite definitions (and along with them the existence of all 
finite beings) as incompatible with the divine infinity, it cannot finally arrive 
anywhere else except a sterile abstraction of what is supposed to be an 
alternative to a being, but proves nonetheless to be nothing more than just a 
complete negation of being as such.  So that, when led in this way to pure 
negativity of existence that can only be known as non-being (and therefore 
unknown, in any positive sense of knowledge), the apophatically oriented mind 
does nothing other in fact but calls into question the ontological status and the 
very reality of what is believed to be ineffable and incomprehensible.  But 
negative theology, so outspokenly enthusiastic about the apophatic approach to 
being, remains tacit about this unwanted implication of its efforts.  Instead, it 
keeps insisting on complete lack of knowledge as the only true way to the 
highest form of being.  “By virtue of ἁὁalone,” says Vladimir Lossky 
about the apophaticism of the Dionysian mystical theology, “can one know Him 
Who is above all possible objects of knowledge.  Following the way of 
negation, we ascend from the lower levels of being to the highest, gradually 
discarding anything knowable so as in the darkness of complete ignorance to 
approach Him Who is unknowable.”54  
     Regarding this, however, the haunting question in fact is whether the via 
negativa really helps the mind to move away from the ‘bottom’ of being and 
come any closer to its very ‘top’, where the incomprehensible infinite is 
expected to be encountered.  In other words, does it really mean that it is 
nothing else but the lack of knowledge that brings the mind to conformity with 
Him Who is unknowable?   Does it not rather mean that the ascent to the infinite 
One, inaccessible to finite knowledge, simply requires a completely new type of 
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knowledge, essentially different from the finite one but thoroughly appropriate 
to infinity?  Perhaps, it is the very all-consuming darkness of ἁὁthat 
does not allow the upholders of apophaticism to see clearly enough that the 
infinite understood as negativity only can actually have nothing in common with 
being at all.  Moreover, as incomprehensible, this negative infinity can only be 
found, so to speak, on the other side of the divide that separates it from 
everything finite and comprehensible.  To be recognised at all, the negative 
infinity needs therefore to be contrasted with the positive so as to become fully 
distinguished from it.  This would make the infinite, however, continuously 
dependent on its opposite and illegitimately turn the latter, finite and transient 
by nature, into something substantial (constantly present), as if it could always 
remain there beyond the infinite and be retained as unchangeable and sufficient 
in itself.  Should it be the case, the opposite of the substantial would be the 
unsubstantial alone.  But as a vision of reality, the unsubstantial infinity placed 
elsewhere above the substantial finitude would inevitably prove to be a mere 
construct of the faulty mind, highly inappropriate to the real whole, both 
indivisible from within and unconfined from without. 
     Thus standing up for ἁὁhat forsakes the ground of sensible evidence 
(which is fairly justified by its incompatibility with the divine infinity), the 
apophatic mind, alas, arrives not at the highest level of being, as mystical 
theology on the whole would claim, but at that stage of ascent where it finds 
itself set over against the initial point of its departure anchored among finite 
things and associated with being or its lower levels.  Indeed, as far as the 
infinite is found to be above all beings, it proves in fact to be confined by them 
and therefore irrelevant to being as such.  By no means should the ascent to the 
highest and infinite being be understood as a kind of flight from the lower and 
finite.  No finite things should simply be abandoned and neglected by the 
ascending mind, i.e. left to their own so as to remain as they seem to be in the 
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inferior state of their immediacy, as though they could co-exist with something 
superior and be outside of what is assumed to be infinite.  The infinite as such 
can only be truly known as embracing all finite things, which, being inside the 
infinite, cardinally change or, better to say, lose their finite form appropriate 
solely to the exterior perceptions of the mind.
55
  So that, as long as the true 
knowledge of the infinite escapes the mind whose perspective remains 
conformed to a wrong vision of infinity, the finite things – although discarded 
as inappropriate to the highest being – can only be understood as being exterior 
to the infinite and therefore con-substantial with it.  If this is the case, the 
apophatic mind, despite its loftiest expectations, can actually ascend to 
nowhere, but can easily become guilty of imposing a fictitious hierarchy-like 
construct upon the entire reality by merely adhering to a metaphysical paradigm 
of thinking and reproducing its major prejudice.  According to this prejudice 
deeply inherent in metaphysics as a type of mentality, the mind may deal with 
no other reality in fact apart from the one divided in two between the finite and 
infinite, where both counterparts (also distinguished as the immanent and 
transcendent) ever remain set over against one another and appear to be 
improperly associated with being and non-being respectively.   
Dialectic versus metaphysics  
     To summarise the above scrutiny of the possible ways of understanding of 
the relationship between being and non-being (which, as it will be seen in the 
following chapter, is crucial to the entire of Eriugena’s system of philosophical 
theology), some distinct features should be highlighted as follows.  
     Non-being may be either 
a) metaphysically understood to be excluded from being or 
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b) dialectically thought of as an aspect of negativity, indispensable for 
knowing the totality of being as neither divided from within nor confined 
from without. 
     Furthermore, as excluded from being, non-being may not unfairly be 
understood at least in three possible ways: 
1. as forbidden to exist for that simple reason that nothing whatsoever, as 
required by Parmenides’ Way of Truth, can ever be found there outside 
the total being; 
2. as following after being, as meant by Parmenides’ Way of Delusion, 
according to which the mind deceived by senses tends to mistake a 
temporal sequence of changing things for the reality as it truly is; 
3. as posited alongside (or ‘above’) being, as apophaticism in general does 
acknowledge while denying definitions of all finite beings, but leaving 
these transient beings as they are in their immanent existence. 
     As indicated in the above points a and b, in contrast to this one-sidedly 
metaphysical approach to non-being the alternative, dialectical, way of 
understanding of the relationship between being and non-being seeks to get the 
latter ‘absorbed’, so to speak, in the former, where no opposites – as required by 
the universality of the Principle of all beings and the order of reality it gives rise 
to – can subsist after or alongside one another and thus divide the whole of 
being from within or confine it from without.  As appropriate to the universal 
Principle of all, the whole of being may only be truly known as infinite that is 
ever unconfined and therefore irreducible to the multitude of finite things, 
regardless of their number included in it.  The totality of Being that unceasingly 
is admits of nothing other (or non aliud, as Eriugena puts it) within or alongside 
itself; it is solely conceivable indeed, as ascertained before, in the way of being 
simultaneously self-identical and different from itself. 
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     This contrast between metaphysics and dialectic in their understanding of 
what being and non-being are further means that, while inclined to metaphysical 
divisions, apophatism would be prepared to consider the ontological contraries 
as being simultaneously con-substantial and therefore relevant to truth, as if 
they might refer to different realms of existence.  However, unlike this faulty 
approach leading to an apparent misconception of infinity, the dialectical vision 
of the same contraries from the perspective of contradiction (where they take 
shape of the contradictory statements) does not imply at all that their 
simultaneous truth could ever be equally distributed, so to speak, among the 
contradictories, as far as they remained mutually countered.  In other words, the 
simultaneous truth of the contradictories dialectically understood is applicable 
to their unity only, since they cannot be known as being con-substantial and 
therefore equally true.   
Resolution of the contradiction  
     All this subsequently means that the only effective resolution of the 
contradiction that allows the mind to overcome the opposition of the contraries, 
tearing the infinite reality of the whole into pieces, may be provided by 
dialectic
56
 alone.  In particular, the resolution comes to be brought about in the 
way of knowing ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ not as remaining mutually opposed 
and confined in their distinction (when they would be appropriate to the world 
of finitude only), but as belonging to the totality of all-pervasive Being – though 
not as its constitutive components, but as the aspects of its absolute self-identity, 
known solely through its self-distinction.  Hence, in the contradiction   
Being is; 
Non-being is, 
where the unity of the contraries is expressed by the predicate is, both ‘being’ 
and ‘non-being’ are understood to be simultaneously referred to the all-
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embracing Being, so that neither of them is meant to be set over against the 
other.  As a result, in conformity with the dialectical vision of the contradiction 
(but in contrast to the metaphysically apophatic attitude to the transient things), 
‘being’ can neither be opposed to nor confined by the contrary ‘non-being’.  
Indeed, from the dialectical point of view, ‘being’ cannot be known as a mere 
immediacy or appearance of  existence, relevant only to the phenomenal world 
of finite things that are always present to the mind ‘here’ and ‘now’, but never 
‘after’ or ‘before’.  As a bare appearance of transient things as they are 
immediately given to the mind through the exterior senses, a confined ‘being’ 
would therefore turn out to be nothing other than just a kind of improper or 
false being.  This is the ‘being’ which – in accordance with the fourth mode of 
Eriugena’s understanding of being and non-being – should not unreasonably be 
qualified as the untrue one or, in fact, non-being, inasmuch as found irrelevant 
to the infinite whole of Being which alone truly is while remaining in its 
unconfined and indivisible totality. 
     Thus within the contradiction dialectically understood, the contraries of 
‘being’ and ‘non-being’ become, as it were, mutually replaced while changing 
semantically, i.e. acquiring the opposite meaning.  As Hegel would explain it, 
any contrary, when contrasted with its counterpart and as such taken on its own 
to be extended to the utmost of its extremity, inevitably turns into the opposite 
and thus smooths away the divide of their distinction, giving the mind an 
opportunity to reconsider the relationship between the two from the perspective 
of their unity.  As a result, what was previously found appropriate to the 
semantics of the metaphysically apophatic approach to existence, now comes up 
in the light of a completely new understanding.  In particular, as seen before, 
apophatism as such seeks to associate being with the immediacy of finite 
existence, and non-being with infinity as bare negativity that is supposed to 
exceed the limits of the immanent presence.  By contrast with this merely 
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alleged overcoming of finitude (where infinity as negativity only seems to 
surpass the finite but in fact remains opposed to it and therefore confined), the 
dialectical treatment of the ontological contraries seeks to embrace being in its 
entirety, so as to leave no room for anything opposite, neither within nor 
outside, and thus to know it as the infinite one.  In this way, dialectic aims to 
overcome indeed the insubstantiality of the opposites mutually confined in their 
opposition, and thus to bring the whole of being to conformity with the absolute 
Being, which alone truly is (and therefore is true) while ever remaining at one 
with the universal Principle of all things that come forth from it but never leave 
the totality of it.  Little wonder, therefore, that within such a holistic approach 
of dialectic (coming to the fore, as we shall see it later, in the fourth mode of 
Eriugena’s understanding of being) non-being can only be acknowledged as a 
mere appearance of the true (infinite) being or its false vision.  For it is from the 
perspective of this sort of vision that the entire existence is erroneously found 
identified with a multitude of contingent things which seem to come and go at 
random, while being exposed to the mind through the exterior senses and the 
experience based on their dictates. 
     All this convinces us that in truth there is no reality divided into being and 
non-being, where things would come into existence and pass away.  In this 
sense, resolution of the contradiction may not improperly be understood from 
the dialectical point of view as being all about the cardinal change of the 
meaning of being, when the latter is found by the mind to be embraced in its 
infinite (self-identical) totality through overcoming in full its distinction from 
the opposite.  Consequently, the contradiction 
Being is; 
Non-being is 
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comes to be resolved in so far as the contradictory statements it consists of are 
known as being simultaneously true, 
because 
- there is nothing external or alien (opposite) in the true being of the 
absolute self-identity; 
- so that no appearance nor pure negativity of the immediate should ever be 
identified with the being itself; 
- for nothing else can be known as the true being apart from the one 
unconfined (opposed by nothing other) that unceasingly is. 
 A blueprint for Eriugena’s discourse 
     With regard to this, therefore, it would be not unfair to suggest that the 
dialectical treatment and resolution of the ultimate ontological contradiction 
provides the mind with a means of restoration of the sound vision of reality as it 
truly is while coming forth from the universal Principle of all and never leaving 
it.  This is the reality known to faith and theology as that of creation, and the 
vision of it is available not to senses or the corrupt mind subject to their dictates, 
but to the reason which, being dialectically disciplined, deservedly acquires the 
name of recta ratio, as Eriugena calls it.  It is this recta ratio restored to its 
proper rational motion (where senses with their contingent contents borrowed 
from without do not go ahead of the general notions of reason) that is capable of 
following the right order of the reality of God’s creation, where the universal 
precedes the particular, and not vice versa.  Thus by reason alone those who, 
unlike Pilate, find the truth (and above all the one of God’s ever-lasting 
kingdom) to be valid are enabled to see through the ‘mind’s eye’, as Eriugena 
puts it, the unconfined reality as it truly is in all its magnificence.  And they are 
doing so, as it is abundantly clear from what is suggested by the Philosopher, 
while breaking through the sensible appearance which – like a veil woven by 
the perverse (irrational or sense-dependent) motions of the corrupt mind – 
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covers up the glorious face of God’s creation.57   In this way, and in accordance 
with the doctrine of return (reditus) central to the whole of Eriugena’s system, 
the entire human being comes to be brought back to the original conformity 
with the substantial reality of creation, as appropriate to the pre-fallen state of 
human mind, unseduced by the senses and therefore not guilty of setting the 
opposites apart.  This is consequently the way in which all humans come to live 
in perfect communion with Him Who truly is the real source of all life. 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
109 
 
CHAPTER III 
The keys to Eriugena’s system 
The ladder of notions 
     From the preceding analysis it follows that the dialectical ontology, which 
alone is appropriate to the conception Eriugena develops in the Periphyseon, is 
the one that is focused on the proper treatment of the ultimate ontological 
contradiction and the implications of its resolution.  This kind of ontology 
proves to bind up the key links of Eriugena’s discourse into a coherent train of 
thought, resulting in a majestic conception of a philosophically rigorous 
approach to the theologically profound truth of God’s Oneness, which is 
revealed to all humans through the salvific message of Christ’s teaching.  Not 
improperly therefore these links of the Philosopher’s discourse could be 
summed up in the form of the following sequence of notions progressing 
towards realisation of the truth of salvation, understood as the return of human 
beings from the illusory world of sensible things to the true reality of God’s 
creatio: 
 Sound vision of the reality provided by the dialectical resolution of the 
ontological contradiction; 
 Reality (ΰorNaturaas it truly is while coming forth from the 
universal Principle of all; 
 Availability of the true reality, not to the senses but to recta ratio (right 
reason); 
 Recta ratio as reason capable of following the substantial order of 
creation that proceeds from the universal to the particular; 
 Appearance as the corrupt mind’s construct imposed upon the true 
reality, hidden thereby from senses but not from recta ratio; 
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 Return (reditus) of human beings (or bringing human life) to conformity 
with the substantial order of creation, resulting in the cardinal change of 
the prospect of human existence within the reality ever-lasting. 
     Such is the ‘ladder’ of notions which, as Eriugena’s discourse suggests, 
brings all human beings (in their ascent from the abstract to the concrete that 
dialectic in its proper Hegelian sense is all about) to the knowledge of the One 
God as the infinite Being that unceasingly is in and through and for itself, ever 
remaining ‘All in All’.  In this sense, the whole sequence of the above notions 
could be fairly crowned (as appropriate to the agenda of the Periphyseon’s 
doctrine) with the idea of  
 God’s Oneness known as a single (indivisible) whole of God’s infinite 
(undivided) being, outside or within which nothing alien (opposite) does 
subsist. 
Overcoming of dualism 
     As a coherent conception of the absolute unity of God’s being, to which it is 
essential not to allow the creature to subsist outside the One God, Eriugena’s 
philosophical theology may not unreasonably be considered as a systematic 
attempt to overcome the dualism of religious thought.  That is the dualism 
which the mind inevitably faces as soon as the metaphysical dichotomy between 
God’s being and that of the creature is taken by common belief for granted.  
Furthermore, as it is clear from the emphasis on the availability of the true being 
to reason alone that, in unison with Parmenides, the author of the Periphyseon 
unambiguously makes in the fourth mode of understanding of being and non-
being, it is not unlikely that his system developed in response to some unfair 
misreading of Parmenides.  In particular, it could respond to the possibility of a 
dualistic interpretation of the Parmenidian approach to the totality of Being 
(well discussed by Islamic scholars at the time of Eriugena), i.e. a possibility of 
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a regrettable misinterpretation of the Greek philosopher largely conditioned by 
deep deficiencies in the non-dialectical character of his approach.  In this sense, 
it does not seem implausible that Parmenides’ Periphyseon, with its strong 
appeal to the Way of Truth as that of approaching the true Being, immensely 
encouraged Eriugena, who was greatly concerned about the way of thinking of 
the infinity of God’s being, and thus gave impetus to his opus magnum, 
accidentally or not called likewise the Periphyseon
1
.  Moreover, since there is 
no compelling evidence that the Carolingians, among whom this monumental 
work of Eriugena’s first came to light, were familiar with writings of 
Parmenides, it can be fairly assumed that Eriugena might have been acquainted 
with Parmenides’ ideas through his Eastern contemporaries.  Had it been the 
case, a key figure among the latter would certainly be al-Nazzam, a disciple of 
the dialectician Allaf and a prominent member of the Mu’tazilah movement, 
who was well read in Greek philosophy and in Parmenides in particular. 
     In his close studies of Parmenides’ writings and other works of the School of 
Elea (and, above all, those of Zeno), al-Nazzam was particularly interested in 
the way of knowing the reality as it truly is, lying beyond any sensible images 
and sense-based assumptions.  Both Parmenides and his pupil Zeno were known 
to al-Nazzam (as they are to all students of philosophy nowadays) as those who, 
on account of the principle divisibility of space (distance) and time (duration) 
ad infinitum, denied a possibility of movement
2
 or, to be precise, its 
susceptibility of being thought of.  This further meant to them that the true 
reality, amenable to thought alone, must be immovable; since movement as 
such is unthinkable.  Enthusiastic about the prevalent role of thought in 
approaching the true reality as it was exercised by these thinkers, al-Nazzam yet 
remained greatly puzzled by a prospect of a dualistic understanding of reality it 
seemed to lead to.  To these doubts of al-Nazzam concerning the status of 
sensible world, that threatened to cleave its reality asunder, Mir Valiuddin gives 
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quite an explicit characteristic: “Among the Greek philosophers, Parmenides 
and Zeno had denied movement itself.  They could not declare untrue the 
movement which is observable and is a fact, so they claimed that perception 
cannot reveal reality.  They maintained that senses are not the instruments of 
real knowledge and are deceptive, and the phenomenal world is illusory, a 
mirage.  The real world is the rational world, the knowledge of which is gained 
by reason alone in which there is neither plurality nor multiplicity, neither 
movement nor change.  It is an immutable and immovable reality.  But they 
could not explain how this illusory and deceptive world was born out of the real 
world.  Thus their system of philosophy, in spite of their claiming it to be 
monism, ended in dualism”3.   
     As a consistent dialectician, Eriugena would, clearly, disagree with such a 
conclusion and strongly object to a dualistic misinterpretation of the 
Parmenidian ontology; although at the same time he would hardly be able to 
deny that this kind of misreading might easily result from those uncertainties of 
Parmenides’ thought with which a mere postulation of the totality of Being (and 
not a coherent thinking of it) was largely fraught.  As seen perspicuously 
enough from the inner logic of the entire Periphyseon, Eriugena is very 
determined to offer an effective antidote to any temptations of the mind to 
cleave asunder the reality of the infinite whole by placing outside it an ‘extra’ 
world consisting of sensible things.  And in the profound meaning of Book IV, 
where the collision between the proper rational motion of human nature and the 
deceptive affect of senses upon the mind is brought into focus, this major 
concern of Eriugena’s is especially evident.  To him, it does not seem terribly 
difficult to explain how the “illusory and deceptive world,” the presence of 
which al-Nazzam was much puzzled by, could emerge.  In the first place, it 
could not be born out of the real one so as to be located, as if something 
substantial, elsewhere outside it.  The sensible world simply comes as an 
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illusion indeed from a wrong vision of reality in the result of deception of the 
mind by senses, when its pure judgement, in Eriugena’s plain words, is 
“clouded by sense-bound thinking”4.  As a matter of fact, this world cannot exist 
elsewhere outside the true reality; it can only be an appearance of the latter one 
when immediately given to the mind through the exterior senses.  It appears to 
come to the mind from without and therefore proves to be nothing more than 
just a wrong perspective of reality, where in truth nothing whatsoever can come 
into being otherwise than from within. 
     As a Christian scholar who thinks theologically and in a dialectically 
coherent manner, it is obvious to Eriugena that this coming from within is the 
way things go in reality as it substantially is – that is, the reality of creation 
which comes into being from the One God, beyond the infinity of Whom there 
is nothing other where else things can come from.  Anything whatsoever, when 
genuinely believed to be created, may only be understood to subsist not 
otherwise than by coming from God and staying within Him Who is the 
universal Principle of all, which, as the universal indeed, may be transcended by 
none.  For as Eriugena suggests in his Homily on the Prologue to St. John’s 
Gospel, the Evangelist gives us to understand that “through the Son all things 
were made and that nothing subsisted outside of him”5.  “All things, therefore, 
that were made by the Word,” the author of the Homily continues, “live in him 
unchangeably and are life.  In him all things exist neither by temporal intervals 
or places, nor as what is to come; but all are one in him, above all times and 
places, subsist in him eternally.”  And further he concludes: “Visible, invisible, 
corporeal, incorporeal, rational, irrational – heaven and earth, the abyss, and 
whatever is therein – in him all live and are life and subsist eternally.  Even 
what seems to us to be without all vital movement lives in the Word”6.  To 
Eriugena, this is the soundest theological view well-grounded in the heritage of 
him whom he keeps calling throughout all his writings the Apostle: “For in 
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him” (the Word), as the Sacred Scripture says, “we live and move and have our 
being”7. 
     So in order that the reality as it truly is might be seen and thus “the 
countenance of the universal nature” be restored, as Eriugena puts it, “to its 
former glory” and beauty (748c), the mind should no longer be conformed to 
the world of things that are seen from without.  Instead, the mind must be 
transformed by its renewing, as St. Paul reminds us in Rom. 12.2.  And in 
accordance with the aforesaid, this renewing of the mind should mean only one 
thing indeed – namely, that the mind must bring itself to conformity to the way 
things truly are so as to properly contemplate them all from within itself.  This is 
the vision of reality that becomes available to the mind, as shown above, 
through the contradiction dialectically treated.  For it is in contradiction that 
metaphysics and dialectic as the two paradigms of thinking, appropriate to 
different perspectives of reality, come to collision as those appealing to senses 
or thought and starting from the particular or the universal respectively.  It is 
consequently here, in the contradiction dialectically resolved, that the perverse 
motion of the corrupt mind, inclined under the dictates of senses to make things 
leave God and therefore responsible for placing them outside Him, gets 
overcome.  And along with it, the very misconception of God is overcome as 
well
8
.  
     Indeed, God cannot be properly known as a remote and superior being that is 
simply located elsewhere above (or alongside) the inferior world of finite 
things; nor can He be known as present to the finite world or lying within it.  
For in the reality of the infinite whole that truly (unceasingly) is, there is neither 
a confined God opposed to the world, nor the finite world, substantial and 
independent in its existence
9
.  In other words, God is definitely not a being 
which, like an external force, would merely push the creature from without to 
come into being out of nothing or non-being.  Such a God acting from beyond 
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upon something else, as if placed outside Himself (even when associated with 
void or disguised under the name of nihil), is inconceivable at all.  This is 
simply because God confined does not exist. 
Creatio ex Deo 
     Thus, dualism as a valid conception is not an issue to Eriugena, because to 
him God is truly infinite.  This means that outside the infinite whole of God’s 
being there is absolutely nothing – nothing in the Parmenidian sense of the 
word, i.e. in the sense that nothing is not at all.  Hence, by no means can the 
creation be understood in the way of transition from non-being into being.  
Coming forth into being out of nothing or out of nowhere should mean to a 
believer in the One God that ex nihilo may only signify ex Deo.  Nothing 
whatsoever, when consistently thought of, can really be known as coming into 
being out of anything else (be it even relegated to nihil or void) apart from the 
true, infinite, Being that is God Himself
10
.  This is what Eriugena is convinced 
of and seeks to prove by the entire system of his discourse
11
.   
     In the reality of God’s creation there is nothing alien to Him, unless the mind 
corrupted makes believe otherwise.  The very account of Genesis makes it 
explicit at Gen.1 that God is fully satisfied with what He makes, because there 
is no discrepancy between His will and act in creation or, as Eriugena puts it, 
between His will and being.  Each ‘day’ of creation is acknowledged by the 
Scripture to be good; the entire creation thus proves to be the realm of Goodness 
and can only be known as the realm of God manifest, where His will comes 
true
12
.  As far as humans find it possible, however, to disagree with this 
fundamental truth conveyed by the Scripture, they doom themselves to live 
wrong life of not theirs (i.e. inappropriate to their true nature coming forth from 
the only Source of all life), and thus actually rebel against God Himself.  In the 
reality of the infinite whole there can be no division indeed into ‘this’ and ‘the 
other’ world existing, as it were, alongside one another.  The dichotomy 
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between the real and the sensible world (as well as between God’s being and the 
creature) is in fact nothing more than just a pernicious blunder made by the 
mind corrupted by its perverse motion.  The senses overriding the mind is where 
sin and unrighteous life are rooted, making human beings fall out of the 
paradise of God’s creation, as Eriugena believes it to happen in line with Gen.3.  
He is therefore convinced that the perverse motion of the mind subject to the 
dictates of the senses is where a genuine effort is to be made.  The corrupt mind 
is what to be amended and brought back to the ways of its proper rational 
motion.  This is consequently where and how the perspective of the true reality 
is to be restored so as to let all human beings return to the world to which they 
originally belong.   
Dialectic, Reality, and the Book 
     Thus dialectic, as Eriugena’s genuine ‘know how’ and the very core of his 
philosophically innovative approach to Christian theology, comes into focus of 
the project which he gives the title of the Periphyseon.  It is by means of 
dialectic, as he gives us to understand it by the entire system of his thought, that 
the restoration and return mentioned above come to be brought about.  
Responsible for a new way of thinking that overcomes dualism in the mind’s 
relation with reality, dialectic provides a holistic vision of being as an effective 
remedy for healing the mind of its addiction to metaphysical divisions of all 
things into opposites. 
     In the course of this treatment under dialectic’s supervision, the mind learns 
to refrain from mistaking these deliberately made dichotomies for true, and thus 
to restore the relation with the reality as it properly is according to its substantial 
order. 
     This substantial reality that properly is according to a certain fundamental 
order is but creation – that is, the reality that proceeds from the universal 
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Principle of all, and proceeding from it never abandons this source of being.  
This is consequently the reality that by no means can be identified with that of 
sensible things as they are given to the mind through the sensual perception.  
The reality of creation is definitely something other than the world of 
appearance, which does not mean however that it lies elsewhere beyond the 
sensible world.  It is the reality which includes the sensible one as well, though 
only when this sensible part is seen anew so as to be known not according to its 
corporeal appearance but as an organic member of the infinite and indivisible 
whole.  This is therefore the reality hidden behind the veil of sensible images 
which needs to be searched for; and it is exactly what Eriugena does by 
resorting to a careful reading of the Book of Genesis.  In this sense, not unfairly 
can his massive system of theological thinking philosophically disciplined be 
understood as an exercise of deep insight into the meaning of the first three 
chapters of Genesis.  The reality he is looking for Eriugena clearly defines as 
that of “the sole Principle, Origin, and universal Source of all, Which Itself 
proceeds from nothing while from It proceed all things, … and Which, Itself 
ἅthat is, without beginning), is the Beginning and the End, the one 
Good, the one God” (741c). 
     This is the search that the author of the Periphyseon not unreasonably 
compares to a “perilous journey”.  And this ‘journey’ is so hard and long that it 
can only be covered by five books in the dense text of his opus magnum, among 
which the most intriguing and at the same time important is the fourth one.  It is 
actually in Book IV that the whole strategy of Eriugena’s exploration cardinally 
changes.  Previously it seemed to smoothly follow a linear-like division of 
Nature into species, which must have been quite intelligible to those 
Carolingians who were familiar, among other conventional doctrines, with 
Augustine’s conception of a threefold structure of the universe of creation13.  
Now, in Book IV, the strategy applied becomes obviously dialectical, bringing 
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to fore contraries and contradictions, and making its adherents not only 
reconsider their understanding of God’s being and creation (including the place 
and role of human beings in it), but also look anew at the very structure of the 
entire treatise and its profound meaning.  Moreover, it is in this book that “the 
conflict and clash of different interpretations” is said to take place, by which – 
as we shall see it below (with regard to the whole of the Periphyseon’s 
conception as well) – the author ultimately means nothing other but the ‘clash’ 
of the conflicting paradigms of thinking in their attitude to the true Being that is 
neither preceded nor followed by non-being.  “The difficulty of this part of our 
theme the conflict and clash of different interpretations”, says Eriugena about 
Book IV, “I find so formidable that in comparison to it the first three books 
seem like a smooth sea upon which, because of the calmness of the waves, 
readers could sail without fear of shipwreck, steering a safe course” (743d).  
“Now, however”, he continues in a vividly poetic manner, “we enter upon a 
voyage where the course has to be picked from the mass of tortuous digressions, 
where we have to climb the steeps of obscure doctrines, encounter the region of 
the Syrtes, that is to say, the dangers of the currents of unfamiliar teaching, even 
in immediate danger of shipwreck from the obscurity of the subtlest intellects, 
which like concealed rocks may suddenly split our vessel; and the length of this 
course is such that we must extend it even into a fifth book” (743d – 744a).  
Thus, in the author’s words, “we shall pick through all these dangers the true 
and safe course, and reach the harbor which we seek” (744a). 
     Needless to say that to Eriugena this “true and safe course” is directly 
associated with dialectic, which alone, “steering a safe course” between the 
opposites, allows those learning from “the subtlest intellects” to overcome on 
their way to truth all  ‘conflicts’ and ‘clashes’ of different teachings.  Originally 
implanted in reality (749a), dialectic alone, when translated into art (or 
discipline of the mind) is understood, according to Eriugena, to be capable of 
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following the proper order of the reality of creation, which he also calls “the 
natural sequence of events”.  This order (or sequence) is such, the Philosopher 
emphasises, that genus is first “because all species are contained in it”, and 
these individual species proceed from their genus (general cause) so as evolving 
within it to “achieve their unity in it” (748a), never actually departing from the 
universal itself, which at 750a is explicitly defined as “the One Universal 
Principle”.  “From this we may see”, Eriugena points out, “that that art which 
concerns itself with the division of genera into species and the restoration of 
species into genera, which is called dialectic, did not arise from human 
contrivances, but was first implanted in nature… and was later discovered there 
by the sages who make use of it in their subtle investigation of reality” (749a). 
     All this gives us to understand that – as a proper way of thinking which starts 
from the universal and further proceeds towards the particular to make the 
universal manifest – dialectic brings human mind to perfect conformity to the 
substantial reality of creation.  And thus it opens before all human beings a new 
prospect of life, which by “the unique teaching of God’s kingdom” is meant to 
be nothing other in fact but living according to truth, that is in harmony and 
union with Him Who truly is the infinite Being that unceasingly is.  But this 
true being of human nature, when “it is brought back to the former condition of 
its substance in which it was made after the image of God” (445c), constitutes, 
strictly speaking, the subject-matter of another book – the fifth one, into which 
Eriugena intends, as clearly stated at 744a, to extend his most difficult and 
intriguing fourth book.  What the author of the Periphyseon is not as explicit 
about, however, is that this subject-matter of the fifth book, smoothly 
proceeding from that of the fourth one, does also perfectly match the fifth mode 
of understanding of being and non-being, which is said to be observed by reason 
in human nature only and associated with living according to “the divine image 
in which it was properly substantiated” (445c). 
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     And this perfect match with a mode of distinction between being and non-
being actually raises a crucial question concerning the genuine structure of the 
Periphyseon itself: is Eriugena outspoken enough when he gives his readers an 
impression that the layout of the treatise is subject to a fourfold scheme of 
Nature’s division articulated in the opening part of the work?  Does not he play 
tricks on readers when, immediately after the four species of Nature, he offers 
five modes of understanding of being and non-being, and later, in Book IV, he 
makes an abundantly clear statement about his intention to write five books?  
Should not it mean that at the very heart of its discourse each of the 
Periphyseon’s books is focused in fact on one of the five modes of our 
understanding of being and non-being, but not on a species of Nature divided, 
as many believe, while taking for granted Eriugena’s own claims, including 
those, as we shall see it below, made in the opening lines of Book IV?  Does not 
it after all mean that the author, being a staunch dialectician, deliberately creates 
a contradiction between the visible and invisible layout of the Book as a whole, 
i.e. between its literal (fragmentary) and spiritual (integral) sense?  Should it be 
the case that the author is determined to distinguish between the finite and 
infinite dimension of the Book so as to let the misleading impression of 
particulars and the substantial meaning of the whole be clearly discerned, we 
may easily recognise in his intention a strong appeal to truth as the real 
objective of a profoundly philosophical text, the ultimate concern of which is 
fairly concurrent with that of the sacred one.  Indeed, the truth itself, as 
considered above, is not merely an external authority that can be imposed upon 
those who claim their belief in it.  Truth cannot be simply declared or given 
from without; it can only be really adopted when acquired from within, through 
reason and deep understanding, as Eriugena himself insists.  For this, truth 
needs to be properly investigated by reason and therefore coherently thought of.  
Understood as a dialectical contradiction, the distinction between the visible and 
hidden layer of writings (i.e. between the particular of the sensible image 
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expressed and the universal of thought defined) would undoubtedly be the best 
way, when properly followed, of approaching the profound meaning of these 
writings, concealed by the letter lying on the surface of their immediate 
appearance.   
     Such a sharp distinction between the contraries implanted in the very form of 
the treatise to be properly tackled in a dialectically coherent way looks like a 
very Eriugenian motif indeed.  Little wonder, therefore, that at 744a, when the 
strategy of exploration is meant to be changing, Eriugena himself gives us a 
clue to complete reconsideration of the whole structure of his opus magnum.   
From the statement he makes there, it is quite clear that Book V was planned at 
the earlier stages of his project, even well before Book IV came to light.  It 
would be not improper to assume, then, that Book V has always been to 
Eriugena not merely an accidental extension of the previous one providing, as it 
were, a sort of supplementary material to its argument, but quite a necessary and 
independent element of a greater plan, appropriate to another scheme, 
completely different from the one overtly claimed by the author – namely, to 
five modes of our understanding of being and non-being. 
     The following detailed analysis of the text from Book IV will enable us to 
considerably enhance this assumption.  For it will become clear from this 
analysis that the argument developing in Book IV is profoundly based on what 
is articulately formulated by Eriugena in the fourth mode of distinction between 
being and non-being.  Furthermore, a striking affinity of this mode’s 
formulations with the epistemological postulates of the Parmenidian ontology 
allows us also to better understand why Book IV has a reputation of being the 
exceptionally important part of the entire project.  It is particularly here, in 
Book IV, that it finally becomes utterly clear that the ultimate concern of 
Eriugena’s is, similarly to that of Parmenides, to establish the truth of the 
totality of Being that infinitely is.  Being at the very outset of Book I from the 
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fundamental division of all things into those that are and are not, Eriugena 
actually seeks to overcome the ontological dichotomy in the totality of the 
infinite Being, which he finds appropriate to call Natura or ΰ (441a).  And 
it is in Book IV where at last we come to clearly understand that Eriugena’s true 
intention never consisted in the investigation of the division of Nature into 
separate species, hierarchically ordered and associated with God (both creating 
and uncreating), the world of created things, and the so-called primordial causes 
mediating between God and His creation.  What Eriugena is really looking for 
throughout the whole of the Periphyseon is Nature’s unity, the unity of the 
whole Being – that is, God’s Unity or, to be precise, the way we may know it.  
For it is this type of knowledge which does allow us to be really at one with 
Him Who truly is the One. 
     In this sense, therefore, it would be not unfair to suggest that the entirety of 
Eriugena’s Periphyseon should be thoroughly understood as an anti-division 
project
14
.  This is the project which proves to be brought about on the ways of 
overcoming those forms of mind where the division of being into contraries is 
actually rooted.  To Eriugena as a Christian thinker, it is utterly unacceptable 
that these forms of the fundamental division, when imposed upon the reality, 
give rise to different perspectives of its distorted perception, and along with it to 
a prospect of human life in a spurious world of things divided.  The 
fundamental division into being and non-being is in fact what separates all 
humans from the reality of Him Who truly is infinite, and this is the major 
obstacle to be resolutely overcome on the way to the One.  The following 
consideration of Eriugena’s text will help us to come closer to a perspicuous 
vision of the deep meaning of his grand system, which may not improperly be 
defined, as mentioned above, as the one of theological thinking philosophically 
disciplined.  
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CHAPTER IV 
 
The text unlocked 
 
Review of Books I – III 
 
     Book IV of the Periphyseon begins at 741c – 743c with a brief review of the 
three preceding books which appear to follow the sequence of the division of 
Nature into four species as they are presented in the opening part of opus 
magnum at 441b – 442a. 
     Starting from a characteristic of book I as the one where the nature that is not 
created but creates is considered, Eriugena defines its aim as that of proving the  
superessentiality of the Cause of all things.  In particular, he says: “The aim and 
principal theme of our Philosophy of Nature was firstly to prove that uncreated 
and creative Cause of all things which exist and all things which do not exist, 
the sole Principle, Origin, and universal Source of all, which Itself proceeds 
from nothing while from It proceed all things, the Trinity which in three 
Substances is co-essential, and which, Itself ἅthat is, without 
beginning), is the Beginning and the End, the one Good, the one God 
ὁύ  and ὑύ(that is, co-essential and superessential), is in 
fact ὑώ (or superessential) Nature” (741c)
     Passing over to the second book where the second species of Nature that is 
created and creates is examined, Eriugena describes its theme as the analysis of 
the primordial causes of things that subsist in their principles.  “For this nature 
on the one hand”, he explains, “is created by that single universal Cause and 
supreme Goodness, whose property it is by Its unspeakable Power to lead all 
things forth from non-existence into existence; and on the other hand does not 
cease to create the things which come after It, by means of their participation in 
It” (743b). 
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     And, finally, concluding his survey with the third book, Eriugena says about 
it as an inquiry into the third division of Nature that treats of “the ultimate 
effects of the primordial causes”; or the nature which is created and does not 
create.  “These hold the lowest rank of nature”, specifies the author, “for the 
devolution of the universe ceases with them, having no further place whither to 
descend, for it is now established in the realm of corporeal objects” (743c). 
Setting a new aim 
     This brief review of the preceding books of the Periphyseon allows 
Eriugena, as he believes, to pass smoothly to putting forward a new aim which 
would determine the subject-matter of the following book.  Having considered 
in detail in Book III Five Days (or Prophetic Meditations, as he also calls them) 
of the creation presented by the biblical account at Gen.1, Eriugena suggests 
that the next part of his opus magnum should start “with the works of the Sixth 
Prophetic Meditation of the creation of the universe” in order then “to consider 
the Return of all things into that Nature which neither creates nor is created” 
(743c).  Thereby Eriugena intends to safely arrive at the fourth species of 
Nature, which is supposed to be the final destination of the “perilous journey” 
of his investigation of the Nature’s fourfold division already postulated 
(although without any sort of explanation or logical underpinning) in the 
opening lines of Book I.  This final species of division is in fact the most 
problematic part of the entire work, since the obscurity of the reason for such a 
division is even more dramatically enhanced by a remarkably paradoxical 
statement that the fourth species of this division “is classed among the 
impossibles, for it is of its essence that it cannot be”(442a).  So that now, after 
having reached along with the author of the Periphyseon the fourth stage of his 
massive work, one might expect to find at last a clear answer to the question 
what is really meant by that far mysterious fourth division of Nature which from 
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the very beginning of the inquiry undertaken has caused a great deal of 
perplexity and seemed to be a stumbling block on the way to the truth sought.  
     Thus, following the way shown in the Periphyseon, one might hope to gain 
an understanding how it happens that, while bringing all things forth from 
Himself, God never departs from Himself but constantly stays within Himself, 
as if returning to Himself from His creation.  As a result, a student of this 
highest truth might not only tune his mind to the universal pattern of the true 
reality that takes its origin from the sole Source of all (that is the “single 
universal cause”), but also bring in fact all his nature into harmony with the 
reality where the Beginning and the End are one, and thereby he might actually 
come to enjoy his union with God Who is truly One. 
     This ultimate lofty aim of encouraging the human soul to enter upon the path 
of ascending towards the truth of God’s Oneness seems therefore to be what 
Eriugena really implies to achieve by the extensive work of analysis of the 
fourfold division of Nature.  And it is in Book IV, which is essentially focused 
on the perceptive interpretation of Scripture with regard to the Final Day of 
creation, that this ultimate objective of the entire project (only implicitly present 
in it before) is made at last explicitly revealed.  “…in the sweat of her brow”, 
says Eriugena about the human soul, “is she to get her bread (that is, the Word) 
– so she is commanded – and to till the field of Holy Scripture, prolific as it is 
of thorns and thistles (that is, a thin crop of interpretations of what is divine)”, 
so that through the study of Holy Scriptures “she may return and reach again 
that which in the Fall of the First Man she had lost, the contemplation of Truth; 
and reaching she may love it, and loving it she may abide in it, and abiding in it 
she may there find her rest” (744b). 
The key to the sacred text 
     Use of dialectic, as Eriugena sees it,  allows him to arrive at what constitutes 
the real target of the entire project undertaken by him – namely, a 
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comprehension of the true meaning of the Message handed down to us through 
the Holy Scripture. 
     In particular, the matter that concerns the author of the Periphyseon above all 
is how to read the sacred text so as to understand the message conveyed.  
According to him, “there are many ways, indeed an infinite number, of 
interpreting the Scripture, just as in one and the same feather of a peacock and 
even in one and the same point of a tiny portion of the same feather, we see a 
marvellously beautiful variety of innumerable colours” (749c).  It is important 
therefore to find the right way of approaching the meaning of the sacred text 
hidden behind the colourful veil of its form and literal sense.  To Eriugena, who 
is well aware of the role of dialectic in bringing about the transformation of the 
whole of human nature (through which the latter returns to the reality of the 
Divine creation), this right way or fundamental principle, that human reason is 
to firmly adhere to as a clear strategy in pursuit of the meaning concealed, is 
precisely what he calls “the relation which exists between the Sacred Texts and 
reality” (749c).  In the light of the above analysis, it is not hard to understand 
that the relation with reality meant here must be nothing other than conformity 
to the substantial order as it is established in reality from the very beginning of 
God’s creation.  About this substantial order as the one of precedence of the 
universal to the particular Eriugena says in the following words: “For there is a 
most general nature in which all things participate, which is created by the One 
Universal Principle.  And from this nature as from an ample spring certain 
streams, so to speak, issue through the hidden pores of the corporeal creature, 
and pursue their different courses through the subterranean channels until they 
break out above ground in the different forms of the individual objects of 
nature” (750a). 
     With regard to the Scripture, all this might consequently mean only one 
thing: it is the search for the substantial order of reality as it is reflected in the 
texture of sacred writings that, like a holy key, unlocks the most secret recesses 
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of their true meaning.  In this way, man comes to initiation into the mystery of 
return to the true reality: by bringing his mind and nature into correspondence 
with the universal order of the substantial reality he starts his journey back to 
the world where he indeed is due to be.  Hence, when equipped with the art of 
dialectic allowing the mind to properly follow the substantial order of God’s 
creation as it is expressed by the sacred text, one really has an opportunity to go 
beyond the smooth surface of the literal sense of Scripture and to penetrate deep 
into the dimension of its genuine meaning, that is, the realm of the Divine 
Word.  Approaching and accepting thus the Truth of the Word of God, every 
human being takes a chance to actually become what he or she truly is. 
Man’s duality 
     According to Eriugena’s reading of Scripture, man appears to be dual in his 
nature.  “It is true,” the Philosopher points out, “that the species of animal 
which is established in man is superior by virtue of reason and intelligence to 
the nature of animals which are in the same genus…” (750b). So that, on the 
one side, man is believed to be brought forth “within the universal genus of 
animals” (751a) as it should be in accordance with the substantial order of 
God’s creation, whereas on the other side he seems to be something special 
among the animals and is even said, as the Scripture reads, to be made in the 
image and likeness of God (Gen. 1, 26-27).  Thus the Prophet, in Eriugena’s 
view, “records this greatest and most precious species of animal twice in his 
account of the events of the Sixth Day: first, under his genus, which is animal, 
he is commanded to be brought forth from the earth; and then somewhat later, 
when a brief classification of the animals has been given, mention is made of 
his creation as image and likeness of God” (750b – c). 
Man’s uniqueness 
     However, a certain problem seems to arise here, for it is a surprising thing 
indeed that not the whole genus of animals but man alone appears to be made in 
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the image of God.  Thus, as Eriugena insists, the Scripture gives us to 
understand that “man was brought first from the earth with the cattle, reptiles 
and beasts of the field; and yet he alone is formed in the image of God, and so 
removed far beyond all comparison with the rest of the animal kingdom” 
(750d).  Moreover, according to the Scripture again, man is preferred to all the 
animals, which he is believed to be brought forth out of the earth together with, 
as a living soul, and ordained to be master over them (750d).  So that, after all 
these it might seem quite problematic indeed to understand how it could have 
happened that, unlike the other animals, man alone proved to be the image of 
God Who created him like the rest of the creature. 
     The solution comes, as the Philosopher suggests, when it is sought in the 
following way.  As the substantial order of creation requires, the whole animal 
(that is, “the living soul”) is constituted “through connection with the body” 
(751a), or in other words, through the soul’s manifestation in the form of body.  
Likewise man, being a species of the same genus, is established in accordance 
with the universal order of creation, within which the living soul comes to 
manifest herself in the form of the body.  Yet, there is an essential difference 
between man and the rest of the animals.  In particular, within the animal 
kingdom the link between soul and body, while exhibited in sensation, still 
remains unconscious (i.e. not subject to reason) and therefore unrevealed.  The 
proper order of soul and body relationship is virtually irrelevant to sensation as 
such, whose function in effect consists in subjecting soul to the impulses 
coming from the body, which obviously breaks the substantial order of things in 
reality.  Meanwhile, in man – about whom it is fairly said that he is “superior by 
virtue of reason and intelligence to the nature of animals” (750b) – the relation 
between soul and body becomes intelligible (i.e. subject to reason that is by 
nature relevant to the universal as such) and therefore gains an opportunity of 
being properly revealed.  Thus, as Eriugena himself formulates it, “the animal is 
the juncture of soul and body in sensation…  But this threefold motion becomes 
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intelligible in man only, the only rational animal.  For he has in subjection to his 
reason certain motions which may be symbolised by the word ‘cattle’, or ‘four-
footed things’ ” (751c). 
     Hence, in so far as the intelligible – which alone perfectly corresponds to the 
proper connection of soul and body – is actualised in human nature, man really 
comes (unlike the animals in whom this connection does not find its proper 
explication) to be the image of God. 
Rational motion 
     As follows from this conclusion, it appears to be beyond question that it is 
the intelligible as the most essential in man that allows him to be what he truly 
is – that is, the image of God.  The only thing, however, that seems to need 
some more attention here to avoid any unwanted deviation from the very centre 
of Eriugena’s conception as a whole is to make it utterly clear how the 
Philosopher understands the intelligible to be actually brought about in man so 
as to let him overcome one-sided animality of his being. 
     While referred for this purpose to the context at 751c once again, careful 
reading immediately draws our attention to such a phrase as “subjection to 
reason” which appears indeed to be the key one in the fragment for 
understanding how the intelligible comes to manifest itself in human nature.  As 
a matter of fact, this “subjection to reason” cannot imply (and the passage to 
follow unequivocally proves it) anything else apart from the leading role of 
reason with regard to senses, which comes to reveal itself, for instance, in 
cognition, as far as it is true and accurate.  As Eriugena himself testifies to this 
‘mechanism’ of operation of the intelligible in man, “by his skilled zeal to 
understand the sensibles he moves his five-fold sense in disciplined order 
towards cognition of them” (751c) to acquire “true and accurate knowledge of 
all the sensibles, dispelling all falsehood” (751d).  All this means that in order to 
let man know sensible things as they truly are and thus to bring him into the true 
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reality, all human senses are to be disciplined by reason so as not to rule over 
reason but to be ruled by it, that is to say, to be moved by reason or, using the 
author’s figure of speech, to be as obedient to its authority as ‘cattle’ is to 
human will (751d).  Being prior to the sense by nature, reason is also, as 
required by its leadership, superior by status.  Therefore, when man’s nature is 
brought into right order universal to the whole of creation so that his five-fold 
sense, while disciplined and led by reason, obediently follows its leader, only 
then man enters in effect the substantial reality of God’s creation where, in 
accordance with its proper order, the universal precedes the singular (as it is the 
case with reasons and sensible things). 
     This properly ordered motion of human nature – in which soul precedes the 
body, and reason the sense, so as to let man really be the image of God in 
Whom the universal embraces all the singular – is what Eriugena calls the 
“rational soul” (751d) or, as it emerges a little later in the text, the “rational 
motion” (752b).  
Irrational motion 
     As a matter of consequence, it logically follows that when the senses – in 
contrast to the rational motion of soul – are not obedient to reason but 
continually resist its discipline, they constitute the ground within man for 
certain motions which, being substantially hostile to his true nature, deservedly 
receive the name of irrational motions.  “But there are certain irrational motions 
arising from the lower nature”, says Eriugena, “which are resistant to reason – 
such as rage and covetousness and all the inordinate appetites of the corporeal 
senses, that make wrong use of sensible creatures” (752a). 
     These motions therefore occur in man when his senses, instead of being 
obedient to reason, entirely rely on what lies outside man, beyond the rational 
control.  Being thus able to notice only discrete external things and taking them 
for true, these uncontrolled senses infect human nature with their wrong 
impressions of the sensible world and thereby unavoidably cause a bitter 
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conflict between what is inside man and what is outside him.  “And since these 
motions which infect human nature belong properly to the brute creation,” 
continues the author, “they are not improperly called beasts, especially as they 
are in continual revolt against the discipline of reason, and can rarely, if ever, be 
tamed thereby, but are ever seeking to attack savagely and devour the rational 
motions” (752a – b). 
     Thus we are given to understand that, as far as man does not rationally 
control his senses but lets them run ahead of reason towards sensible things 
(turning them into merely corporeal objects perceived from outside only), this 
man actually dooms himself to untrue being in the midst of the sensibles, 
turning his nature into one of the corporeal things among other.  
Subrational motion 
     Meanwhile, apart from the two aforesaid types of motion of the soul, there is 
one more, as the Philosopher believes, to be counted in human nature.  It is 
particularly the one that provides a living (or physiological) connection between 
soul and body, which brings them together into a single whole of a living being.  
This is the motion which performs what the author calls the “auctive and 
nutritive” functions of “the living soul”.  “Moreover in the rational animal”, he 
says, “there are certain other motions, though not manifesting themselves, by 
which the body joined to it is administered.  These motions are situated in the 
auctive and nutritive part of the soul.  And since they perform their functions by 
their natural facility and as it were hiddenly – for they in no way agitate or 
disturb the disposition of the soul but, provided that the integrity of nature is 
preserved intact, penetrate by a silent progress the harmony of the body – they 
are therefore not improperly given the name of reptiles” (752b). 
     Being thus deeply hidden within the soul-body integrity of human nature, 
this living function may be fairly defined as subrational motion.  Though, like 
the irrational one, this motion of soul stays beyond the rational control, it 
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however does not revolt against human reason (as the irrational sense does), but 
simply remains out of reason’s reach.   
Manifestation of the proper order of creation in man 
     “Now in all animals except man”, concludes Eriugena, “two only of these 
aforesaid three types of motion are found: that which resides in the sense and 
lacks the control of its own reasoning, and is therefore called bestial; and that 
which is attributed to the nutritive life force, and resembles the reptile” (752b – 
c).  Consequently, one might clearly see from this that, though the “living soul” 
is substantially constituted by soul and body relationship, this foundation of the 
living creature remains revealed properly and in its full extent (so as to be the 
image of the Creator) in none except man.  In particular, neither the irrational 
motion of soul (when she seeks to entirely rely on the bodily sense in her pursuit 
of knowledge of the outside world and thus allows the body to prevail over her) 
nor subrational motion (where it remains unknown which of the two precedes 
the other) can really show the soul administer the body.  Only in man, as far as 
the rational motion prevails in him so as to let the soul precede the body by 
virtue of bringing the sense to reason’s control and leadership, the proper order 
of the whole creation, according to which all the particular is caused to being by 
the universal, comes to be manifest.  In this sense, it is rightly therefore said that 
“man is in all animals and all animals in him, and that yet he transcends them 
all” (752c). 
Man’s choice 
     However, although human nature is destined to be by its very essence the 
image of God Who causes the whole creation to being, yet in real life it is up to 
man to choose whether to bring his nature into right order by virtue of reason’s 
discipline imposed upon the sense or to let senses override reason that would 
ultimately lead to complete disorder and destruction of his nature.  Since God is 
the One and therefore subject to nothing outside Him, so man, who is supposed 
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to be God’s image, should likewise determine his being from within (i.e. from 
the very heart of his pure nature) to be truly what he is and thus find himself in 
conformity to God’s Nature as a whole.  This precisely means that man should 
freely make his own decision (so that no one can do it for him) concerning his 
true being.  Unless he is utterly free from any compulsion from without, he 
cannot become truly man.  Hence, it is always an alternative for man whether 
really to be what he truly is by his nature or to remain among the animals and, 
while being administered by irrational and subrational motions of his soul, to 
simply live like a beast or a reptile.  “For when consideration is given”, as 
Eriugena points out, “to his body and his nutritive life force, to his senses and to 
his memory of sensibles, and to all his irrational appetites, such as rage and 
covetousness, he is altogether an animal; for all these he shares in common with 
all the other animals.  But in his higher nature, which consists in reason and 
mind and the interior sense, with all its rational motions, which are called 
virtues, and with the memory of the eternal and divine things, he is altogether 
other than animal” (752c – d). 
     So that, unless man has made his choice and remains dual in himself, “it may 
rightly be predicated of him: ‘Man is an animal’; and: ‘Man is not an animal’ ” 
(752c). 
The outer and the inner man 
     In support of his view of man’s duality, Eriugena refers at 753a to St. Paul’s 
distinction between the ‘outer man’ and the ‘inner man’ expressly given at II 
Cor. 4, 16.  This approach to human nature suggested by such an indisputable 
authority of Christian thought provides the Philosopher with the terms which 
seem to be quite appropriate for an explicit description of man, when he is 
understood to be “in a manner of speaking a two-fold creature” (753c): “And 
that part of him by which he is animal is appropriately termed the outer man, 
while that by which he transcends all other animals as well as the animal part of 
himself may be called the inner man” (752b). 
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     Indeed, when man is considered on the one hand from the side of the body so 
that his being appears to be entirely reduced to bodily operations, then the term 
‘outer man’ may properly match human nature seen like this.  For according to 
such a view, the soul (that is supposed to be understood as the interior of man) 
proves in effect to be widely exposed to the outer world and fully dependent on 
what is delivered to her by the bodily sense from outside.  At the same time, 
however, when man is understood on the other hand to be administered from 
within by the rational motion, so that even his sense (while disciplined, as said 
above, by mind and reason) is formed inside man and receives the proper name 
of the interior one (752d), then the term ‘inner man’ may adequately fit this 
view of human being. 
The spiritual and the unspiritual man 
     Nevertheless, despite its obvious merits and, above all, its emphasis on the 
inner part of human nature as superior to the outer one, the distinction between 
the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ man might yet bear in itself an implication of division 
of man into two contrasting sides of his being that would subsequently 
inaugurate man’s duality as something substantially true.  Meanwhile, the 
distinction between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’ in man should by no means 
signify an actual split within his nature into two different, as if separate, beings 
that could somehow mutually co-exist.  Therefore, what this distinction does 
imply is that – although under certain circumstances man might appear as an 
outer being (surrounded by the world of external things appropriate to it) – such 
an outer state of his must be radically overcome as imperfect and fundamentally 
untrue.  “For he who lives perfectly”, the Philosopher admits, “not only 
altogether despises his body and the life force which administers it and all the 
corporeal senses together with the objects which they perceive, and all the 
irrational motions which he perceives in himself, together with the memory of 
all transient things, but also, in so far as he is able, does away with them and 
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destroys them, lest they should in any way prevail within him, and (he) strives 
that he may become dead to them and they to him” (753b). 
     All this consequently means that the distinction between the ‘inner’ and the 
‘outer’ man is not a rigid contrast, but a dynamic relationship.  As a natural 
result of this relationship, the true superiority of the inner over the outer should 
consist not in establishing a higher position of one of them in contrast to a lower 
position of the other, when they both, as if satisfied with their discrimination, 
co-exist in mere confrontation.  In effect, the real supremacy of the inner reveals 
itself in overcoming any contrast of mutually restricted opposites.  It is such an 
overcoming which allows the inner actually to be what it truly is – that is, not 
merely an ever concealed side of being countered by the ‘outer’ as its opposite, 
but a general principle which gives rise to the ‘outer’ as its own specific 
manifestation.  The truly ‘inner’ therefore is to be understood not as that which 
is always simply different from the ‘outer, but as that which exhibits itself in the 
‘outer’, so that there can be neither discrepancy nor, all the more, opposition 
between the two. 
     Having said this, one may not unreasonably conclude that since the ‘outer’ as 
such is to be truly understood not as a bare opposite of the ‘inner’ but as an 
explication of it, likewise the ‘outer man’ should be rightly viewed not as 
merely countered by the ‘inner man’ but as the one in whom the ‘inner man’ 
makes himself disclosed.  In this sense, it would be fair to acknowledge that the 
distinction between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’ man, as far as it remains firmly 
confined to the contrast between the two opposite sides of human nature, proves 
to be quite imperfect with regard to comprehension of man as a whole and true 
being.  For as a truly whole being, in whom the inner does not simply counter 
the outer but unfolds itself in the outward form adequate to it so as to prevail in 
human nature through and through, man virtually comes to be Spirit.  “For in 
those”, as Eriugena maintains, “who live according to the Spirit, in the words of 
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the same Apostle, ‘the outer man wastes, but the inner man is renewed from day 
to day’ ” (753b). 
     So that, unlike the inner-outer distinction, though explicitly true but 
implicitly fraught with a possibility of division of man into opposite parts of his 
nature, human being may more properly be interpreted – in line with St. Paul’s 
language offered at I Cor. 2, 14-15 – by virtue of comparison between the 
‘spiritual man’ and the ‘unspiritual man’ (753a). 
The split of reality 
     Hence, as far as man overcomes the duality of his nature so that the inner, 
while “renewed ‘from day to day,’ ” comes to prevail in it, he really becomes a 
spiritual being in whom, as in the Divine reality, there is no division and who 
therefore finds himself fitting in with this true reality so as to be able to 
participate in it.  On the other hand, if man does not overcome the duality of his 
nature so that the outer takes it over, while the inner remains in him only in 
potential as a hidden counterpart of the outer side of his, then such a man finds 
himself within the animal nature, that is, in the world of “transient things” 
perceived by the corporeal senses (753b), which is outside the substantial reality 
of “the things of God.”   
     With regard to man’s choice concerning the right order of his nature, 
according to which he might prefer to be controlled either by the irrational or 
the rational motion of the soul, man consequently finds himself facing two 
different prospects of being: either in the spurious (illusory) reality of transient 
things (i.e. sensible objects produced by the corporeal sense), or in the true 
reality of eternal things (subsisting in God by coming into being within Him and 
never departing from Him).  Among these two modes of being, “one is 
animal…, which admits nothing spiritual within itself”, whereas the other is 
spiritual, “since it has communion with the eternal, spiritual, and divine 
substances, and is free of all animality” (753a).  For as Eriugena puts it in Paul’s 
words, man “in his animal nature… does not perceive the things of God”, 
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although “in his spiritual nature judges all things, but is himself judged by 
none” (753a). 
     Thus the words above give one to understand that in consequence of his 
choice man not only simply opens up before his mind two different perspectives 
of reality, but also actually finds himself in two different dimensions of it.  So 
that, as a spiritual being, he gets into God’s creation proper (where the universal 
precedes the particular) and, to the extent that his mind enjoys the conformity to 
the right order of creation, is able to judge all things.  By contrast to this, 
remaining just an irrational creature, man stays in the world which proves to be 
outside the creation of God, for nothing of the Divine is said to be admitted 
within it. 
     All this convinces those who read the Periphyseon carefully that the question 
of man’s duality and choice is not an idle matter at all.  Indeed, because of this 
duality and the subsequent choice that man unavoidably faces, his nature 
appears to be cleft asunder.  In particular, as follows from Rom. 7, 25, “that 
nature through which man is in communion with the animals is called the flesh; 
and that by which he participates in the celestial essence is called mind or spirit 
or intellect” (753c).  Consequently, regarding the way man resolves the problem 
of the duality of his nature, he may actually destine himself to two alternative 
modes of being, that is, two different lives he might live – namely, that of an 
animal among the animals or that of a spiritual being among the “celestial 
essences”, who is fairly said to be made “in the image and likeness of God” that 
is beyond all animal nature (753c).  This means, as Eriugena concludes making 
use of the Apostle’s words again, that in the result of his own choice man may 
virtually find himself in utterly different dimensions of reality subject to 
absolutely different laws and, subsequently, appropriate to different prospects of 
life: “By my mind I serve the Law of God, but by flesh the law of sin” (753c).  
Thus man himself chooses in fact whether to accept or to reject the destiny to 
come, for as said, “that part of him by which he partakes of the celestial essence 
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he renews ‘from day to day’, that is, he ascends from virtue to virtue by the 
movement and co-operation and leadership and perfecting power of the grace of 
God” (753c). 
     It is in this way therefore that man proves in fact to cause the split of reality 
into that of the spurious (or illusory) one, which – being spread among transient 
things of the sensibles – only seems to be; and that of the substantial (or true) 
one, which – being originally established among eternal things of God – comes 
to be revealed to man.  In this sense, it is right to say that the split of reality 
arises from man, and it remains there unless man completely brings his nature 
into right order so as to actually achieve the pristine state of union with the 
substantial reality of God’s creation.  This state of union comes to be lost in 
consequence of the disastrous delusion of man’s mind becoming guilty (when 
imperfectly used) of bringing his nature into a devastating disorder by means of 
taking the outcomes (effects) of its motions for their beginnings (causes).  The 
reunification of human being with the true reality visibly happens (or rather 
begins to happen) when the transformation of the corporeal sense into the 
interior one – i.e. the transformation of what is shared with animals into what is 
fully controlled, disciplined and led, by reason – comes  to be apparently 
manifest in man.  For only when man’s reason does not counter itself to the 
senses so as to stand in its pride apart from all the senses taking them for 
something inferior and unworthy, such a reason may take up the role of the 
Good Shepherd (Jn.10, 2-4) to call all the senses by name (i.e. giving their data 
a definite notion) and thus to lead them out of its own secret folds going ahead 
of them.  Only then human reason (whose nature thereby comes to perfectly 
accord with the rational motion of the soul) may be properly called, as the 
Philosopher suggests, spirit or mind or intellect (753c).  As such, man really 
becomes as whole as God Himself is, which enables him to embrace the entire 
reality beyond any division imposed upon it by the imperfect mind overridden 
by the exterior sense.  Thus, by virtue of healing his mind (whose rightly 
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ordered motion acquires later in the text the name of recta ratio), man really 
enters the world as it originally is since coming into being from the One God, 
and thus recognises in it the Kingdom of God that he has been obliged to find as 
the place appropriate to the high status of imago Dei. 
The unity of reality. 
     It follows from what has been said that man’s choice concerning the right 
order of his nature (and, subsequently, the modes of his being) does not imply 
that one part of it may be merely rejected in favour of the other, as it might 
seem to be the case with the distinction between the ‘inner’ and the ‘outer’ man.  
Indeed, just as no living being can be divided into parts and yet remain alive, so 
it is with the human nature as the living soul that it cannot be, as it were, cut up 
either into separate ‘outer’ and ‘inner’ sides, or ‘lower’ and ‘higher’ extremes, 
or ‘animal’ and ‘spiritual’ natures so that neither of the two contraries would 
admit anything of the other (see 753a).   In this sense, it is fair to say therefore 
that in human nature there are actually no parts that could be understood to exist 
on their own.   
     Thus, being not countered by the body but incorporating it as the 
manifestation of its own wholeness, the spiritual nature constitutes the totality 
of human being, and for this reason cannot be rightly considered at all as merely 
a part of it.  And it is in accordance with this spiritual unity that “the whole 
man” is fairly said at 755d to be “both an animal and a spiritual creature” in the 
sense that the ‘inner man’ is inseparable from the ‘outer man’, in whom the 
‘inner’ one is made explicit. If it were nevertheless somehow imagined that the 
spiritual nature could be only one of the constitutive elements of human being 
so as to break its living wholeness, it would be then, according to Eriugena’s 
conviction, just an absurd opinion that no “true philosopher should maintain” 
(754a).  For as he argues, if it were only the case that human nature consisted of 
co-existing animal and spiritual parts adjusted to one another as if from without, 
it would have to be maintained (though neither reason nor Divine authority 
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permits it) “that in the one man there are two souls” (754a).  In line with such a 
dichotomy, it would also have to be held that one of the two souls “administers 
the body, giving it life and nourishment and increase, and perceives the 
sensibles by means of the corporeal senses and stores the phantasies of them in 
its memory, and performs all the other functions which it is well known are 
performed by the souls of the other animals; while the other which subsists in 
the reason and the mind, ‘is made in the image and likeness of God’.  But this 
seems altogether absurd” (754a).  However, in truth “man consists”, the 
Philosopher concludes, “of one and the same rational soul conjoined to the body 
in a mysterious manner”, and it is only “by a certain wonderful and intelligible 
division that man himself is divided into two parts…” (754b).  As a matter of 
fact, his soul “is whole in itself and its wholeness pervades the whole of its 
nature.  For it is wholly life, wholly mind, wholly reason, wholly sense, wholly 
memory, and it is as a whole that it gives life, nourishment, consistency and 
increase to the body.  As a whole it perceives the sensible species through the 
whole of its senses; as a whole it operates beyond the bounds of the bodily 
senses and treats, separates, combines and forms judgements upon the nature 
and reason of the sensibles; as a whole it extends beyond and above every 
creature, including even itself in so far as it is itself reckoned among the 
numbers of the creatures, and, purged from all vices and all phantasies, revolves 
about its Creator in an eternal and intelligible motion” (754c). 
     This gives us to understand that the split within reality arises from the split 
within man’s own nature.  Hence, in so far as the duality of his being is healed, 
man becomes whole in himself (as he truly is by his nature originally coming 
into being from the universal Principle of all), and along with the wholeness of 
man the division of reality gets overcome too.  Becoming a single whole, man 
sees the same reality with new eyes which allow him to look beyond its old 
bounds, for this reality now appears to him in the true light of its being in the 
original state of the substantial wholeness of God’s creation.  Therefore, being 
141 
 
one whole, as Eriugena says, the human nature “operates beyond the bounds of 
the bodily senses” (754c), and thus – by extending itself “beyond and above 
every creature” (i.e. every individual sensible object, the multitude of which 
forms the world of particular things) – his nature comes to revolve “about its 
Creator in an eternal and intelligible motion” (754c), which alone in its 
universal grasp is appropriate to the whole of the true reality. 
     In this regard, it is vitally important to understand that the restoration of 
man’s wholeness, which makes him fit in with the wholeness of the true reality, 
happens only when man evokes within himself the universal motions of his 
nature, that becomes possible solely when the soul is occupied with “the Divine 
essence” or, at least, with “the natures and causes of creation” (754d).  For 
solely when, exceeding “the bounds of the bodily senses”, the human soul 
extends its capacity as far as to grasp such universal subjects as God’s Nature 
and general causes of things, and thus acquires respectively the proper names of 
mind (also called by Eriugena spirit or intellect) and discursive reason (754d), 
only then man is made truly one (755d), both within himself and with the whole 
universe of God’s creation.  And this is rightly so; because it is in this way of 
being brought into conformity with the true reality subject to the Law of God 
that the human nature is converted into Spirit. So that, only when understood to 
be Spirit who follows the proper order of God’s creation (where, according to 
the Law mentioned, the singular takes its beginning from the universal, but not 
vice versa), man really comes to participate “in the Divine and celestial 
essence” (755c).  Thus, becoming one with the substantial reality as it truly is, 
man really achieves the state of his true being, through which he properly 
subsists in God’s creation.   
     In contrast with this, in so far as man does not evoke within himself the 
universal motions of his soul so as to enjoy the perfect use of mind and 
discursive reason (755b) and thus to become whole (while restoring the original 
right order of his nature), he actually fails to cleave to the true reality and 
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therefore cannot truly be.  For as follows from 754d-755b, being content after 
the manner of the irrational animals with “the use of physical sense” and “the 
hidden operation within the body”, i.e. “the capability to administer his body”  
(which is also called ‘vital motion’), man finds himself to be confined to “the 
bounds of the bodily senses”, within which his soul “perceives the sensibles by 
means of the corporeal senses and stores the phantasies of them in its memory” 
(754a).  Engaged thereby not with the things of the substantial reality that are 
universal by nature but with the sensible objects (which are not the things 
themselves as they truly are but, as said at 754c – d, just perceptions of “the 
sensible species”, i.e. of individual things, received by the soul from without 
through the exterior senses), man inevitably comes to face only the sensible 
world, which is rather the realm of man-made phantasies than reality as such.  
Having no suspicion nevertheless of being captive to his own phantasies of 
sensible objects drawn by the memory from the sense (755c), man is led astray 
by the irrational motion of the soul into an illusory world.  As a result of this, 
he finds himself among the external things as they appear in their discrete state 
and therefore only seem to exist on their own.  Mistaking his sensible 
impressions of the surrounding world for the proper reality, man actually 
entrusts himself (and his fate) to the world of appearance, and thus deprives 
himself of the true being, both of being a true human and subsistence in the true 
reality.  For this reason, it is rightly said of man that “it is by the freedom of his 
will only” (for man is free indeed to choose between the rational and the 
irrational motion of his soul) “that he is animal” (755d).   
     As a matter of fact, man is free to yield to animality in himself and thus to 
dishonour the dignity of his pristine nature, which is said to be “the dignity of 
the Divine image” (756b).  The real trouble about this ill choice resulting in 
man’s disgrace is, however, that by making it man does not simply find an 
alternative mode of being, less perfect then the substantial one, yet suitable 
enough to his animal-like needs and pleasures.  Indeed, becoming animal in 
143 
 
defiance of his genuine nature and thus corrupting its proper order, man violates 
the universal Law of God and, as a matter of consequence, dooms himself to 
non-being.  For in the substantial reality of God’s creation there are no such 
things at all that could subsist while being less true or less perfect than they 
essentially are, because nothing that does not accord with its own proper nature 
can truly be (see 756b).   “Therefore man becomes animal”, Eriugena admits, 
“and is so described, when he abandons those operations, which accord with 
reason and intellect and are concerned with the knowledge of the Creator and of 
creation, for those irrational activities which among the brute beasts are 
concerned with the appetites of the body – and falls through his wilful appetite, 
so as to gorge his interest with the deadly allure of the temporal and corruptible 
things which tend towards non-being” (756a).  
     After all this, it is not hard to understand that in so far as man makes a choice 
between the rational and the irrational motion of the soul, he actually chooses 
not between one or another mode of being, but between being proper and non-
being.  For corrupting his true nature by bringing it into subjection to the senses 
so as to make it compatible with the finite things of the sensible world, man 
virtually lets the transient take him captive and gradually draw the entire of his 
nature (even against his will or intention) towards non-being as the only end of 
everything temporal and corruptible.  Hence, as far as man is really concerned 
about his proper subsistence in the true reality so that he could reach in effect 
“the state to which he is destined by his immutable substance” (756b), man has 
in fact no other choice to make except to bring himself into perfect accord with 
his proper nature or, in other words, for being perfect as the Father in heaven is 
said to be perfect (Math. 5, 48).  For only when his actual existence perfectly 
accords with his essential nature (which, being rational in its true status, is 
infinite and universal), does man truly come to properly subsist in the Divine 
reality, because he really becomes what he is meant to be from the very 
beginning of creation – that is, the image of Him Who says of Himself: “I am 
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Who I am” (Ex. 3, 14).  Otherwise, if man understands the temporal existence 
after the manner of the irrational animals to be his fate, then he loses indeed the 
entire meaning of his life and cannot dare even thinking of himself to ever 
become the image of God Who seems to him to be too far away and even alien 
to his imperfect being.   
Mode 4 and the unity of being 
     Thus the inner logic of the text as it develops in Book IV, when focused on 
investigating the ontological implications of the contrast between the rational 
and irrational motions of human nature, brings us close to the formulations of 
mode 4 of the “division of those things of which it is said that they are and those 
things of which it is said that they are not” (443a).  In particular, giving a fair 
distinction between the intellect and senses in their approach to being (which 
may not improperly be associated with the distinction between the ways of 
Truth and Delusion in Parmenides’ ontology), this mode reads as follows, 
beginning with a clear reference to its affinity with what had been proposed by 
“the philosophers”: “The fourth mode is that which, not improbably according 
to the philosophers, declares that only those things which are contemplated by 
the intellect alone truly are, while those things which in generation, through the 
expansions or contractions of matter, and the intervals of places and motions of 
times are changed, brought together, or dissolved, are said not to be truly, as is 
the case with all bodies which can come into being and pass away” (445b-c). 
     In the light of what is examined in detail in Chapter II with regard to 
Parmenides’ ontology and epistemology as well as what Eriugena concentrates 
on in Book IV of the Periphyseon, it is not hard to understand what he means by 
saying in mode 4 about the ontological status of the things available to human 
mind through the sensual perception.  In mode 1, appropriate, as we may clearly 
see it, to the division of reality into the transcendent and immanent realms 
(developing in Book I in the course of discussing the basics of the apophatic 
theology), such things available to the mind through the senses are apparently 
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classed among those that are said to be.  Introducing the theme of the modes of 
our understanding of being and non-being, Eriugena in particular maintains: “Of 
these modes the first seems to be that by means of which reason convinces us 
that all things which fall within the perception of bodily sense or within the 
grasp of intelligence are truly and reasonably said to be, but that those which 
because of the excellence of their nature elude not only all sense but also all 
intellect and reason rightly seem not to be – which are correctly understood only 
of God and matter and of the reasons and essences of all the things that are 
created by Him” (443a-b).  However, in contrast to this purely metaphysical 
dichotomy between being and non-being, as a result of which God proves to be 
unfairly opposed to existence as such, the dialectical view of reality suggests, as 
the entirety of our analysis shows, that God’s being as it truly is cannot be 
confined at all, neither from within nor from without.  According to this, the 
true (infinite) being may only be properly known when it is coherently thought 
of as fully distinguished (by means of the dialectical contradiction) from the 
opposite, and therefore as neither preceded nor followed by non-being nor 
remaining con-substantial with it.  So that, as soon as Eriugena makes it 
perfectly clear in mode 4 that the true being is utterly irreducible to the spatio-
temporal realm of existence and is available to the intellect alone, he actually 
means to confirm by this his allegiance to the dialectical standpoint, explicitly 
stated at the beginning of Book IV (749a). 
     According to the dialectical approach to being, the true infinity, as seen 
before, can by no means be found compatible with the finite dimension of 
reality, i.e. with the temporality of all ‘bodies’ spatially confined and anchored 
in the sensible world – the world unsubstantial by nature and packed with 
fleeting impressions that things leave upon senses while, as said, coming into 
being and passing away.  By affirming the perspective of ‘genera’ over the 
perspective of ‘species’, as dialectic of “the sages” applied to “their subtle 
investigation of reality” requires (749a), Eriugena seeks in fact to exalt the point 
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of view of the mind over that of senses, bringing the former thereby to its 
perfect conformity to the whole of being as it truly (infinitely) is in its 
unconfined totality.  Thus, he believes, the fundamental ontological dichotomy 
is overcome and the way to the substantial reality, which is that of God’s 
creation, is cleared.  In this way, on account of the imago Dei, all human beings 
come to be at one with God, knowing Him and therefore worshipping Him in 
Spirit and Truth.  But this radical transformation of human life in union with 
God, brought about through the perspicuous contemplation of the true reality of 
creation and actual participation in it (by perfection or making the inner nature 
adequately manifest), constitutes, as already mentioned, the focal point of mode 
5 of understanding of the true being (445 c-d), and along with it the subject-
matter of the following, fifth, book of the Periphyseon. 
     All this convinces us that the prime concern of the entirety of the vast project 
undertaken by Eriugena is indeed about “those who in the first man were lost 
and had fallen into a kind of non-subsistence”, and whom “God the Father calls 
through faith in His Son to be as those who are already reborn in Christ” (445c-
d).  Not unreasonably therefore, in continuity with the profound consideration 
of the rational motion of human nature (developing in Book IV), does Eriugena 
add to the formulations of mode 5 an emphasis on the crucial role of the proper 
manifestation of the innermost recesses of that nature: “But this too” (i.e. God’s 
call) “may also be understood of those whom God daily calls forth from the 
secret folds of nature in which they are considered not to be, to become visibly 
manifest in form and matter and in the other conditions in which hidden things 
are able to become manifest” (445d). 
     In the light of these insights into the meaning of mode 4, it would be fair to 
conclude that it is in the fourth book’s inquiry into the relationship between the 
mind and the senses that we are given to understand how the true (unconfined) 
being comes to be knowable and therefore attainable.  It is in fact through the 
right order of the mind and senses and their interaction that the proper 
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manifestation of human nature and, accordingly, its actual participation in the 
substantial reality of the whole come about.  As a rigorous discipline of the 
mind restoring human nature to the pristine dignity of its wholeness, dialectic 
seeks to establish the right order in question and thus – through the mind’s 
conformity to the proper order of reality – to bring human beings back to the 
bosom of creation, where, as appropriate to imago Dei, they are properly due to 
be.  This is what the following analysis of Eriugena’s text in the next chapter 
allows us to understand better. 
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CHAPTER V 
The doctrine of contradiction 
The integral approach 
     As follows from the above inquiry into the order of human being, man’s 
existence in accordance with his proper nature may be rightly (dialectically) 
understood to come about by virtue of negation of all animality within himself, 
manifest par excellence in such purely corporeal features of his nature, taken on 
their own and separately from its inner dimension, as the external body and 
bodily senses.  Not unfairly, therefore, should man in his proper existence be 
defined as not an animal.  Indeed, it is in contrast to sensation essential to 
animals that reason only or, to be precise, the rational motion of the human soul 
(where senses are not just neglected or discarded but, as discussed above, 
disciplined and led by reason) adheres to the universal order of creation, making 
it manifest in man and thus enabling him to actually participate in the 
substantial reality.  In this sense, it would be right to say, following Eriugena, 
that rationally embracing the whole genus of “the living soul” (i.e. adequately 
representing in himself the basic order of the soul-body relationship) man is at 
the same time among the animals and transcends them all (752c).  For this 
reason, he is truly found to be simultaneously an animal and not an animal.  
“Therefore, the whole soul,” the author points out, “is on the one hand produced 
from the earth in the genus of the animals, and on the other hand is made in the 
image of God.  For this and nothing else is what must follow from the foregoing 
arguments.  …And no true and orthodox philosopher should doubt it, lest he 
appears impiously to tear in two this most simple and indivisible nature” (755a). 
     Thus, in the form of the paradoxical statement concerning man’s animality 
and non-animality, contradiction comes into focus in Eriugena’s discourse.   
“…how one and the same man can, as this discussion seeks to demonstrate,” 
asks the Philosopher, “be, and yet not be an animal; possess, and yet not 
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possess, animality; be, and yet not be, flesh; be, and yet not be, spirit.  How can 
such contradictory and mutually opposed predicates be understood of one 
absolutely simple nature?” (755a). According to Eriugena, this contradiction 
should not however discourage those who are perplexed by its apparent 
difficulty: “From what has already been said it should be as clear as day to 
anyone who looks into the matter more carefully that everything which seems… 
to be contrary to the simplicity of human nature is in fact not only not contrary 
to but is entirely suitable” (755a-b).    
     Indeed, when applied to human being, the negative predicate “not an animal” 
should not be understood as a bare negation of animality as such.  No negative 
predicate should be qualified as a mere negation for the sake of negation.  If it 
were otherwise  and the positive predicate could just be denied by the contrary 
one, then the whole statement concerning man’s simple (i.e. undivided) nature, 
according to which he is simultaneously an animal and not an animal, would 
prove to be meaningless.  Hence, when man is said to be both an animal and not 
an animal, it is quite reasonable to assume that the negation constituting the 
crucial part of this statement is meant to play a constructive role
1
 rather than 
that of a bare negation – namely, the role of affirmation.  And this specifically 
understood affirmation (i.e. affirmation through the negation), being different 
from the ordinary one that is usually believed to dispense with negation, is in 
fact a true affirmation.  In its truth, affirmation as such is solely possible as the 
overcoming of negation, but not as asserting something contrary to anything 
opposite and therefore exposed to the following denial.   It means that the true 
affirmation does occur from the negation of negation only, and thus may only 
be properly understood as the overcoming of negation.  For being in fact the 
negation of the finite state of human being (which, in turn, itself is the denial of 
man’s true nature), the negation of animality in man is supposed to result in 
overcoming the finitude of the fleshly one-sidedness of his being or, in other 
words, in affirmation of his true nature which is infinite in itself, as due to 
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imago Dei.  “For everything that is created in man according to nature”, as the 
Philosopher argues, “must of necessity remain eternally intact and uncorrupted.  
For it is not in accordance with the Divine justice that anything should perish of 
that which He has made, especially as it is not nature herself who has sinned, 
but the perverse will which moves irrationally against rational nature” (760c). 
     All this consequently means that the affirmative and negative predicates of 
man’s being – that is, “an animal” and “not an animal” – which seem “to be 
contrary to the simplicity of human nature”, are in fact not contrary at all.  
When taken together in their integrity as the two inseparable aspects of a truly 
simple (undivided) and therefore really subsisting human nature, in which the 
inner and the outer cannot be severed, these predicates are to be rightly 
understood as mutually complementary or, as Eriugena himself puts it, “entirely 
suitable” (755b).  For only in their integrity (suitability) do the opposed 
predicates – while representing inseparability of the inward and outward sides 
of a real being – prove in fact to be ontologically applicable.  As such, they 
enable the human mind (and thereby human being as a whole) to exceed the 
limits of a formally logical appeal to purely abstract categories and thus to 
approach the substantial reality as it truly is.  Otherwise, if the predicates in 
question were taken not in their integrity but separately (so as to be considered 
not in relation to the whole of human being but in their temporal sequence to 
one another), then both definitions – as being mutually countered and confined 
– would turn out to be no more than ontologically inappropriate abstract 
predicates, standing at best for some static states of being which, because of 
their separateness, are not there in reality.  Hence, understood as the negation of 
negation, the negative predicate “not an animal” proves actually to be nothing 
else but the way to conceive the mode of affirmation, by which the restoration 
of human nature to its proper status is to be meant.  
     Thus, the paradoxical statement of man’s being quoted from 755a at the 
beginning of the current chapter allows us to understand the following: 
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     First, a higher status of nature (in the sense of its greater perfection or 
accordance with itself) is implied to prevail in man so as to raise him above the 
horizon of the sensible world, where in his present imperfect state of improper 
use of his own rational nature he exists among the external (i.e. finite or, in 
other words, temporal and corruptible) objects only.   
     Secondly, from the same statement it also follows that this affirmation of the 
surpassing nature happens in man not simply by means of rejecting the 
animality that is deeply rooted in him as the fundamental relationship between 
soul and body, but by transforming it into a radically new quality of its being by 
bringing the soul-body relation into right order, which comes to be manifestly 
realised in man precisely in the way of subjecting the sense to reason.   
     It means that it is in the result of this thoroughgoing transformation of 
animality within human being that the true nature of man (as it is expressed by 
the inseparable predicates discussed above) resolutely supersedes in him the 
negated one, which in its imperfection is akin to that of the brute animals.  And 
thus, in the way of affirmation of the true nature in man, the proper order of the 
entire creation becomes adequately manifest in reality, so that even God 
Himself comes to be fully revealed in it.  It is therefore in this way that, 
metaphorically speaking, nothing but God’s face is understood to be seen in 
man who is thus allowed actually to be what he truly is by his nature, namely 
the imago Dei.  For all men – in so far as they are genuinely believed to come 
into being from the Sole Source of all (that is to say, from above) – are truly 
said in the holy words of St. John to become (on receiving the Truth revealed) 
“children of God, who were born, not of blood or of the will of the flesh or of 
the will of man, but of God” (Jn. 1, 12-13).  That is why in agreement with this 
high truth the author of the Periphyseon enthusiastically admits: “For 
everything which her Creator primordially created in her” (i.e. human nature) 
“remains whole and intact, though remaining hidden until now, ‘awaiting the 
revelation of the sons of God’ ” (761b). 
152 
 
 
     It becomes therefore clear what Eriugena really means when, in response to 
the pivotal question raised at 755a with relation to the alleged duality of man’s 
nature, he suggests in quite an extraordinary manner that the “contradictory and 
mutually opposed predicates” of being and not being animal (as well as flesh 
and spirit, as mentioned in the context) are to be rightly understood to apply to 
one and the same subject (human being) as “not only not contrary” to its 
simplicity, but also as “entirely suitable” (755b) to it.  These are consequently 
the predicates that embrace the real wholeness of human nature in its true being 
which is said to be “everywhere a whole in itself” (761b).  Indeed, the true 
being of man can in no way be understood to spread beyond his nature’s self-
identity into the realm of an illusory being that would emerge from separation of 
the outer from the inner (as well as from their substantial disorder, when the 
particular would seem to give rise to the whole), which therefore is nothing 
more than non-being.  This finally means that man’s proper nature can neither 
be conceived in its truth nor actually affirmed in reality without the negation, 
which in fact is but the negation of the one-sided finitude of his being, leading 
to the restoration of its proper wholeness.  Such an integral approach to human 
being through a dialectically understood negation would further require, as we 
shall see it below, that the contradictory statements should be considered as 
being simultaneously true.   If these statements however were considered 
separately in a dilemma-like “either – or” manner, in accordance with which it 
is sought to be decided whether man is only “an animal” or only “not an animal” 
(so as to choose only one of the opposing statements for true), then neither of 
the statements in focus would prove to be relevant to truth. 
     However, in contrast to this dialectical (holistic) approach, these statements 
were dealt with separately and independently from each other so as to be 
considered, for example, in a dilemma-like “either – or” manner (according to 
which it would have to be decided whether man is only “an animal” or only “not 
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an animal”, and, as a matter of consequence, between the two opposed 
statements only one would have to be chosen for true), then anyone who is said 
to look “into the matter more carefully” (755a) would admit without hesitation 
that neither of the statements in focus could actually be true.  For, as 
reciprocally countered, either of them would appear in affect to be rigidly 
confined to its finite meaning, which is of necessity encumbered with its own 
negation; so that, as a result, each of the two contradictory statements in its 
isolation from the other would inevitably prove to be equally untrue.  
Thinking the whole 
     By a dialectical treatment of the contraries with respect to their integrity, as 
seen above, Eriugena actually approaches the very fundamentals of a radically 
new logic.  Dealing with the wholeness as such, both ontological and 
epistemological at the same time, this logic proves to perfectly match the 
substantial reality as it truly is while proceeding from and staying within the 
universal Principle of all.  This is the reality which is embraced by the 
contraries and is therefore approached when coherently thought of by means of 
contradiction, aimed at overcoming all dichotomies between the opposites, 
including the ultimate ones of being and non-being.  Thus the logic, appropriate 
to this reality and called dialectic, becomes an effective instrument which 
enables the mind both to restore the wholeness of human nature (by bringing the 
senses and reason into right order) and reach the reality of the whole.  This 
consequently means that inasmuch as man becomes whole in himself (through 
the reason’s control over the sense), he also becomes at the same time one with 
the whole of the substantial reality of God’s creation, where the universal 
contains the particular, and the cause gives rise to the effects, but not vice versa.   
     In this way, by getting the wholeness of his nature restored through the mind 
dialectically disciplined, man is understood to come to the reality of creation to 
encounter God Who is truly the One, while unfolding Himself in creation and 
being thus All in all.    It is in this sense, therefore, that man is fairly said to be 
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both the image and likeness of God (Gen. 1, 26).  “For just as God”, Eriugena 
holds, “is both beyond all things and in all things – for He Who only truly is, is 
the essence of all things, and while He is whole in all things He does not cease 
to be whole beyond all things, whole in the world, whole around the world… – 
in the same way human nature in its own world (in its subsistence) in its own 
universe and in its visible and invisible parts is whole in itself…” (759a-b). “For 
even the lowest and least valuable part, the body”, the Philosopher continues, 
“is according to its own principles whole in the whole man, for the body, in so 
far as it is truly body, subsists in its own reasons which were made in the 
beginning of creation; and since human nature is so in itself, it goes beyond its 
whole” (759b).  It is for this reason, therefore, that the whole of man’s nature is 
said to cleave to its Creator (759b).  “… therefore we not improperly say”, 
Eriugena concludes, “that human nature cleaves to its Creator.  For possibility is 
often taken for realisation, and that which is bound to happen some day is 
regarded as happening now and already achieved” (760a).  And this is precisely 
what appears to him to be unequivocally conveyed by the sacred words of the 
Gospel at Jn. 12, 26: “Where I am there is My servant also” (759c). 
     All this convinces a careful reader of the Periphyseon that the logic Eriugena 
is pursuing is all about the transformation of the entire human being (brought 
about through the cardinal change of the way the mind operates) and bringing it 
into the substantial reality of creation as it truly is in union with God.  And what 
really makes this logic radically new is simply contradiction. That is why an 
extremely important question about the nature of contradiction inevitably arises 
in the context at 756b – 757b, where the author appears to make a good effort to 
define it by focusing on its contrast to that of difference.  A careful comparison 
between the two undertaken by him results in what may be reasonably qualified 
as a coherent doctrine of contradiction, in which –for the purpose of its better 
apprehension – two distinctive stages, as they successively occur in the course 
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of its gradual unfolding, may be featured as follows: 1) difference and 
contradiction; 2) uniformity of the subject.   
Difference and contradiction 
    As it appears from Eriugena’s discourse at 756b-d, no singular things (such 
as individual species of the animal genus) can actually oppose one another in so 
far as they remain simply separate externals.  Likewise, no rational beings can 
oppose irrational animals, even though the predicates ‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ 
are fairly said to be  “completely opposed to one another” (756c).  Indeed, if the 
nature of individual (singular) things is considered more carefully, it becomes 
clear, according to the Philosopher, that these things, as some separate objects, 
can only be perceived as being in external relations to one another.  For this 
reason, they prove in fact to be neither “mutually contradictory” nor 
“completely opposed”, but merely different.  It is to be understood with regard 
to this, therefore, that the negative prefix, explicitly present in such pairs of 
contrary terms as visible and in-visible, corporeal and in-corporeal, rational and 
ir-rational, stands actually for a distinction between some things designated by 
them and, consequently, “refers in many cases to a difference, not a 
contradiction” (756c).  “For visibility and invisibility”, Eriugena explains, “are 
two properties which are separate from one another but not mutually repugnant” 
(756c).  Hence, however “completely opposed” the contraries might appear to 
be, in fact they are not contradictory at all if they refer to different things while 
standing for some particular (though contrasting) properties in them, as it is for 
example the case with the following pair of contrary statements: ‘Man is a 
rational animal’ and ‘Horse is an irrational animal’ (see 757a).  This means 
furthermore that among such statements, in so far as they concern the difference 
between two separate things (that is held by the contrasting predicates regarding 
their essential properties), either assertion is virtually true, and neither 
contradicts the other. 
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     From this, it is reasonable to assume that contradiction can arise solely when 
the contrary statements contradict each other.  This may, clearly, happen if and 
only if “a pair of contradictories” is predicated of one and the same subject.  
According to common belief, however, contradiction is usually understood (or 
rather misunderstood) in such a way that one of the contrary statements is 
supposed to be true and the other false (756d). “For contradictory statements of 
one and the same subject”, according to this belief, “cannot both at the same 
time be true or both at the same time be false, whether they be of a universal or 
of a particular application” (756d).  And this is precisely what the traditional 
understanding requires of contradiction, but not that of Eriugena.  According to 
his view, as follows from the context at 757b-c, a real contradiction does arise 
only when both contradictories are either simultaneously true or simultaneously 
false
2
.  For otherwise, if one of the opposed statements is recognised to be true 
and the other false, they do not constitute a contradiction; because in fact they 
prove to be just separate from one another, and for this reason do not come to 
contradiction at all.  In so far as one of the statements is merely true and the 
other is respectively false there is only a disparity between the two and no room 
for a contradiction at all.   Misunderstood however, in contrast to Eriugena’s 
view, as a distinction between the true and the false, contradiction fails to 
conform to its own nature; for the true and the false do not contradict, but only 
exclude one another.  It is as simple as that.   
     Contradiction therefore, as we can draw from this, should not be reduced to a 
mere antinomy, which in fact is not concerned about getting the contraries 
reconciled.  In other words, contradiction should not be oversimplified and, like 
antinomy, only warn the mind against falling into delusion of formulating 
contradictory statements, and subsequently compel it to choose between the 
contradictories standing, as assumed, for truth or falsehood.  Indeed, if only one 
of the contradictories were recognised for being true, it would necessarily mean 
that one of the contraries predicated of the subject is simply irrelevant to it and 
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should refer to something else, i.e. to another subject.  According to Eriugena, 
however, contradiction should refer, as seen above, to one and the same subject, 
of which the contrary predicates should be understood in their unity, i.e. in the 
way of being appropriate to the infinite nature of the substantially true things.  It 
is a matter of great importance therefore to realise what it really means to 
Eriugena to understand how contradictories can refer to one and the same 
subject and thus, taken in their integrity, uncover the infinity of the substantial 
reality.  
Uniformity of subject.   
     In the result of the above analysis, one has to admit that difference as such is 
always found to be relevant to the external dimension of existence, for this 
difference (or distinction) is apparently rooted in separateness of external 
things, and it only occurs in language when some contrary predicates are 
applied respectively to different subjects.  By contrast, therefore, it necessarily 
follows that if these contrary predicates are referred to one and the same 
subject, then contradiction arises, which with regard to human thought signifies 
its turn towards the inner dimension of reality.  In this sense, it is consequently 
right to say after Eriugena that “whereas difference distinguishes one species 
from another,” contradiction “is always held to be within one and the same 
species or part” (756c).  So that – as he draws a conclusion – “if speaking of 
man one were to say of that species of nature which according to its substance is 
called man, ‘man is a rational animal’ and ‘man is an irrational animal,’ this 
would be the statement of a pair of contradictories” (756d). 
     Thus Eriugena’s reasoning safely arrives at the question of the nature of 
contradiction itself that lies, as mentioned above, at the very heart of his entire 
enterprise regarding the development of a new type of logic properly called 
dialectic.  And the first problematic thing to be tackled concerning this focal 
point is that of the status of the constitutive elements of contradiction which 
give rise to the contradiction itself.  In this respect, it is to be particularly 
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decided whether both thesis and antithesis, as the elements of contradiction, are 
to be counted for being equally valid so as to be truly held – as Eriugena insists 
on it – within one and the same subject defined (and therefore embraced) by 
their unity. 
     As a faithful dialectician who is totally committed to knowing the truth of 
the unity of reality that takes its origin from the universal Principle of all, the 
author of the Periphyseon leaves his readers in no doubt concerning the 
resolution sought, when with regard to the statement of man’s being at the same 
time an animal and not an animal he unequivocally says that it is equally true 
that man is an animal and is not an animal (757b).  Indeed, in accordance with 
what has already been said about the true nature of contradiction, one could 
easily agree that falsehood as such arises in effect only when each of the 
opposed statements is regarded separately from the other, as if having value 
while taken on its own as something finite – i.e. in contrast to the opposite 
statement.  Furthermore it cannot be otherwise, for nothing finite – as being 
confined to its contrary – can be really true (or relevant to the reality of the 
whole).  In consequence of this, it is not hard for those who look into the mater 
carefully enough to understand that man, as he truly is in his present state, 
cannot be only an irrational animal (i.e. merely a brute beast whose being is 
confined to body and sense) or only a rational animal (i.e. a pure mind which 
has nothing to do with animality itself as the union of soul and body).  This 
means that, in so far as the contrary statements are only understood to be 
mutually countered so that one of them is accepted for true and the other is 
denied as false, both statements then inevitably prove to be equally untrue (or 
fraught in themselves with their own denial). 
     And Eriugena is really determined to deliver this challenging message to 
those who are concerned about knowing the Truth that is said to make them free 
(Jn. 8, 32), i.e. fit for living in the substantial reality confined to nothing
3
.  As a 
single whole of “a pair of contradictories”, a proper contradiction enables the 
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human mind to enter the infinite depth of truth correspondent to the infinity of 
the whole.  For the true resolution of contradiction is seen by him on the way of 
restoration of the wholeness, but not on that of making contradictories mutually 
countered.  This, in Eriugena’s conviction, is the right way to properly 
safeguard truth from any delusion or wrongdoing.   
      All this allows us to understand that the genuine purpose of Eriugena’s work 
is not as much to abolish the norms of the old (non-contradictory) logic as to 
bring the human mind, and along with it the entire human being, closer to the 
true reality, where no finite (one-sided)  things subsist. To the Philosopher, 
contradiction is not a sign of delusion that reason should avoid on its way to 
reality, but a proper means of thinking of the wholeness, which alone – while 
spread between the extremes of being and non-being – is totally appropriate to 
the true being itself.  Understood like this, contradiction becomes for the human 
mind nothing other than an effective instrument of uncovering the infinite 
nature of things as they genuinely are beyond their one-sided appearance, while 
belonging to proper (unconfined) being and actually participating in it.  It is 
subsequently in this way of bringing the human mind into perfect conformity to 
the infinite nature of things that contradiction opens up before the ‘mind’s eye’ 
(as Eriugena calls it) the perspective of proper being, and thus allows the whole 
of human being to approach indeed the true reality of God’s creation as it 
substantially is, ever remaining infinite in itself.  For as Eriugena suggests 
following the Dionysian logic of the Symbolic Theology (757c-d), likewise to 
human nature in its true status “two mutually adverse predicates can be made of 
God, and can be true and in no way false, … as for instance when it is said that 
‘God is truth’ and that ‘God is not truth’ ” (757c).  Being thus both infinite by 
their nature God and man meet in their communion, when properly conceived 
by means of contradiction, according to which “either statement is true” (757d).  
It is for this reason therefore that those who really come to enjoy this unity in 
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their knowledge of the true being are not improperly said to acquire the name of 
the sons of God (761b). 
     From this it is fair to conclude that – in order to be appropriate to the reality 
of the infinite whole – the contradictories may only be predicated of the uniform 
subject in the proper sense of the word.  This subject is the one which is no 
longer considered as something particular opposed to some objects external to 
it.  This subject is the whole that perfectly fits the totality of being and, as the 
universal indeed, itself holds particular objects.  Therefore, as infinite in-and-for 
itself that is confined to nothing, this truly uniform subject does exceed any 
limits in order to embrace the entirety of God’s being.  And thus the uniform 
subject really becomes the true being that is not only in itself but also for itself, 
and is therefore at one with God while sharing “the unity of substance with 
Him” (761a).  For as the Principle of all, God likewise is understood to be 
nothing other than the Universal Subject Who, while bringing everything forth 
into being and comprising it, never moves beyond Himself but only “from 
Himself in Himself towards Himself” (453a).  In this sense, as Eriugena puts it, 
the Divine essence “is correctly said to be created in those things which are 
made by itself and through itself and in itself and for itself” (454c). 
          This further means that in the true reality as it substantially is there is 
ultimately nothing save Him Who is properly thought to be the Beginning and 
the End of all or “the one Who alone by Himself truly is” (518a).   For God is 
fairly said to be the One Who “sees in Himself all things that are while He looks 
upon nothing that is outside Himself, because outside Himself there is nothing” 
(452c).  In other words, in so far as God is truly believed to be the One, it has to 
be admitted that He cannot be just one among many (as appropriate to the 
particular only), but is infinite indeed.  God is the universal Being that is 
absolutely incompatible with anything finite, and thus indispensably is one with 
the whole of creation, but not opposed to it as to something one-sided and 
isolated in its independent existence.  For coming out of God (i.e. being of one 
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essence with Him or, using the conventional term, ὁύthis creation 
never actually departs from Him with Whom it is of the same essence, but ever 
remains within God Himself, Whose being is fairly defined  as “the invisible 
Unity which is what He Himself is” (520a).  All individual things therefore 
substantially are (i.e. participate in the true Being) in so far only as they 
manifest their infinite nature that is in and for itself.  Otherwise, no entity could 
be really co-essential with the very nature of the Uniform Subject where it takes 
its origin from to participate in the universe coming out of Him.  For according 
to Eriugena, “everything which is said to exist exists not in itself but by 
participation in the Nature which truly exists” (454a).  And only when 
perceived from the perspective of the external world (and not from that of 
creation), these individual things are seen from outside and therefore seem to be 
particular (separate), as appropriate to the finite that appears to be torn off the 
Principle of all beings.  As such, they can only be found, as it were, outside the 
universal Being and unable to take part in Him Who is truly the One – that is, 
the only and uniform Subject Who is countered by nothing separate or opposite. 
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CHAPTER VI 
The doctrine of knowledge 
Two perspectives on one reality 
    After what was considered in the previous chapter, we may have no difficulty 
in realising what Eriugena means to suggest when he asserts that God “has 
created in man all creatures visible and invisible, for the whole spread of 
creation is understood to inhere in man” (763d).  He certainly does not intend to 
say by this that “bestiality, quadrupedality, volatility and all the differences of 
the divers animals and of the other things, together with all species and 
properties and accidents and all the other innumerable attributes” are made in 
man to be actually present in him (765b).  Otherwise, if all the attributes of 
animality, while “so far removed, were indeed found in man, he would rightly 
be considered not a man but the foulest of monsters” (765b).  Hence, what 
Eriugena really means to suggest by his assertion is that since all of “this 
sensible world is fashioned in man” so as to be in its entirety held by his mind 
(764a), “the whole spread of creation” cannot actually exist apart from being 
perceived by man as a whole –both by his reason and body, where even “the 
pupil of the eye, although the least of all the members in physical size, yet 
exerts the greatest power” (764b).  From this it follows therefore that man’s grip 
on the world created extends as far as his rational nature (or, to be precise, 
rational motion) is engaged.  Accordingly, “everything which is known by the 
intellect or the reason or imagined by the sense can somehow be created and 
produced in the knower and perceiver” (765c).  It is consequently in the sense 
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of relation of the entire creation to the human mind that the following words of 
Eriugena should be understood: “No part of it” (i.e. creation) “is found, either 
corporeal or incorporeal, which does not subsist by being created in man, which 
does not perceive through him, which does not live through him, which is not 
incorporated in him” (764a).  Thus, as a focal point of the whole created nature, 
man is understood to have a chance to know that no finite being exists on its 
own nor takes its origin from the Principle of all beings that gives rise to 
nothing finite.  It means that anything finite may only be known as an accident 
appropriate to the subjectivity of human perception.  Therefore, to be properly 
known in its truth (i.e. as a real member of the universe of creation but not as 
one of the transient things), any particular being must be grasped as it is beyond 
its finitude (or appearance), while coming from the universal Principle of all and 
remaining in ever-lasting unity with it.  In this way man comes to the starting 
point of his knowledge leading him to the substantial reality of creation: this 
starting point is a clear vision (available to the ‘mind’s eye’) that nothing finite 
“which is not from God can by any means be understood, because it does not 
exist in any way” (765a).  As Eriugena further suggests, it must be as clear as 
light that only those things truly exist (and can therefore be properly known) 
which are from God as the universal Principle, and thereby belong to being or 
subsist as essences (764d – 765a).  On the contrary, those things which only 
relate to essence or substance “are not to be reckoned in the number of the 
universe of things – in fact are altogether without being…” (764d). As a result, 
knowing things as they truly are, man actually transcends the power of the 
corporeal senses that insidiously make him imprisoned among finite things. 
Thus he broadens before his universal (properly ordered) mind the horizon of 
creation up to the utmost of knowledge of the Very Creator.  “Reason then 
permits us to say”, the author of the Periphyseon draws a conclusion, “that God 
willed to place man in the genus of the animals for this purpose: that He wished 
to create every creature in him,… because He wished to make him in His image 
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and likeness, so that, just as the Primal Archetype transcends all by the 
excellence of His essence, so His image should transcend all created things in 
dignity and grace” (764b). 
     From this it follows that – depending on whether man’s attitude to the 
surrounding world is subject to the sense or to the mind, so that either finite 
objects or infinite nature respectively come into focus – one and the same reality 
of creation may be considered by man from the perspective of two dimensions.  
“For every creature”, says Eriugena in this regard, “is considered under one 
aspect as it exists in the Word of God in which all things are made, and under 
another as it exists in itself”1 (770c).  Hence, when considered from the 
perspective of “the Wisdom of God”, all things are known according to their 
substance (or true being), for, as is said, substantia omnium omnia est  (770c).  
This is the perspective of reality where the right order of things is established 
and sustained, so that according to this order the inner essence precedes the 
outer existence, and the universal cause gives rise to its singular effects, but not 
vice versa.
2
  By contrast, if “the intellectual and rational creature” assumes – as 
it further appears from the context at 770c – that it possesses “intelligence of 
itself” in so far as “it is in itself” (i.e. on its own and, hence, regardless of any 
relation to God as the source of every being), then the knowledge produced by 
this creature approaches the same reality from another perspective, according to 
which all things are seen as externals that seem to subsist on their own. This 
knowledge, therefore, appears to correspond to something else in addition to (or 
even instead of) the true being – that is to say, to the so-called ‘second 
substance’ (770c), different from the ‘first’ one (770c–d) and, at best, co-
existing alongside it. 
     By this we are given to understand that in so far as these ‘substances’ or two 
aspects of one reality are understood in an abstract way to be mutually 
countered in like manner to the diametrical opposites, then the uniform reality, 
indivisible by nature, would seem to fall apart into different realms, first in the 
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human mind and subsequently in his practical conduct. In consequence of this 
delusion resulting from the improper use of the mind (by which both the 
theoretical and practical attitude of all humans to the world is determined), 
human nature as well appears to be divided within itself.   “Under one aspect”, 
Eriugena says, “the human substance is perceived as created among the 
intelligible causes, under the other as generated among their effects; under the 
former free from all mutability, under the latter subject to change; under the 
former simple, involved in no accidents, it eludes all created intelligence; under 
the latter it receives a kind of composition of quantities and qualities and 
whatever else can be understood in relation to it, whereby it becomes 
apprehensible to the mind” (771a).   
     Be it the case however that such a split of reality and human nature were 
accepted for true so that one substance might be considered under two aspects 
(771a), the nearest result of this division of the reality of the whole into the 
opposite (and therefore mutually confined) counterparts would then be finite 
knowledge.   Being solely appropriate to the world that appears to consist of 
finite things, this kind of knowledge seeks to comprehend what individual 
things are (see 770d) as purely external objects.  The major defect of this type of 
knowledge is however that its intentions are doomed to failure for the simple 
reason that no finite thing may be known as to what it is in itself (770c).  
Indeed, anything external (as it is undoubtedly the case with all finite things) is 
concealed and, as being external, cannot ever disclose what it is in itself.  
Moreover, as spurious being confined to non-being, nothing finite can truly 
exist and, because of this, be ever liable to proper understanding.  For as is 
clearly stated at 765a, that which does not exist (i.e. is not seen as coming into 
being from God and remaining in unity with His infinite nature), can by no 
means be understood. 
     Consequently, it has to be admitted that if one and the same universal reality 
of creation, uniform by nature, is considered from the different perspectives (as 
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appropriate to the aspects indicated above), it appears not only to cleave asunder 
but also to remain unknown in both of its parts.  As mutually countered and 
devoid of their unity, these two parts would appear to be nothing more than just 
finite realms of spurious being.  “So it is”, concludes the Philosopher, “that 
what is one and the same thing can be thought of as twofold because there are 
two ways of looking at it, yet everywhere it preserves its incomprehensibility, in 
the effects as in the causes, and whether it is endowed with accidents or abides 
in its naked simplicity: under neither set of circumstances is it subject to created 
sense or intellect nor is it understood by itself as to what it is” (771a – b).  
Phantasies and concepts 
     From the above analysis, it can be further deduced that in so far as the 
universal reality is understood to be fissioned within itself when considered 
under the contrary aspects, such a division of reality indispensably entails two 
different types of knowledge.  Although these types of knowledge are initiated 
by the split of reality in two, they do not simply correspond to the mutually 
opposed realms of being but result from the contrast between the holistic and 
differentiative approaches of the mind.  This means that the types of knowledge 
in question are respectively understood to be either adequate or inadequate to 
the universal reality as the two essentially different perspectives of it, of which 
only one is able to adhere to the fundamental order of procession of causes into 
their effects (785d).  As a result, depending on whether the reality is considered 
as a whole or as divided within itself (so that the inner and the outer, the 
immanent and the transcendent, and the like seem to set apart as the confronting 
counterparts), two different successions of concepts, as appropriate to the 
rational and irrational motions of the mind respectively, do come into focus in 
Eriugena’s ongoing discourse.  As we may see from Eriugena’s statement to 
follow, these two successions of concepts (while progressing, as is clear from 
the context below, in the opposite directions) determine two opposite orders of 
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the knowledge content and, accordingly, the contrary types of it – namely, those 
of  the knowledge from without and from within:   “…the species of sensible 
things and the quantities and qualities which I reach by my corporeal sense”, the 
author explains, “are in certain way created in me; for when I imprint the 
phantasies of them in my memory, and when I deal with them within myself by 
division and comparison and, as it were, collect them into a kind of unity, I 
notice a certain knowledge of the things which are external to me being built up 
within me; and in the same way when I seek earnestly within me after certain 
concepts resembling the intelligible species, concepts of intelligibles which I 
contemplate with the mind alone, as for example the concept of the liberal arts, I 
feel them born and becoming within me” (765c-d). 
     From the quotation given above, it may follow that the two types of 
knowledge, as they are highlighted in it, should be distinguished with a great 
deal of certainty as the produced and the prior (concerning the latter see also 
779c).  Indeed, when on the one side knowledge appears to follow the corporeal 
(exterior) senses and is provided by their perceptions of externals (which 
despite being ‘built up’ in man, remain external both to a knowing subject and 
to one another as merely discrete objects), such knowledge inevitably becomes 
fashioned after the exterior sense or, in other words, formed from without.  At 
the same time, on the other side, in so far as knowledge does not refer to the 
corporeal senses as to a reliable source of information concerning “the species 
of sensible things” nor does it take its beginning from these senses (and to this 
extent evolves independently of them
3
), this knowledge proves to rise from 
within or, as the Philosopher puts it, to be born from the human mind (765d).  
Accordingly, the former kind of knowledge entirely relies upon the senses; and 
though the bulk of it is said to result from such mental operations as division, 
comparison and collection (765c), this sort of knowledge may yet be only 
understood as no more than the sensible one that proceeds from the sensible 
phantasies, and in this respect it apparently comes to be a produced (or made) 
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one.  On the contrary, when conceived to precede the exterior (corporeal) senses 
(see 766b-c) so as in accordance with the rational motion of the mind to 
discipline and rule them for the purpose of gaining a perfect conformity to the 
truly infinite nature of things, this kind of knowledge turns out in effect to be 
the intelligible or the prior
4
 one (see 776a-b; 779b-c).  It is the latter therefore 
that comes forth from the innermost depth of the mind to be thus perfectly 
appropriate to the inwardly infinite nature of things as they truly are.  And it is 
by this type of proper knowledge that both the human mind and being are 
brought to conformity to the fundamentally right order of the universe of 
creation, where the inner precedes the outer, and the universal causes the 
singular, but not vice versa.   
     As for the difference between the successions of concepts as they pertain to 
the types of knowledge distinguished above, it ought to be explained likewise 
by “the relation between this knowledge and the things themselves which are its 
object” (765d).  This particularly means that the difference sought fully depends 
on the order in which knowledge and its object occur to the mind.  If knowledge 
places its object among the things as they are immediately given to the sense 
and, for this reason, is commonly believed to derive from the things themselves 
(or their images imprinted in memory), then knowledge like this provides the 
mind with a concept which proves in fact to be nothing more than just a replica 
of the things seen from outside or a phantasy.  For as rightly said at 765d, the 
corporeal species of a certain animal, grass or tree cannot be of the same nature 
with the knowledge of them produced by the incorporeal nature.  To confirm 
this crucial point of his doctrine of knowledge, Eriugena refers to the word of 
authority found in Augustine, from whose monumental treatise On the Trinity 
(Book IX, chapter 11, as the author scrupulously indicates, underlining thus the 
importance of the point made) he quotes as follows: “‘When we learn of bodies 
through the sense of the body, a certain replica of the bodies is created in our 
mind: this is a phantasy in our memory.  For it is certainly not the bodies 
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themselves that are in our mind when we reflect on them, but replicas of them’ ” 
(766a). 
     On the other hand, if knowledge does not associate its object with individual 
things but finds it among the universal concepts of the mind, then this 
knowledge results in understanding of what the concept proper is.  Similarly to 
replicas, the concept of this knowledge is likewise said to differ from the things 
themselves, though not as their obscure images but as being more exalted than 
them (766a).  This difference, therefore, is  of another kind – namely, not that of 
a phantasy which is torn off the things and merely resembles them, but that of 
discrepancy between what is defined to be of a better nature (766b, 776a) and 
those things which are straightforwardly seen as the sensibles only.  “For it is a 
doctrine according to reason”, Eriugena admits, “that that which understands is 
better than that which is understood” (766b).  Indeed, as he further argues, being 
the knowledge of all things the Divine Wisdom is “incomparably superior to the 
things of which it is the knowledge.  And if so, I believe that the same 
relationship proceeds from the Divine providence throughout all creation, so 
that not only every nature which has a concept of that which follows it is better 
and superior, but also the concept itself, through the dignity of the nature in 
which resides, greatly excels the object of which it is the concept” (766b).   
     All this gives us to understand that what is thought to be of a better nature is 
actually meant to be closer to Good as such, which consists – as the course of 
the entire inquiry shows – in nothing other than the universal Self-identity as the 
perfect accordance of the inner essence with its outer existence.  Thus the 
infinite itself (i.e. the whole of the Divine reality as the living Spirit Who alone 
everywhere explicitly is what He implicitly is in Himself) comes to be actually 
manifest through this self-identical Good and the Concept, as its adequate form, 
which in its ultimate status is Logos.  For God is the One, and there is no 
discrepancy between Him as the Creator (the Supreme  and Universal Cause) 
and the outcome of His creation (the effect of the Cause), between what He 
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wills and what He does – so that, what He wants or says to be, exactly that (and 
nothing else) comes to be.  That is why the Philosopher later points out at 786b 
with regard to the Genesis account (Gen. 1, 4-31) that “in the text ‘God saw the 
light that it was good’ the Holy Spirit is intended, as also on the other days” (of 
creation) “wherever it is added ‘And God saw that it was good.’ ” 
     Thus, unlike phantasies, concepts are to be understood not to derive from 
sensible things, as would be the case with purely abstract forms.  Conversely,  
being as exalted over things themselves as the universal truly is in relation to 
the singular, concepts, according to Eriugena,  precede all things, so that even 
“the concept of the intelligibles precedes the intelligibles themselves” (766b).  
And if in continuity with this, as he further suggests, it could be, for instance, 
argued with regard to the liberal arts that their concept “was not formed from 
the arts, but the arts from the concept”, the argument would be running then 
along the right lines (766c).  It is subsequently in this way that, forming all 
things but being not formed by them (766c), the concept as such – understood 
as “a kind of multiple source of inexhaustible depth” (770a) – constitutes indeed 
the very basis of the prior knowledge that comes forth, as said before, from the 
innermost nature of the mind and is found to be in conformity to the inwardly 
infinite nature of things.   
     From this it follows therefore that the concept as such may be understood to 
be different from things only in so far as they are taken on their own as sensible 
objects, which merely seem to subsist by themselves.  However, if the same 
things are properly considered as they truly are in their inwardly infinite nature 
that comes forth from the Supreme Cause of all, then the true concept, while 
defined as exalted over all things, turns out to be universal by nature.  And thus, 
like the prior knowledge initiated by it, this properly understood concept proves 
to be appropriate to the infinite nature of things as they are perspicuously seen 
through it according to their reasons (769c) and, in this sense, implicitly 
contained by this concept.   
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     As a result, all things as they appear to man in the light of their true being, 
which is solely attainable by virtue of knowledge or “the perspicuous vision of 
all things”, should be fairly acknowledged to be established in the human mind 
(769b).  This means that not only the animals (or “every living soul”), but also 
the things “which nature contains besides the animals, such as the elements of 
the world, the genera and species of grasses and trees, quantities and qualities, 
and all the innumerable multitude of differentiations” (769b) come to subsist, as 
Eriugena specifies, “in the notions of them contained in the soul of the wise” 
(769d).   “For where they are comprehended”, the author adds, “there they are; 
and they are nothing other than the understanding of themselves” (769d).  And 
this is reasonably so; for in accordance with Gen. 2, 19, all living creatures are 
supposed to receive from man the names proper to their nature (as due to “the 
very concept of the living soul”), which the Philosopher understands to be the 
way man enters the substantial reality of creation that the Holy Scripture itself 
clearly points to (768d-769a).  
     All this, from Eriugena’s point of view, may be summed up as follows: 
“True knowledge of all these is implanted in human nature, although it is 
concealed from her that she has it until she is restored to her pristine and 
integral condition, in which with all clarity she will understand the magnitude 
and the beauty of the image that is fashioned within her, and will no longer be 
in ignorance of anything which is established within; for she will be 
encompassed by the Divine Light and turned towards God in Whom she will 
enjoy the perspicuous vision of all things” (769b-c).  Hence, unlike the image as 
a replica of things that is imprinted in the mind of man after they have been 
perceived by his corporeal senses, the Concept is to be understood as the true 
Image which is fashioned in human nature after the Supreme Being Himself so 
as not to come from without (inasmuch as nothing can subsist outside the true 
being) but to be inborn from within.  And being thus innate in the human mind, 
this Concept opens before man the perspective of the true reality of God’s 
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creation to let him be properly in it or, as is said, restore his nature to the dignity 
of her “pristine and integral condition”.   
     With regard to what has been revealed of the concept as such and the true 
knowledge as a clear vision of the nature of things, it may be counted for certain 
that the “inner concept which is contained in the human mind constitutes the 
substance of those things of which it is the concept…” (770a). “What is so 
remarkable then”, the Philosopher refers to those puzzled by this, “if the 
concept of nature, created in the human mind and possessed by it, is understood 
to be the substance of the very things of which it is the concept, just as in the 
Divine Mind the concept of the whole created universe is the incommunicable 
substance of that whole?” (769a). According to Eriugena, there is nothing 
extraordinary in this understanding of the concept to be puzzled by.  For just as 
we may call “the concept of all intelligibles and sensibles in the whole of 
things” to be “the substance of those intelligibles and sensibles”, so we may also 
say “that the concept of the differences and properties and natural accidents are 
the differences and the properties and accidents themselves” (769a-b).  
Likewise, as the author further underlines, even “the concept by which man 
knows himself may be considered his very substance” (770a). 
     By no means should the true concept be understood therefore as merely an 
abstract form.  The concept cannot be reduced to a purely cerebral phenomenon 
contrasted both with the rest of the human nature and reality itself.  Otherwise, 
human nature would be relegated to nothing more than the corporeal side of it 
(i.e. to such of its physiological functions as sensation brought about by bodily 
senses), and reality would simply appear then to consist of a number of sensible 
objects only.  In fact, as a concrete form which perfectly fits reality as such 
while embracing the whole of it without residue, the proper concept determines 
the human being as a whole so as to effectively control all parts of his nature, 
including both the mind and the sense and the body itself.  And only as such, the 
concept – “through contact with the ‘variable object…’ ”  (769d) mediated by 
173 
 
the sense, fully disciplined and guided by this concept – constitutes indeed the 
totality of things in all particular details of their differences, properties and 
accidents as they are perspicuously seen from the perspective of the integral 
mind.  That is why, in line with this, Eriugena later adds with confidence: 
“…for the soundest reason teaches us in no uncertain way that one man, alone, 
is greater than the whole visible world, not by the bulk of his parts but by the 
dignity of the harmony of his rational nature” (784c).   
     From this it follows that to the extent that the phantasy is controlled by the 
mind subject to the inner concept, it turns into what Eriugena calls the interior 
sense (see 787c).  This is the sense that rises from the midst of man’s rational 
nature and thereby essentially differs from the exterior one.  Crucial to the 
distinct types of knowledge discussed above, this difference between the 
exterior and the interior sense allows us not only to distinguish the opposite 
types of senses but also to indicate the diametrically opposed perspectives of the 
mind.    These are the perspectives that Eriugena describes at 783c-784c by 
means of an allegorical interpretation of the celestial luminaries as they appear 
in the Genesis account (Gen. 1, 14-19), presenting them as sense-related 
metaphors.   
     In particular, with relation to “the larger luminary” Eriugena is quite certain 
that, in his view, it appears to symbolise the sense which announces to the mind 
“without danger of error the species of the sensibles”, so that “with the greatest 
ease and without labour the mind is able to form unclouded judgments upon 
these species in all clarity” (783c).  This means that, by analogy with the sun, 
this kind of sense might be unequivocally associated with a centrifugal motion 
of the rational nature that, led by the central luminary of the mind, goes along 
its rays. So that, when illuminated by the intelligible light, this sense penetrates 
into the darkness of the unknown so as to actually see things as they truly are; 
“for it does not deceive the mind, but with all the brightness of the sun uncovers 
every sensible species and lays them bare before the reason” (783d). 
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     As for “the lesser luminary” (i.e. the moon that lights not by itself but with 
reflected rays), it reminds the Philosopher that mode of sensation which 
receives impulses from without and, because of this, often deceives the mind, 
“as though wandering uncertainly through some nocturnal dusk” (784a).  This 
comparison allows  him to clearly demonstrate that, instead of focusing on 
things as they truly are, the mind is deceived and misled by the exterior senses, 
due to which it deals in fact with some obscure phenomena of sensual origin 
that only seem to stand for the things themselves.  As it further follows from the 
context at 784a, among these deceptions of the mind such examples may be 
counted as “the oar which appears to be broken when it is dipped in water”; or 
“the reversed face in the mirror”; or “towers which appear to those sailing to 
move”; “and a thousand other illusions of this sort, which are found naturally in 
all the senses of the body” (784a).  This therefore entails that as long as 
submitted to the sense undisciplined and thus fully dependent on its hectic 
impressions of outer things, the mind “cannot easily form true judgments upon 
objects which it receives through sense” (784a).  “And the rational soul, when 
forming its judgments”, the author concludes, “must employ the greatest skill 
and utmost industry to distinguish these from true appearances.  For these have 
no existence in nature, but are formed in the senses and frequently deceive the 
mind and put it into the error of taking false things for true” (784a).   
     And finally, as for the opinions of the mind that are formed by it under the 
impact of the exterior sense, they are not the mind’s own ideas, but the ones 
which in all their particular details entirely derive from sensual perceptions.  
And though elaborated and possessed by the mind so as to seem to have some 
relevance to the inner senses, this sort of innumerable opinions prove yet to be 
basically sensible (but not intelligible) by their content, as due to those of the 
external origin.   In the light of such an understanding, therefore, the sense-
related experience appears to Eriugena “under the metaphor of the stars of 
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different brilliancies” (784c).  For according to him, when numbers of sensible 
forms are poured into the mind through the senses, it “attempts by means of 
certain logical processes to make statements which will to some extent resemble 
the truth, and to be certain about things which are themselves uncertain.  And it 
disputes about the minutest reasons of visible nature in various ways: 
sometimes offering opinions which, like bright stars, show a degree of clarity 
and proximity to the truth…” (784b). 
Two types of knowledge 
     The results of the preceding inquiry could be summarised as follows: 
Knowledge 
 
 
Produced 
 
subject to the sense and fashioned after 
it; 
___________________________ 
proceeds from without – from the 
exterior sense: its concept is the image – 
replica or phantasy – of sensible things 
(formed by abstraction of the diverse 
attributes
5
); 
___________________________ 
accommodates human mind (and, 
through it, man himself) to the sensible 
world. 
 
Prior 
 
independent of the sense while preceding 
and leading it; 
____________________________ 
proceeds from within, i.e. rises from the 
midst of the mind: its concept is the 
image of God (based on the universal 
principle of self-identity to be appropriate 
to the infinite nature of being
6
); 
___________________________ 
introduces human mind (and, through it, 
the whole of human being) into the reality 
of creation. 
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     Thus, it is seen from the above that the proper concept – as it appears in 
relation to the prior knowledge which enables the mind to contemplate all 
things as they truly are – constitutes the basis of the true knowledge that is all 
about the infinite nature of the universe of God’s creation.  Being actually 
inborn or “implanted in human nature” (769b), this true knowledge nevertheless 
remains hidden from man until he is restored to his “pristine and integral 
condition” (769b)7.  In this condition “with all clarity” man would be able to 
understand “the magnitude and the beauty of the image that is fashioned within” 
him, so as not to be any longer “in ignorance of anything which is established 
within”, but to enjoy in the Divine Light “the perspicuous vision of all things” 
(769c).  Hence, only restored to the pristine and integral state of his being in the 
original and ultimate reality of God’s creation (which is ever the absolute one), 
man does find himself to be “encompassed by the Divine Light” or, in other 
words, to be able to see in the perspective of this Light, so as truly to know all 
things as they substantially are.  Thereby, through the true knowledge of things 
according to their substance or infinite nature (i.e. when causes and their effects 
are comprehended to be one), man actually enters the true reality of creation, 
where the absolute essence and its existence are inseparably one.  In this sense, 
therefore, to gain true knowledge by virtue of comprehension of the proper 
nature of concept
8
 means in fact nothing other than to reach the true reality itself 
and to be actually in it, when the whole of human nature (including the body 
itself) is brought to what it is genuinely meant to be by its very concept.  “For 
there is innate in him” (i.e. in man) “intellect and reason, as well as the innate 
principle of possession of the celestial and angelic body”, Eriugena explains, 
“which after the Resurrection shall appear more clearly than light…; for it will 
be common to all human nature to rise again in eternal and incorruptible 
spiritual bodies” (764a).  It is subsequently for this purpose that man is 
supposed to bring his essence (the inner nature of his true being) into 
accordance with his actual existence, which unequivocally implies that he must 
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live according to the mind that is deeply hidden in him and really constitutes the 
profound essence of his nature.  For this, man’s intellect is strictly forbidden “to 
cherish visible forms” in order that he could be, in the words of St. Paul, “not 
fashioned after this world” (780d).  And to achieve this goal, the mind is to be 
carefully cleansed of any impressions it receives from the corporeal senses. For 
as Eriugena argues, is it not obvious to any true philosopher “that this sensible 
world was created for the sake of man, that he might rule it as a king rules his 
kingdom and as a husband his household, and that he might use it to the glory of 
his Creator, subordinated to no part of it, in no way dependent on it, but raised 
above it ruling it alone?  For if man had not sinned” (i.e., submitted himself to 
the power of senses) “he would not be ruled among the parts of the universe, but 
would himself rule the whole of it as his subject; and he would not employ for 
that purpose these corporeal senses of the mortal body, but would govern 
eternally and faultlessly the whole and the parts of it in accordance with the 
laws of God, without any physical act in space or time, but solely by the rational 
apprehension of its natural and innate causes and by the easy use of right will” 
(782b-c).   
     As a result of the complete purification of the mind that is effectively carried 
out by its submission to the substantial order of the universe of creation (which 
the true Law of God consists in), a rigorous discipline of this submission comes 
to be imposed upon the mind’s skills (or faculties) referred to the particular 
targets, which in fact are nothing other but its potential manifestations.  And in 
consequence of this, the exterior sense proves to be replaced by the interior one 
– that is the sense which is ruled from within when illuminated by the mind’s 
light, i.e. controlled and led by it, as due to the rational motion of human nature.  
Through this transformation of the sense, mind truly comes to manifest itself.  
Through the ability of inner sight acquired thereby, it comes to see all things 
from within, and thus enters the substantial reality, where all things subsist 
according to their proper nature. “Just as the Creative Wisdom, which is the 
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Word of God”, Eriugena expounds, “beholds all things which are made in It 
before they are made, and that very beholding of all things which are beheld 
before they are made is their true and eternal and immutable essence, so the 
created wisdom, which is human nature, knows all things which are made in it 
before they are made, and that very knowledge of the things which are known 
before they are made is their true and indestructible essence” (778d – 779a).  
And further he concludes: “We can then sum up everything that we have been 
trying to teach briefly as follows: Just as the understanding of all things which 
the Father made in His only begotten Word is their essence and is the substance 
of all those attributes which are understood to be attached by nature to that 
essence; so the knowledge of all things which the Word of the Father has 
created in the human soul is their essence and the substance of all those 
attributes which are discerned to be attached by nature to the essence: and just 
as the Divine intellect is prior to all things and is all things, so the intellectual 
knowledge of the soul is prior to all the things which she knows and is all the 
things which she fore-knows” (779b-c).   
     Since “the knowledge in the Creative Wisdom is itself rightly held to be the 
primary and causal essence of the whole of creation”, whereas “the knowledge 
in the created nature” is considered by contrast as “the secondary essence” that 
“subsists as the effect of the higher knowledge” (779a), all things due to this are 
believed to “subsist as causes in the Divine understanding, but as effects in 
human knowledge” (779c).  It does not however mean, according to Eriugena, 
that “the essence of all things in the Word is something other than the essence 
of all things in man, but one and the same essence is contemplated by the mind 
under two different aspects, as subsisting in the eternal Causes, and as 
understood in its effects…” (779c). It is consequently apparent from this that – 
being one in the true reality or reconciled in “one and the same essence” – 
causes and effects should not be separated in the true knowledge.  Otherwise, if 
they are considered by the human understanding separately, i.e. as only the 
179 
 
causes and as only the effects, neither of them can be known at all; for as said, 
nothing finite is permitted to be known (see 779c).  Subsequently, to be true (i.e. 
appropriate to the reality as it truly is), human knowledge must resolutely 
approach the inseparable, and thus the infinite as such.  And for this purpose, 
the perspective of knowledge (which is that of “the created wisdom”) must 
perfectly concur with the substantial order of the Creative Wisdom or, in other 
words, be as prior to all things as “the higher knowledge” is.  For as Eriugena 
maintains, an accurate examination of the universal nature clearly shows that 
“whatever circumstance attaches to the substances in the human intelligence”, it 
“proceeds through the created wisdom from the knowledge of the Creative 
Wisdom” (779b).  
     All this should convince students of Eriugena’s thought that the mind, as it 
truly is in accordance with its innermost essence, comes to be manifest in man 
when it is purified from the sensible phantasies, and  the universal self-identity 
inherent in the reality of creation is properly thought of.  This is, clearly, 
achievable not so much by means of ascetic practices of wrestling with the flesh 
but by virtue of a thorough application of the fundamental principle of self-
identity to the task of comprehension of causes and effects in their proper 
unity
9.  Indeed, it is the mind’s self-discipline provided by an effective use of 
dialectic that allows man, as discussed above, to really resist the sway of the 
corporeal senses correspondent to finite (sensible) things only.  It is 
consequently by means of dialectic, becoming thus an art of living in the true 
reality, that a proper distinction between the exterior and the interior sense is 
brought about to give birth to the inner sight, which opens to man the reality in 
which all things are perspicuously seen as they subsist according to their 
reasons.   Purified thereby, the mind itself becomes adequately manifest in its 
true wholeness, due to which the senses are not merely neglected and discarded 
but disciplined and led by the mind.   
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     This dialectic therefore proves in fact to be nothing else but precisely that 
discipline of the mind which leads it to its proper condition.  In this condition, 
while preceding all particular things, the mind actively forms them, using the 
concepts innate in it.  For it is, no doubt, these concepts that really enable the 
human mind to clearly see all things according to their proper self-identical 
nature, in which the universal essence of all particular things and their actual 
existence are at one.  Thus, as Eriugena further argues (see 766d-767b), the 
mind comes to be understood as being brought into accordance with its 
constructive skill and discipline, which are not accidents to it but the 
“substantial and constituent parts”.  For, in so far as the image and likeness of 
God (that is, human nature) is thought to be created not by accident but by 
substance (767c), its skill and the discipline are not accidents to the mind, but 
“are naturally present to it” (767c).  “For although”, the Philosopher continues, 
“through the accident of its transgression of the Divine command whereby it 
became forgetful both of itself and its Creator, the mind is born unskilled and 
unwise, yet when it is reformed by the rules of doctrine it may discover again in 
itself its God and itself and its skill and the discipline and all those things which 
subsist in it according to its nature…” (767c).  And thus the mind, its skill and 
the discipline will form “a kind of trinity in one essence” (767d). 
“A doctrine according to reason” 
     In connection with the preceding analysis of the Periphyseon’s text, it is not 
hard to understand that the doctrine mentioned above, in accordance with which 
the mind is meant to be reformed to uncover its proper nature, is nothing other 
than “a doctrine according to reason” (766b).  This is the doctrine which 
consists in teaching about the intimate proximity of the intelligible nature to the 
universally self-identical Good.  According to this doctrine, as previously seen, 
“that which understands is better than that which is understood” (766b), and 
hence is nearer to Good.  As discussed before, this Good is to be properly 
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understood as the Divine being in its self-identity or as the self-knowing Spirit.  
Being thus ever in and for Himself, never departing from Himself but remaining 
within Himself throughout everything so as to know Himself (or to see Himself 
from within) as the universal Good, this Spirit of God has nothing inside nor 
outside Himself to counter Him, and thus to disrupt His being or to cause any 
deficiency in Him.  Likewise, the human mind in order to be true (i.e. 
appropriate to the true reality) is supposed to arrive at its own self-identity, 
which brings it close to the infinite being of the Spirit of God Who truly knows 
Himself as the universal Good.  
     From the “doctrine according to reason” it is clear therefore that the human 
being comes to conformity with the substantial reality of creation in so far as the 
human mind, brought into harmony with its own nature, attains knowledge of 
itself.  As a form of overcoming the finitude of all individual things brought 
together into the unity of the universal concept, the mind’s self-knowledge 
becomes a means of the restoration of man’s wholeness and, consequently, of 
his participation in the substantial reality of the whole.  It is indeed by knowing 
himself as a universal being, who thoroughly understands all things as they truly 
are, that man actually becomes identical to himself and, thereby, a participant in 
the universal reality.  In this sense, it is right to say after Eriugena that, when 
restored to its Good-like self-identity by virtue of self-knowledge, “the human 
mind, and its concept by which it knows itself, and the discipline by which it 
learns itself so as to know itself, subsist in one and the same essence” (770b).  
Understood thereby as the true being of human nature identical to itself in all of 
its essential manifestations, this “one and the same essence” should further be 
known as Spirit to whom, where appropriate, Eriugena refers throughout his 
discourse as a fair definition of human being.  “For no one knows”, the 
Philosopher holds, “what things are in man, save the Spirit of man which is in 
him” (770a).  This consequently means that becoming infinite and universal 
through his self-knowledge, man actually encounters the self-knowing Spirit of 
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God, Who likewise is “one and the same essence” that embraces the entire 
being of creation.  
     Thus the notion of “one and the same essence”, as it occurs in this context, 
seems to be central to Eriugena’s discourse concerning the issue of encounter of 
the human and God’s Spirit.   Indeed, in the light of the uniformity of essence, 
the Spirit of man and the Spirit of God can hardly be understood as two remote 
entities merely co-existing as the different substances; rather they should be 
known, as the very notion requires, as “one and the same essence”.   For it is 
undeniably true that the absolute being is indivisible within itself and, being 
essentially one, cannot consist of separate (isolated) parts.   In the absolute 
reality, the infinite God cannot be set apart from His creation so as to look upon 
it from afar as if something alien to Him.    With reference to this it is right to 
admit, following Eriugena, that “if every creature whether visible or invisible is 
in itself most perfectly created and since the Creator is perfect and more-than-
perfect, it cannot be believed that He has created anything that is imperfect…” 
(775d).  
     All this consequently means that in the reality of “one and the same essence” 
any particular being can properly subsist, and therefore truly known, as the 
infinite only.   And although these issues (of uniformity and infinity) “seem to 
be extremely difficult since they pass beyond the limit of simple doctrine” 
(774b), nevertheless the Philosopher assures that whoever “looks intently into 
the nature of things will soon find that this is the way in which they are 
constituted” (775b).     
Knowing the infinite 
     If it is assumed that – in  order to be self-identical (or to know himself) – 
man must know all things as they truly are, this certainly does not imply that 
these things ought to be known in themselves as a sort of individual beings 
immediately taken by themselves.  For when regarded on their own (so as to 
appear to exist independently of the causes of their being), any things prove to 
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be impenetrable and therefore utterly incomprehensible as to what they are.  In 
contrast to this incomprehensibility in their  finitude, all things nevertheless may 
be really known as they truly are when conceived of in their relation to the 
infinite nature (which is both the Ultimate Cause and the inner essence of their 
being), and thus understood as belonging to the true being that ever is and never 
ceases to be.  It is consequently by knowing things not as to what they are but 
that they are, that man actually cleaves to the substantial reality of God’s 
creation proper, where all things are necessarily self-identical while retaining 
their living link with the true infinite nature and strictly following the 
fundamental order of it.  Being actually the knowledge of the infinite as such, 
dialectic therefore is of great help to man on this way to the reality as it truly is.   
     As is said at 771b, when a contradiction concerning man’s knowledge of all 
things (and accordingly of himself) arises, it is hard to decide for sure whether 
man knows all things (and, as a result, himself) or not.  An instrument that man 
has at his disposal to master such contradictions and ensure his progress to truth 
is dialectic.  Thus in particular, if on the one hand the human mind appears to 
know itself, whereas on the other does not, then according to dialectic, as 
previously discussed, either part of such a collision the mind comes into ought 
to be treated as equally true.  “Both assertions”, Eriugena argues with regard to 
this, “have the full support of reason.  For the human mind does know itself, and 
again does not know itself.  For it knows that it is, but does not what it is” 
(771b).  It would be fair to conclude from this that it is a dialectical treatment of 
the contradiction in question (leading to the unity of opposites) “which reveals 
most clearly the image of God to be in man” (771b).  Indeed, in so far as the 
opposed statements are grasped in their unity (but not in an ‘either-or’ manner), 
the human mind is enabled thereby to conceive of the wholeness as appropriate 
to the unconfined infinity.  And this integrity of the opposites becomes for man 
the way of approaching the universal nature of his being, which is never 
confined to non-being and therefore perfectly accords with the infinite nature of 
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Him Who ever is and never ceases to be.  “For just as God is comprehensible in 
the sense that it can be deduced from His creation that He is,
10” the Philosopher 
insists, “and incomprehensible because it cannot be comprehended by any 
intellect whether human or angelic nor even by Himself what he is, seeing that 
He is not a thing but is superessential; so to  the human mind it is given to know 
one thing only, that it is – but as to what it is no sort of notion is permitted it” 
(771b – c).   
     It is clear from this that a contradiction concerning man’s self-knowledge 
requires a dialectical way of its treatment.  It particularly means that none of the 
contrary statements, in so far as each is taken in contrast to the other, could be 
chosen as true.  When, however, dialectically considered as being 
simultaneously in their integrity, both counterparts of the contradiction should 
be accepted for being true at the same time.  In this sense, therefore, it is equally 
right to say after Eriugena about human self-knowledge as follows:  
Man does know himself; 
Man does not know himself.                                                                      
                                                     
     In this way, the Philosopher intends to suggest that, from the dialectical point 
of view, it is impossible to say of man that he only knows himself or only does 
not know himself.  According to the integral approach to human being which 
alone is appropriate to the wholeness of the true being as such, man may only be 
properly known when dialectically understood to know and not to know himself 
at the same time.  And this is truly so; because, as Eriugena specifies at 771b, 
The human mind does know that it is, 
but does not know what it is. 
    This consequently means that in order to know himself as he truly is in 
accordance with his proper nature, man must conceive of his being as the 
infinite one.  This further entails that everything finite – when taken by itself in 
contrast to the infinite – should be regarded as irrelevant to man’s proper being 
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and therefore rejected as the untrue predicate of it.  Hence, in order to really 
know that he is – that is to say, truly is (while never disrupted by non-being) – 
man must resolutely deny any finite knowledge of himself or, better to say, any 
knowledge of himself as a finite being.  That is why, as appears from the second 
half of the contradiction presented at 771b, the human mind is unequivocally 
said not to know what it is, i.e. not to know itself as anything finite, that is 
limited by something other and therefore seen, as it were, from without as a 
particular ‘what’.  And it cannot be otherwise, because – in contrast to the 
Aristotelian approach
11
 – nothing at all may be truly known as to what it is.  For 
strictly speaking, it is definitely impossible to know anything finite at all.   Even 
God Himself, as confirmed at 771b, is understood not to know what He is.  
Indeed, nothing finite can be thought of otherwise than in the way of being 
confined to its limit, resulting from its encounter with something other.  Being 
thus in its existence dependent on the other, no finite thing can ever be 
understood to subsist in a true way – i.e. in its outer existence to be an adequate 
manifestation of the inner essence.  Nothing finite can actually pertain to being: 
remaining within its own limits, it is always fraught with negation, and 
therefore burdened with non-being.    
     Since Spinoza it is well known that omnis determinatio est negatio.  
Everything finite, according to this, inevitably turns into its opposite. Likewise 
truth, in so far as it is understood to be limited (or appropriate to the finite only), 
inevitably turns into falsehood.  To remain itself, truth must be appropriate to 
the infinite alone.  It means that only the infinite itself can be the genuine object 
of the true knowledge or, in terms of the above contradiction, the knowledge of 
‘that it is’ type. 
     From this it follows that only that which truly subsists, but not merely 
appears to exist when perceived by senses, can be really known.  And although 
it seems natural to popular sentiment to know not the infinite but finite things 
only, which are immediately given to the sensual perception (and for this reason 
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seem to lie within the mind’s grasp), in fact only that which is coherently 
conceived as being infinite in-and-for itself can actually be known and therefore 
belong to the true reality that is inseparably one with the universal and infinite 
Principle of all being.    Despite common belief’s fear of infinity as something 
incomprehensible, the infinite being cannot in fact remain unknown.  The true 
reality cannot merely hide itself, as if it were something non-existent.  On the 
contrary, it actually exists by revealing itself (i.e. unfolding its unfathomable 
depth), as due to the Uniform Subject
12
.  The problem therefore is in the mind’s 
conformity to the reality like this.  In its proper state of likeness to the 
substantial reality of God’s creation, the mind is supposed to be universal and 
infinite too.  It is consequently this proper nature of the human mind that is to 
be uncovered.  Through the mind’s discipline of self-identity and skill of being 
perfectly congruous to the infinite reality, the whole of human nature, as due to 
imago Dei, comes to conformity to the true Being that ever is and never ceases 
to be.  
     Thus, it follows of necessity that the statement that man’s being is infinite 
(i.e. the affirmation that it is) does not yet express the infinity itself, unless it 
comes to collision with the opposite statement, according to which man is just a 
finite being or, in other words, a particular ‘what’. Indeed, as a real target of 
contradiction, the infinity (or proper being) is not anything individual only: it 
cannot be merely declared to be this or that, nor indicated to take place here or 
there, for it is neither seen from without as a particular ‘what’ nor placed next to 
anything other.  Hence, the infinity cannot be properly conceived of and 
therefore truly affirmed without the true negation of all finitude, when 
everything individual is perfectly grasped with regard to “an extremely true and 
very well tested” substantial definition (768b-c).  This is the definition through 
which nothing but the true being reveals itself by the complete denial of “what 
relates to the substance from the attributes acquired by the substance from 
outside itself through generation” (768c).  According to this substantial 
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definition, appropriate to the substance as “the true existence” (774a), man’s 
proper being “cannot be called by this or that name, for it stands above all 
definitions and all groupings of parts, for it can only be predicated of it that it is, 
not what it is.  For that alone is what a truly substantial definition does: it asserts 
only that it is, but does not say what it is” (768c).   
     This means that the infinite can only be known when all the knowledge of 
the finite (i.e. of every individual ‘what’) is negated.  The true affirmation, 
which alone is adequate to the infinite reality, may therefore result from the true 
negation only, that is by its nature nothing but overcoming all finitude (or 
knowing things as they truly are in their relation to the infinite).  Speaking in 
terms of dialectic, this affirmation should be understood as the negation of 
negation.   
     This negation of the finite knowledge is what Eriugena calls ignorance
13
, 
which means that nothing can ever be truly known as to what it is.  In this sense, 
‘ignorance’ becomes a crucial factor of the knowledge of the infinite.  Not 
unreasonably therefore is the human mind held to be honoured in its 
‘ignorance’, which to some extent is ever more praiseworthy than the abstract 
knowledge itself.  Indeed, it is full awareness of the limits of the finite 
knowledge, and not the knowledge of the finite things themselves, that really 
opens the way to the true knowledge as such
14
.  Without this sort of awareness 
and the subsequent overcoming of all restrictions of the spurious knowledge 
applicable to the improper being of finite things only, no true knowledge, 
appropriate by its content to the true reality, is attainable at all.  “And, a fact 
which is stranger still and, to those who study God and man, more fair to 
contemplate”, says Eriugena, “the human mind is more honoured in its 
ignorance than in its knowledge; for the ignorance in it of what it is is more 
praiseworthy than the knowledge” of that kind (771c).   “Therefore”, he 
continues with regard to the infinite nature of the true knowledge, “the Divine 
likeness in the human mind is most clearly discerned when it is only known that 
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it is, and not known what it is; and, if I may so put it, what it is is denied in it, 
and only that it is is affirmed.  Nor is this unreasonable.  For if it were known to 
be something, then at once it would be limited by some definition, and thereby 
would cease to be a complete expression of the image of its Creator, Who is 
absolutely unlimited and contained within no definition, because He is infinite, 
superessential beyond all that may be said or comprehended”  (771c-d).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
189 
 
CHAPTER VII 
  Overcoming the division  
Partaking in the one indivisible reality 
     In this way, our inquiry into Eriugena’s doctrine of knowledge brings us to a 
clear understanding that the reformation of the mind, leading human being to 
the reality of the infinite whole, directly depends on the proper (infinite by 
nature) subject-matter of its knowledge.   This means that once the mind of man 
draws “the whole of his attention to the contemplation of the Cause of all 
things, and then of the principles according to which and in which all things 
were made” (844b), it actually opens before this man an utterly new perspective 
of being. It is from this new perspective that, by contrast to his outward 
existence among the contingent sensible objects, man proves to be not an alien, 
exposed to hostile (exterior) forces any more, but a real partaker of the one 
indivisible universe coming forth from the only Cause of all.   
     This perspective of the one indivisible universe becomes available to man, 
according to Eriugena, after he is “purged from every disease of body and soul” 
(858c), which is their discord (or cardinal disorder of human nature) resulting, 
as well seen before, from “the perverse motion of the rational soul” (844d; see 
also 855d-856a).  As a result, the human mind allows everyone to realise indeed 
that, proceeding to all particular beings, the universal Principle of the entire 
reality nonetheless neither decreases nor departs from Itself but, paradoxically 
enough, remains ever identical to Itself.  As a matter of fact, it is because of Its 
universality that the Principle of all gives rise to everything particular and thus 
– in like manner to the fruitful Tree of Paradise (the metaphor Eriugena is keen 
to use) – does nothing other in fact but unceasingly manifests Itself, while 
retaining Its genuine universality by being substantially homogeneous to the 
totality of all Its manifestations.  And in this way indeed, causing all things to 
come into being, the universal Principle of the whole reality never departs from 
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Itself to get eventually dispersed among the singular.  Instead, unfolding Itself 
into actual being, the Principle ever returns to Itself and thus properly is in and 
for Itself, never transcending (as the universality itself requires) the boundaries 
of Its absolute totality.  And this is truly so, because nothing alien (non aliud) to 
the very nature of the properly universal Principle of all things, visible and 
invisible, is ever brought to light in the course of Its self-disclosure. 
     In this sense therefore, being an outcome of the Creator’s self-disclosure, the 
creation as such proves to genuinely subsist in so far only as it returns to its 
Creator as being essentially akin to Him by its pristine nature, pure from any 
distortions imposed upon it by the irrational motion of the corrupt mind.  
Indeed, having in itself nothing alien to the Source of its origin (for there is 
certainly nothing other apart from that which comes forth from the only 
Beginning of all beings), the creation cannot properly subsist otherwise than by 
remaining substantially one with the Primal Cause of its being, as if it were ever 
returning to the place where it originally belongs (see 858b-859a).  It is 
perfectly obvious, then, that nothing alien to the Ultimate Principle Itself should 
ever be recognised to subsist in creation: where the Beginning and the End are 
understood to be one, there the true (self-identical) Being-in-and-for-itself 
properly is.  Besides, it is also apparent in line with this that, grasping the 
profound truth of a return-like mode of being of the Universal Itself, the mind of 
man inevitably gets rid of sensible illusions about the world he lives in, so as to 
find himself actively engaged with nothing else but bringing the whole of reality 
back to the way it truly is.  Thus man does become a real partaker of the one 
indivisible universe of creation – that is, the domain of God’s Self-revelation.   
     All this consequently means that the entire creation as it properly is beyond 
the phantasies of the finite (sense-dependent) knowledge may not be truly 
known, unless it is consistently conceived – appropriately to the return-like 
pattern of the true reality – as being brought back “to the condition in which it 
was first created” (855a).  For only then all things, including the human nature 
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restored to the integrity of its pristine state, appear to the mind (after the labours 
of its “purgation in practice and theory”) to be perspicuously seen indeed 
according to their true nature (see 855a).  And thus the mind comes to know the 
nature which ever remains in “the immutable stability of the primordial causes” 
(858b) and, for this reason, abides “at peace and in harmony in itself and with 
its Creator” (855c).  “For God does not curse”, the Philosopher pinpoints, “the 
things which He made, but blesses them…” (848c).  That is why “freedom from 
error”, as fairly said, is guaranteed without fail to “those who, bathed in the 
splendour of the Divine ray, take the path of right contemplation and seek 
themselves and their God; for in these the knowledge of the Creator precedes 
the knowledge of the creature” (844c).  And it cannot be otherwise indeed, in so 
far as “the rational inquiry into truth” is concerned (858b); for such is the “order 
of the Divine Law” (843c) that the universal Principle of all does precede 
everything particular caused to being.  And it is the rational motion of the mind 
which alone – when the corporeal senses do not any longer resist it (see 856a) – 
enjoys the perfect conformity to the proper order of the entire human nature  
and creation, and therefore is really able “to observe the most just and beautiful 
order of the Divine Law” (843c).   
The logical dilemmas and paradoxes  
     Thus we are given to understand that – coming back through the proper 
operations of the mind to the state of his pristine integrity with “the One Creator 
of the whole creature, visible and invisible” (843b) – man attains “the perfection 
of wisdom” which truly enables him to “reason together with God concerning 
the principles of visible things” (843b).  With regard to this, therefore, it would 
be right to admit along with Eriugena that man does realise that all the beauty of 
the creature (“whether the inner beauty of the principles or the outward beauty 
of the sensible forms”) is to be referred “to the glory of the Creator” (843c).  
And thus approached, this undeniable truth should certainly imply after all that 
in creation as a whole nothing at all properly subsists separately from the 
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Creator manifest.  This further means that, in so far as the true being as such is 
concerned, neither the creature nor the Creator can actually dispense with one 
another.  If it is so, however, that the creature and its Creator are in fact 
mutually dependent in their being, it may further mean only one thing indeed – 
namely that, in consistency with this valid proposition, it would also be 
logically sound to acknowledge that as the Creator God is hardly conceivable to 
subsist before the creature has been brought to being. Likewise, from the logical 
standpoint it remains utterly unclear what the Creator needs to do after the act 
of creation has been completed.  Moreover, on the one hand, it appears logically 
faultless to assume after all that He, Whose essence and existence are said to be 
one (Ex. 3, 14), should definitely face His own ‘glory’ in all the ‘beauty’ of the 
creature (which undoubtedly is the explicit harmony of its essence and 
existence). On the other hand, when the totality of distinct things is concerned, 
this assumption yet seems too extraordinary to be accepted.  Indeed, it would be 
indispensable to suggest then that the Creator, although uncreated, nevertheless 
encounters in creation none other but Himself, as if He Who is uncreated, could 
also be – as highlighted at 452a and 454d – somehow created while all things 
are coming out of Him into being.   
     What are all these logical difficulties about – do they mean to challenge the 
human understanding of God’s eternity or to indicate some apparent 
imperfections of the very conception of creation?  Is it just inadequate to 
consider the absolute God as the Creator only or to confine His infinite being to 
the relations with the creature alone?  Should the very approach of the human 
mind to the infinite nature of the Divine be improved or simply some additional 
postulates, like those of the continuing act of creation or sustaining the creature, 
be allowed for the conception of creation?  After all, no matter how many other 
questions of the kind could be raised in this regard, it should be quite evident to 
everyone who carefully follows the inner logic of the Periphyseon that the only 
constructive way of tackling the dilemma in focus is supposed to agree with that 
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plain insight that it is impossible at all to think of God’s being without falling 
into contradiction.  In no way does it mean, however, that the contradictions, by 
which the mind is haunted in its attempts to know the infinite, prevent man from 
making any progress towards knowing God’s truth.  On the contrary, the real 
implication of this insight consists in highlighting the basic axiom of dialectic 
that it is nothing other than the contradictions themselves, when properly 
treated, that truly become an effective instrument for overcoming any obstacles 
on the way to the infinite as such.   For it is the vigour of negation latent in them 
that brings to fore the fundamental inadequacy of any finite definitions to the 
Divine being, despite they flourish in abundance within the scope of cataphatic 
theology, specifically keen on ascribing some conventional attributes to God 
and, as a result, honouring them for the real properties of His true nature
1
.  
     From this, it necessarily follows that the true knowledge of God (which the 
righteous are undoubtedly directed to by their faith) is to be all about resolutely 
overcoming the contradictions
2
 into which the human mind inevitably falls as 
soon as it sets out to think of the infinity of the Divine in terms of creating and 
non-creating, as well as of being respectively created and uncreated. 
     To many present-day theologians however (especially those largely 
influenced by Kierkegaard’s vehement rejection of human reason’s ability “to 
answer the basic religious questions of life”) such paradoxes seem so utterly 
insoluble that they find it fair to assert that “the truth of Christianity is grasped 
only by faith and not by reason”3.   By contrast, to such early Christian thinkers 
as Eriugena – with whom, as Hegel says, “the genuine philosophy begins”4  – it 
is apparent that the true faith in the One God, letting everyone  “rightly believe 
and understand” (860c), should only encourage, and not humiliate, human 
reason, without which the nature made in the image and likeness of God would  
simply be inconceivable
5
.   
      From this point of view, it would be fair to expect of a faithful Christian not 
to give up, when on the way to the truth of God’s revelation he finds himself 
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confronted, as he thinks, by some flagrant paradoxes, which on closer 
examination prove nevertheless to be not as insoluble as they first appear; 
because in fact these paradoxes are not of the matter man seeks to know, but of 
his own reasoning. 
      Indeed, speaking of this in general, it is true to admit that all paradoxes of 
human knowledge may finally be understood only as stemming from nothing 
other than knowledge itself or, to put it more precisely, from the way the matter 
of knowledge is approached.  Hence, if any paradoxes do occur, it is not matter 
that is to blame for it nor, all the more, is the problematic matter to be forbidden 
to knowledge.  In fact, reason alone is guilty of its own failures; again, however, 
not because reason is merely instrumental and serves man’s practical needs or is 
simply unfit for the task of knowing anything obscure at all (and ultimately the 
truth as such), but solely because the very logic, which reason adheres to in its 
cognitive activity, proves to be just inappropriate to the complex nature of the 
matter itself.  This obviously means then that human reason should not try to 
escape the paradoxes it encounters on the way to knowledge, nor seek its 
consolation in faith troubled by no paradoxes.  Neither of these would actually 
save man from being what he is supposed to be by his pristine (proper) nature.  
Rather man should do his best to bring his reasoning into perfect conformity 
with the matter he seeks to know.  And if this concerns the knowledge of the 
infinite as such (without interest in which no true belief in God is possible at 
all), then the very logic of thinking that man uses to solve the cognitive task he 
sets himself is to be radically changed so as to thoroughly fit the nature of the 
infinity in question, that is evidently achievable when the infinite depth of 
thought is unconcealed and aptly applied.  It is for this purpose hence that, 
surprisingly or not, nothing other but paradoxes themselves must be well 
employed.  In fact, it is a dialectically coherent treatment of the theses and anti-
theses in which the paradoxes consist that really becomes the proper way of 
their resolution.  And it is subsequently in this way that the mind is allowed to 
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break through the gravity of the finite (sense-dependent) knowledge of  ‘what it 
is’ type to the boundless horizon of the true being that unceasingly is.  In the 
result of this, the finitude as such (ultimately expressed by mutually confined 
contraries of any logical contradiction) is radically overcome to open up before 
the human mind the perspective of the reality of God’s creation as it truly is in 
its indivisible unity with the Universal Principle of all being.  Through this 
gateway of the dialectically resolved contradiction man is invited to enter the 
reality, not improperly compared in the Scripture to that of the garden with the 
Tree of Life in its midst, to enjoy the communion with Him outside of Whom 
there is nothing, because He ever is the all-embracing One, the Beginning and 
the End of all.  
The triune nature dialectically conceived  
     By seeing perspicuously the entire creature, while contemplating it “with the 
reasonable sense controlled by the dictates of the mind” (843c), man is 
understood by Eriugena to bring this creature back to the way it truly is 
according to its proper (original) status of the intimate unity with the Universal 
Principle of its provenance.  And at 860b this is qualified as “the Return of the 
natures into their primordial causes and into that Nature which … is God 
Himself”.  Having thus realised by means of dialectical view of the absolute 
(self-identical) whole that, in accordance with the “order of the Divine Law”, 
God’s creation as such may only be treated as the disclosure of His own Nature,  
man does arrive at a new understanding of God as the Triune One (see 455c-d)
6
.  
For once God is genuinely believed to be the Supreme Cause of all, He may 
solely be known in truth as the universal Principle which, because of Its 
absolute universality, is never transcended and therefore inevitably is not only 
the Beginning but also the Middle and the End of all being, so that nothing at all 
can ever be understood to properly subsist outside of Him
7
.  Indeed, from what 
the Philosopher appears to be aware of from the very outset of his quest and 
clearly states in the beginning of the Periphyseon, it unambiguously follows that 
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– to the faithful mind well-disciplined in dialectic– not only should God be 
properly known as “the principal Cause of all things which are made from Him 
and through Him” (451d).  In fact, He should also be known as “the End of all 
things that are from Him, for it is He towards Whom all things strive.  Therefore 
He is the Beginning, the Middle and the End: the Beginning, because from Him 
are all things that participate in essence; the Middle, because in Him and 
through Him they subsist and move; the End, because it is towards Him that 
they move in seeking rest from their movement and the stability of their 
perfection” (451d).  In this sense, therefore, it is fair to say that God is perfectly 
known – according to “the path of right contemplation” that Eriugena is 
immensely concerned about – only when “unity and trinity” are simultaneously 
predicated of His absolute being (455d). 
     From this, it obviously follows that in no way should “the Return of the 
natures” mentioned above be understood as a sort of spatio-temporal movement 
of the creature back to a primary state of its pre-existence, where it becomes as 
it were absorbed by the Creator again.  Rather, it should be understood 
conversely as a spiritual process taking place within the human nature restored 
to its perfect integrity
8
.  Indeed, when faithfully following the ontologically 
proper order of creation, the rational motion of the mind leads man out of the 
corrupted world of sensible phantasies (where since the Fall he has been captive 
to the sin of subjection of his pristine nature to the power of the exterior sense), 
and thus opens up before him the perspective of the entire of the true reality, as 
if bringing it back to the ways it has been originally set up within “that Nature 
which is God Himself” (860b).  But if it is true that in giving rise to the creature 
God does not yet transcend Himself as the absolute being, and accordingly 
encounters in the integral whole of creation nothing other apart from His own 
Nature disclosed, then not improperly – as the author of the Periphyseon insists 
beginning with the opening lines of his massive work (441b) – should God be 
also thought of as the One Who does not create. 
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       Thus, after “the Return of all things into that Nature which neither creates 
nor is created” has been considered in the way discussed above, the fourth 
species of Nature, the most obscure in the overall account of Its division (441b), 
eventually comes to the fore in Eriugena’s conception of reality of the whole.  
At 860b it is brought into focus of the Philosopher’s inquiry into the meaning of 
what seemed at the beginning to be “classed among the impossibles” (442a) and 
to cause a great deal of perplexity among those who found it “of its essence that 
it cannot be” (442a).  A careful reader of the Periphyseon is thereby led finally 
to understand what the author of this voluminous work truly implies by  
introducing such an extraordinary and highly problematic species of Nature, and 
what consequences for the whole doctrine of the fourfold division of Nature it 
really entails.  And this time again, as it always was before when a coherent 
thinking came across any flagrant contradictions on its path, nothing other but 
dialectic is to be appealed to for an assistance to the human mind.  Since the 
fourth species of Nature apparently opposes the first one, which according to 
the fourfold scheme of division stands for God (442a) understood as the Nature 
“which creates and is not created” (441b), it is logical to assume that by 
introducing this opposition the Philosopher actually means to articulate our 
thoughts of God in the form of contradiction to get an opportunity of 
overcoming any finitude in our knowledge of God. 
      It is obvious to Eriugena that the true infinity of God’s being, exceeding the 
limits of a non-contradictory approach, is properly conceivable by virtue of 
contradiction only.  When it is treated in a dialectically coherent way, 
contradiction becomes a means of knowing the infinite as the negation of 
finitude or, to be precise, as its overcoming, possible solely along with the 
concomitant affirmation of somewhat positive of a superior or absolute nature.  
For such is the way of knowing  Him Who is really the One while never 
abandoning Himself and containing everything particular in Himself;  because 
He truly is the Absolute – that is, the Beginning, the Middle, and the End – and 
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beyond Him there is utterly nothing.  And no faith is subsequently true, unless 
the knowledge of God, as the way of encounter with Him Who is the foundation 
and the ultimate meaning of all being, is really pursued by man. 
The cardinal contradiction 
     No wonder therefore that – from the very outset of his quest for a profound 
understanding of the truth of Revelation – the author of the Periphyseon appears 
to be determined to identify, as seen from 441b-442a, a cardinal contradiction 
in our knowledge of God.  When dialectically treated, this contradiction alone 
may allow the mind of man to break down the bonds of the finite (sense-
dependent) knowledge that holds him back from knowing the true God Who, 
being absolutely universal by His Nature, is confined to nothing
9
.  Nothing of 
the kind seems to have been ever done before Eriugena – neither, say, by 
Augustine, whose legacy apparently was an indisputable authority for the 
Carolingian scholars;  nor in the Dionysian apophatic theology which, despite 
(or perhaps thanks to) its obscurity, intrigued them so much.  Indeed, even the 
latter, though greatly appreciated by the Philosopher for exercising the principle 
of negation in its treatment of the Divine matters, did not actually search among 
the contraries’ collisions for the only cardinal contradiction, a constructive use 
of which could definitely revolutionize the mind’s attitude to the very concept 
of God and, as a consequence, considerably advance the entire knowledge of 
His being.  Likewise, Augustine’s theology did not seem to be concerned about 
finding such a contradiction, resolution of which could become a means of 
improving human knowledge of God.  Instead, it is in lack of antinomies that 
his theology saw a guarantee of its own consistency and validity, and for this 
reason sought to eliminate from the knowledge of God’s Nature any possibility 
of falling into contradiction.
10 
     Thus, as seen from Augustine’s discussion of the substantial order of 
creation (On the City of God, Book V, Chapter 9)
11
, he finds a hierarchy-like 
threefold division of causes to be appropriate for giving a non-contradictory 
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account of the Divine reality as a whole.  According to this threefold division, 
all the causes are thought to successively proceed from the most general 
Ultimate Cause to the particular ones so that no room seems to be left there for 
anything contrary that could ever impede their smooth procession: 1. “Thus, the 
cause of things which produces, but itself is not produced, is God.”  2. “Another 
one both produces and is produced, as it is for example the case with all the 
spirits created, especially those of the intelligent ones”.  3. “Then, the corporeal 
causes are the ones which, being rather produced than producing, should not be 
counted among those that give origin to the effects; for they are only able of 
doing what the will of spirits does with them”.12  As a result, the whole of the 
Divine reality seems to be  coherently described in this way because, as the 
author of the doctrine believes, “there are no other causes giving rise to 
anything that happens, apart from those depending on the will, … i.e. on that 
nature which is the spirit of life” – that is, the spirit “who gives life to all things, 
and is the creator of any body.  And this spirit of every creature is God Himself, 
the spirit in no way created”.13   So that those, who are convinced by this 
straightforward approach to the matter, might agree with Augustine that the 
knowledge of God is only attainable in a non-contradictory way, when the 
entire course of reflection upon His Nature adheres to the monistic principle of 
supremacy of a single Supreme Cause over all the effects It causes.  
      Eriugena however apparently thinks otherwise.  Once he enters upon “the 
path of reasoning” (441a), which is supposed by its nature to be free from any 
sensible phantasies, his approach to knowing God’s being inevitably comes into 
conflict with that of Augustine’s.  Moreover, it is likely the latter to which the 
author of the Periphyseon tends to object
14
.  Indeed, the Ultimate Cause of all 
may only be properly conceived of not so much in a linear way, so to speak, as 
a single starting-point of a sequence of actions, but rather in an integral way as 
the all-embracing Universal Principle, beyond which there is nothing in reality 
at all.  For only then, as those taking their origin from the Cause that is 
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supposed to be essentially unfathomable and inexhaustible, all things may be 
truly understood as contained by It.  Its singularity therefore, as far as 
considered in a coherent manner, should no doubt be conceived of inseparably 
from Its universality. 
     Meanwhile, those who, following Augustine, seek to avoid (as they think) 
any dualism in their understanding of the Ultimate Cause by taking no opposites 
into consideration, actually arrive, despite their intentions, at just the opposite 
result – namely, the duality of the Cause in question or, to put it more precisely, 
Its confinement by the opposite, on account of which It cannot be self-dependent 
any more.  In fact, after being produced by the Cause, the particular effects, as 
they appear according to Augustine’s scheme, eventually turn out to be inert.  
And even though this Cause happens to be referred to as “the spirit of life”, and 
the effects themselves are called “the corporeal causes”, all these cannot really 
help thinking to escape the invisible pitfall it stubbornly makes its way to.   
Indeed, “the corporeal causes” are understood to be completely obedient to “the 
spirit of life”, while doing only “what the will of spirits does with them”.  As a 
result, having proceeded into a number of other causes, the Supreme one proves 
nevertheless to be after all opposed by Its own produce, entirely passive and 
having therefore nothing in common with the very nature of “causes”.  By no 
means, hence, can such an outcome of the one-sided treatment of the matter be 
found compatible with knowing the universal nature of the Principle of all 
being.   
     By contrast to this, a proper approach to the nature of the Ultimate Cause 
should not mean avoiding the dualism of singularity and universality, but 
should rather dialectically tackle their unity, which alone may clear the way to 
the advanced knowledge of the Divine.  In fact, solely that cause may be 
counted for being truly single which has nothing other alongside itself, and thus 
is properly known at the same time as the true universality which counters 
nothing other beyond itself.  From this perspective, it is therefore not hard to see 
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that it is nothing but the universality as such
15
 that may be properly understood 
as a real starting-point
16
 of anything that has ever happened in God’s creation.  
     It is quite unequivocal then with regard to this that there is actually no other 
way to conceive of the universality than by reducing all possible contradictories 
concerning the knowledge of the Ultimate Cause just to one cardinal 
contradiction.  For that is the contradiction which would allow the mind, when 
dialectically resolved, to bring all the extremes to the absolute unity of the 
Universal.  Moreover, it is in this way of the true knowledge of the Divine that 
all humans may get released from their bondage to sin (or wrongdoing), 
inevitably resulting from the entire dependence of both their mentality and 
mode of being on the knowledge of the finite – that is, the knowledge 
appropriate to the world of sensible phantasies only, where the opposite 
extremes appear to be set apart and nothing substantial is assumed to exist.  This 
way of conceiving the proper nature of the Ultimate Cause, therefore, proves 
actually to lie at the very heart of Christian faith.  Indeed, this manner of 
thinking, which no consistent faith can really dispense with to be not confined 
to darkness of ignorance, virtually becomes an effective means of restoration of 
the corrupt mind to its true status. From its wandering in the obscurity of 
sensible illusions, the mind thereby is brought back to the ways it properly 
operates as recta ratio, while keeping the whole human nature (inseparable 
from its innermost essence) in unity with the Principle of all being.  As a matter 
of consequence, it is primarily this restoration of the mind which does enable all 
men and women to perspicuously see the substantial reality as it truly is, so as to 
let them thereby, while finding themselves belonging to it, actually join this 
reality known to the faithful as God’s creation or the one coming into being 
from the only Cause of all.  For solely that is the reality taking its origin from 
God which is ordered in such a way that the universal in it precedes the 
singular, and the whole the particular, but not otherwise.  
 
202 
 
Novelty of the fourfold division 
     From this, it follows therefore that – as long as looking for the Kingdom of 
God, or the true being, as required by their faith – only those truly are who, 
beholding the God-centred reality with the eye of their minds, seek to 
participate in it in effect by bringing their being into perfect conformity with the 
proper order of creation.  To gain a right view of reality as it substantially is and 
thus to restore the mind to its original capacity of ‘right contemplation’ (or 
proper speculation), God’s being is to be conceived of as a single whole, that is, 
according to Its universal nature.  This is, clearly, attainable in a dialectically 
coherent way only, when thinking in contradictions allows the mind to embrace 
the ultimate extremes of the true (infinite) being with a prospect of having their 
indivisible unity comprehended.  Such is the way of getting the faithful (who 
genuinely believe in their belonging to eternity) to be saved from captivity in 
the sensible world of transient things (the construct of the corrupt mind).  In 
other words, this is the way of getting them fit for subsistence in the reality of 
God’s creation, not improperly called His Kingdom, where all beings truly are 
according to their substantial nature, but not a mere appearance.  This is the 
reality given not to the senses only (whom the mind perverted serves as their 
obedient instrument), but to recta ratio alone, when it is fairly understood, as 
previously considered, to guide the “reasonable senses”, which are 
unambiguously said to be the ones “controlled by the dictates of the mind”.    
     That is why – as a Christian thinker who is fully committed to following the 
truth revealed to the faithful and is therefore deeply convinced of the necessity 
of advancing the knowledge of the Divine making their faith certain – Eriugena 
appears from the very beginning of his thoroughgoing inquiry to be determined 
to develop the doctrine of the substantial order of creation.  And he really does 
so – even despite a great deal of perplexity and paradigmatical difficulties it 
causes (similar to those indicated at 442a) – by introducing the “fourth species” 
of division of the universal genus, which is understood to contain in itself, as he 
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puts it, absolutely all things, “those that are and those that are not”, and is fairly 
chosen by the Philosopher to be named, more adequately than by that of 
Cause
17, by “a general term” of Natura (441a).  In fact, as clearly seen from the 
context at 441b – 442a, this fourth species of Nature and subsequently a 
coherent consideration of “the division of Nature by means of four differences” 
(441b), really proves to become a new development in the evolution of 
Christian thought – namely, a distinct attempt of approaching in a dialectically 
advanced way the proper knowledge of the universal-singular relationship ever 
articulately made before in the course of systematic speculations on God’s 
being.  And it is actually nowhere but in the Periphyseon itself that, as follows 
from 442a, this uncommon and quite intricate teaching, with a highly 
problematic fourth species of division of the absolute whole in its focus, is first 
ever introduced to be unequivocally qualified by the author himself as his own 
opinion (441b).  That is the opinion which is naturally supposed to differ from 
any other ones relevant to the subject-matter and therefore to be liable to “sound 
criticism” (441b), as solely due to a distinctively new standpoint whose 
articulation needs to be well verified.  “It is my opinion,” says Eriugena, “that 
the division of Nature by means of four differences results in four species” 
(441b).   By applying this innovative method to considering the Universal’s 
“division by differentiations into species” (441b), he obviously means not only 
to present “a true account of this matter” (441b), but also to challenge those of 
his opponents who likely found fewer differences and fewer species to be 
suitable enough for interpreting the division of the whole, as it certainly was the 
case with the Augustinian conception of the threefold order of creation.  
     Thus, largely paraphrasing Augustine’s definitions of the first three forms of 
this substantial division, and apparently finding their succession incomplete for 
giving “a true account” of the matter, according to which the universal whole 
should be perfectly understood to remain itself after being divided into species18, 
Eriugena adds the fourth form which is meant by him to be contrary to the 
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primary one, so as to guarantee that the universal does not disappear after being 
divided into the particular.  As a result, he has got a pair of the contraries that 
are to be certainly understood not as mere opposites attributed to different things 
(as those of created and uncreated nature, according to the account of division), 
but as being mutually contradictory, when predicated of one and the same 
subject.  And this subject, taken in its ultimate sense as the one preceding any 
action, should be indisputably detected as the nature uncreated.  So that, since 
among all the forms of Nature, as they are examined according to the substantial 
order of creation, “the first creates and is not created”, it is logically required, 
when a dialectical train of thought is followed, that this form inevitably “has as 
its contrary that … which neither creates nor is created” (442a).  As the 
contraries referred to one and the same subject that precedes everything but 
itself is preceded by nothing, these two forms of Nature appear to be altogether 
appropriate, when taken in their unity, for a cognitive approach to the proper 
nature of the universal as such.  Indeed, making itself manifest through the 
particular, the universal in fact never departs from itself (i.e. does not transfer to 
the particular nor breaks down to pieces) but, as it were, returns to itself, 
because outside it nothing particular may ever subsist.  Thus the universal 
Principle of all beings comes to be truly known in Its unbreakable integrity as 
the One beyond which there is nothing other (alien), and which therefore may 
only be properly treated as the Nature that creates and does not create at the 
same time.  
      In this way, hence, the author of the Periphyseon actually arrives at the 
fourfold division of Nature as a comprehensive model of the absolute 
wholeness, in accordance with which God comes to be known as the true One 
Who is confined to nothing alien. Nature is divided, says Eriugena, “first into 
that which creates and is not created, secondly into that which is created and 
also creates, thirdly into that which is created and does not create, while the 
fourth neither creates nor is created” (441b).  Indeed, the reference of this 
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division to God and His creation, directly confirmed at 442b, is entirely evident. 
However, only as a fourfold division does it really bring all parts of the Divine 
being to their absolute unity, so as by all means to stand for the true Oneness of 
God, Who as a single whole can neither be split up within Himself nor opposed 
by anything alien.  As for the first three forms of Nature as they are believed to 
proceed in the course of creation, everything seems to be clear and no questions 
at all, as said at 442b, need to be raised concerning them.  In particular, it 
appears utterly undeniable that “the first is understood to be the Cause of all 
things that are and that are not, Who is God; the second to be the primordial 
causes; and the third those things that become manifest through coming into 
being in times and places” (442b).  If, however, a full account of the division of 
the universal whole did not proceed as far as the fourth species of Nature but 
suddenly stood still at its third stage, as in Augustine’s doctrine, then God, the 
knowledge of Whom is solely sought by means of such a division, would 
inevitably prove to be diametrically opposed by His creation in its purely 
external (spatio-temporal) dimension, and therefore confined to it as His 
counterpart, which is evidently wrong.  For this reason, to avoid such a 
discouraging result, “the opposition of the third species to the first” (442a) 
should not be ignored in favour of a non-contradictory approach to the 
knowledge of the Divine, but by all means taken into consideration with a 
prospect of overcoming it, and along with it the chasm between God and His 
creation imposed upon the absolute being by the ill-disciplined mind that 
readily sets the absolute and  the tangible apart, as if the universal whole could 
be at all confined or split in two.  
The universal and particular from the dialectical perspective 
     A distinctive feature of Eriugena’s innovation is just the one therefore which 
consists in tackling in a thoroughgoing manner the finitude and other 
imperfections of human knowledge of God as they are above all displayed in 
contradictories and any sort of opposites that the mind gets entrapped in as soon 
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as it attempts to approach the infinity of the Divine.  In fact, at the centre of this 
distinction of the Eriugenian approach from any other attempts of advancing the 
fundamental knowledge of this kind there definitely lies a radically new attitude 
to the opposites as such.  Thus, whereas the upholders of a non-contradictory 
treatment of the matter seek to take no opposites into consideration to escape 
any inconsistencies in knowledge, Eriugena does exactly the opposite.  In 
systematically uncovering and subsequently overcoming all oppositions, which 
any interpretation of the infinite is largely encumbered with, he sees the way of 
perfection of our knowledge of the absolute.  Regarding this, it is important to 
understand however that in order to break through these oppositions as they 
appear in the knowledge of the absolute Nature, after the mind, according to 
Eriugena, identifies the “pairs of opposites” (namely, of the third and the fourth 
species of division to the first and the second ones respectively), no dialectician 
should actually permit their reconciliation at the expense of any additional 
postulates.  Such extra measures would undoubtedly prove to be entirely 
extrinsic to the doctrine itself and, for this reason, would diminish its validity, as 
is apparently the case with an assumption of subjection of anything particular in 
creation to “the will of spirits” that was additionally made by Augustine with 
respect to the order of causes to explain their cohesion, as he saw it
19
.  Instead, 
should the dialecticians find, and Eriugena really does, some inner means 
effective for the purpose of getting all the opposites reconciled – that is, the 
means intrinsic to the very logic of the doctrine of division of the absolute 
whole. 
     According to this logic, as it follows from what Eriugena suggests, after 
being totally divided the universal nevertheless does not get dispersed among 
the particular at all but, on the contrary, remains itself.  Moreover, it is through 
giving rise to everything particular that the universal actually becomes itself or, 
in other words, what it is supposed to be by its proper nature – that is to say, all 
in all.  The universal as such (which not unfairly is called by the Philosopher 
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Nature) does come to be truly known only when it is dialectically thought to 
release and encompass everything particular at the same time.  In the light of 
this logic, therefore, it may be clearly seen that the inner means in question, that 
is decided in the course of the present scrutiny to be necessary for effective 
overcoming the oppositions (dividing the universal whole), is all about a 
constructive treatment of the contradiction between the universal and the 
particular.  Since, furthermore, in its true sense this contradiction does refer to 
the way the only Cause of all is properly thought of (both in Its singularity and 
universality taken together), it is also evident enough to realise then that this is 
the contradiction which alone may be reasonably qualified as the cardinal one – 
that is, the one lying at the very heart of the most fundamental knowledge, 
which undoubtedly is our knowledge of God.  Indeed, once dialectically 
resolved, this contradiction allows the mind to overcome all the oppositions that 
tear the infinite whole into pieces, and thus to really advance in knowing God 
unconfined, Who truly is the Ultimate Cause of all while being neither split 
within Himself nor opposed from without by anything whatsoever, be it even 
brought forth from Him
20
. 
 
Overcoming a dualistic view of creation 
     That is why, as 442a reveals, Eriugena sounds pleased rather than upset or 
confused while holding that within the four species of Nature established 
according to his method “there are two pairs of opposites”.  Indeed, when 
examined in their successive order, it is really hard to miss that “the third is the 
opposite of the first, the fourth of the second”, and Eriugena articulately admits 
it (442a).  What is more, however, he lingers over the evident difficulty of 
understanding the fourth opposite, from which it may be fairly deduced that it is 
actually the second of these two pairs that seems to be of a greater importance 
and especially dear to the Philosopher, as if he sought to introduce the fourth 
form of division for no other purpose than having this problematic pair of 
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opposites brought to light.  And there would be nothing extraordinary at all 
about making such an assumption; for once its origin is perfectly understood, 
this opposition proves to elucidate the proper nature of the universality as such 
and thus to clear the way to the cardinal contradiction in question.   
     As a matter of fact, the role of the opposition of the second form of division 
to the fourth is absolutely crucial for the whole doctrine of Eriugena’s.  In 
particular, unlike the first of the two oppositions detected within the fourfold 
division of Nature, this one allows the mind to overcome in effect all the 
opposites that our understanding of the infinite is inevitably encumbered with, 
and in this way to successfully progress to the true knowledge of God as the 
only universal Cause of all.  Thus, when the explicit opposition of the first 
species of Nature to the third (or of “the Cause of all things” to Its ultimate 
effects, if to put it in more conventional Augustinian terms) is sought to be 
approached in a non-contradictory way with a prospect of overcoming the 
impassable gulf between God and creation which is obviously there between the 
opposites mutually countered within their opposition, some intermediate that 
produces, though itself is produced, is normally placed in between to bring the 
opposite extremes close to one another.  Nevertheless, regardless of a variety of 
names under which this intermediary agent might appear in different doctrines 
either as “the will of spirits” or “the primordial causes” or anything else, the 
nearest outcome of such an attempt of making the extremities of the Divine 
reality meet yet becomes utterly unacceptable for any further development of a 
coherent conception of creation.  For despite their intention to avoid any 
contradictories in the course of reasoning concerning the Ultimate Cause of the 
whole being, those who readily resort to this auxiliary remedy to fill the gap 
between the Cause itself and Its multiple effects in the realm of particular 
(finite) things eventually gain just the opposite result.  Indeed, whereas prior to 
any discourse the Cause of all is straightforwardly declared to be one, it proves 
however to be duplicated and therefore deprived of its substantial uniqueness.  
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It happens in the result of a non-dialectical treatment of the matter, when the 
finite (produced) effects are assumed to be concordant with the infinite 
(unproduced) Cause while being mediated by some semi-causes, which though 
caused are also meant to cause a vast range of particular effects so as to 
distribute, as it were, a primary impulse from the First Cause to every single 
thing.  So that, with respect to this unexpected metamorphosis of the matter in 
focus, it is not hard to realise that as far as the only Cause of all is believed to be 
facilitated in Its action by some auxiliary means, It actually splits in two, which 
regarding the doctrine of creation must be fundamentally wrong.   
     From this, it follows therefore that if all things were understood to be created 
both by a Prime Cause and the secondary ones, then the act of creation as such 
would happen to have more than one beginning
21
, that must be impossible by 
the very notion of creation.  In truth, as Eriugena puts it, “only of the Divine 
Cause of all things is this rightly predicated” that “it is the supreme and unique 
Cause of all things which take their existence from it and exist in it” (452a). 
For, according to the true account of creation, God “alone is the principal Cause 
of all things which are made from Him and through Him, and therefore He is 
also the End of all things that are from Him, for it is He towards Whom all 
things strive” (451d).  And it cannot be otherwise indeed; for as right reason 
suggests, “from the One all things which take their being; from two or more, 
nothing” (459b).  In other words, “it is the one beginning of all things, and there 
one end, in no way at discord with itself” (459a).  All this consequently means 
that once an improper division of the Ultimate Cause into any intermediary 
causes as a means of producing Its multiple effects is taken for granted, such an 
apparently dualistic view of the act of creation would inevitably lead the faithful 
mind astray – namely, towards a flagrant misconception of God.  In fact, in this 
way the faithful would be offered a deceptive perception of the Trinity, 
presented in the form of a Unity of three Substances
22
, as if one and indivisible 
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being of God might consist of three layers of reality existing alongside one 
another.  
A coherent treatment of the opposites 
 
     To escape the fatal error of linking the opposites together (when their 
opposition is sought to be overcome) by placing a certain intermediate between 
them, the mind should instead appeal to the dialectical approach of recta ratio, 
which alone would allow it in effect to get the opposites reconciled and their 
opposition overcome.  This is precisely a collision of these two diametrically 
opposite paradigms of thinking
23
 that the author of the Periphyseon largely 
deals with from the very outset of his extensive inquiry into the matter of 
division of what he calls Natura (441a).  On the one hand, it is utterly clear to 
Eriugena that no opposites or their opposition can be really overcome by virtue 
of mediation, when some intermediary is believed to bring the counterparts 
together.  On the other hand, it is likewise obvious to him as a firm believer in 
God’s truth how vital it is that all the opposites, which tear the indivisible nature 
of the infinite into pieces (and thus impede the mind’s approach to the true 
reality), ought to be completely overcome.  Therefore, for the solution of this 
problem the Philosopher chooses to focus on a coherent treatment of the 
opposites themselves according to their relative nature.  And this is the decision, 
a crucial significance of which he emphasises in the first words of the 
voluminous work, where the profundity of his attitude to the fundamental 
division as such appears to be formulated as a basic principle of the entire 
project to be fulfilled.  “As I frequently ponder”, the author says, “and, so far as 
my talents allow, ever more carefully investigate the fact that the first and 
fundamental division of all things which either can be grasped by the mind or 
lie beyond its grasp is into those that are and those that are not, there comes to 
mind as a general term for them all what in Greek is called ΰand in Latin 
Natura” (441a). 
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     Thus the Philosopher gives us to understand that, even prior to the inquiry 
itself, the opposites as such, the opposition of which fundamentally divides the 
totality of things (and in this way prevents the mind from knowing all things as 
they truly are in their absolute integrity), may only be properly regarded as 
those of being and non-being.  Indeed, if anything whatsoever appears to be the 
opposite of something else, then for the sake of simplicity and clarity their 
relation may not inadequately be described in formal terms as that of A and not 
A, in accordance with which one of the counterparts indicated is and the other is 
not.  In other words, if any A is understood to signify an affirmation of some 
properties with respect to a certain entity, then not A proves of necessity to be 
the negation of the same properties with respect to another entity, because of 
which the two entities are recognised to be mutually opposed.  Likewise, when 
God is not unreasonably defined as the nature “which creates and is not created” 
(441b), then the opposite of Him, that common belief normally associates with 
the creature (and in the fourfold account of division is explicitly identified with 
its third form), should be accordingly defined as the nature “which is created 
and does not create” (441b).  So that, it would be fair to admit in this regard 
that, as long as they are defined in these terms, both God and His creation 
appear to oppose one another as the two completely different entities.  And 
those who from force of habit contrast the finite creature with the infinite 
Creator would probably find nothing wrong with such a sharp distinction.  
Meanwhile, quite a crucial detail, that might escape their attention but which 
cannot be ignored by a deeper insight into the matter, threatens to shatter a 
mosaic picture of the universe of creation which they tend to compose of some 
poorly matching fragments, similar to those of the opposites dividing the totality 
of the true (infinite) being into separate pieces.  This crucial detail is the one 
that is to be found in a faulty association of opposites with opposite entities.   
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     As a matter of fact, when clarified, this key detail sheds light upon that weak 
point of a non-dialectical paradigm of thinking which, like a stumbling-block, 
impedes the faithful mind’s motion along the way of treating God’s being as a 
single whole. This obstacle on the way to the profound knowledge of the real 
integrity is nothing other than the principle of contradiction, in accordance with 
which any opposite properties may be thought to refer not to one and the same 
entity but to different ones only.  Unless this implicit weakness of the logic 
entirely resting upon the principle which rigorously requires of no entity to be 
simultaneously A and not A is revealed, the reasoning guided by such a logic 
remains however fully confident that nothing at all might ever be grasped as 
being and not being at the same time.  Indeed, the opposite properties that this 
sort of reasoning deals with are by no means assumed by it to be just the 
mutually countered sides of one and the same thing (merely suitable, when 
taken together, for a speculative treatment of its wholeness).  Instead, these 
properties are mistaken for the ontological features that can pertain to different 
things only.  Thus, in so far as God and creation are perceived in line with the 
contrasting definitions of their nature as the diametrically opposite entities, they 
both inevitably prove to be mutually confined, as if they were nothing more than 
finite things only.  But if it were the case that God’s being could be confined 
and therefore confronted by something finite, then, paradoxically enough, 
neither God nor His creation improperly defined in like manner to the opposite 
entities would actually come to be compatible with the true being of the Divine, 
which obviously allows nothing particular to exist outside the universal to 
counter it
24
.   For as clearly said, God alone may be truly understood to be the 
Principle of all (453b) “to Whom nothing is opposed, and with Whom nothing 
is found to be co-eternal which differs from Him by nature” (459b).  As the 
universal Principle, therefore, God “is everywhere, without Whom nothing can 
be, and beyond Whom nothing extends.  For He is the place and the 
circumference of all things” (453a).  In this sense, it is not unfair to assert with 
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respect to the universal nature of the Divine being that “everything which is said 
to exist exists not in itself but by participation in the Nature which truly exists” 
(454a).  
Irrelevance of the divisive approach to the Divine reality of creation 
     Hence, as it can be drawn from what Eriugena suggests, a logical aporia 
concerning God and creation is that neither of them can actually subsist in so far 
as they are found to oppose one another and therefore, as something finite, to 
alternate as being and non-being in pendulum-like manner (depending on which 
of the two is counted to lie within or beyond the mind’s grasp, and is 
accordingly affirmed or negated).  To avoid this logical aporia, a non-
contradictory reasoning (fearful of any antinomies that impede its smooth 
discourse) seeks to insert between the two extremes an intermediary stage of 
creation, as if it could be a mediating link between the Creator and the creature, 
where both might encounter before they split away from one another as far as 
the opposite extremes.  Indeed, when conceived according to their truth, neither 
the universal can decrease at all while giving rise to anything particular 
(otherwise it would eventually get dispersed among the singular things), nor the 
singular can ever exist outside the universal so as to counter it from without.  
But if the universal and the singular are envisioned as the two distinct and 
remote poles of the universe of creation, it might seem reasonable to common 
belief to assume then that apart from these opposite extremes there must be 
something else in between that would mitigate their mutual alienation 
(inevitably fraught with their mutual negation) by allowing the singular to 
participate, as it were, in a more general element that would bring it somehow 
closer to the universal.  As a result, in the overall account of the division of 
Nature there comes up Its second form to fill the gap between the first and the 
third ones. This is the form that in Eriugena’s account is defined as the nature 
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that “is created and also creates” (441b), by which “the primordial causes of 
things” (529a) are explicitly suggested to be understood.   
     Despite being seemingly appropriate for the task of making up a coherent 
account of creation, however, this auxiliary construct (resulting of necessity 
from a non-dialectical mode of treatment of the “fundamental division of all 
things”) does not yet allow the mind to jump over the gulf between the Creator 
and the creature, which opens wide in its discourse as soon as the opposition of 
the universal and the singular cleaves asunder into counterparts confronted.  As 
a matter of fact, such a paradigm of thinking, within which any opposites are 
tackled as the diametrically opposed entities, cannot actually help to understand 
how finitude as such – that is, the finitude of the mutually confined opposites – 
may be overcome, and the way to the true knowledge of the infinite be opened.  
On the contrary, once the universal and the singular are thought to be set apart 
and mediated in their reciprocal relations by some additional means, the finitude 
resulting from this non-dialectical treatment of the opposites is inaugurated in 
effect as the principle of division, altogether relevant to the reality of finite 
things.  And its power, utterly evident in the realm of the finite, seems so 
unrestrained that is also believed to extend that far as the domain of the Divine 
things.  As a consequence, even the Ultimate Cause, the universal nature of 
which alone truly is the beginning of all, is found then exposed to the universal 
impact of dichotomy. As a result, the uniqueness and omnipotence of the 
Ultimate Cause come to be challenged by the so-called “primordial causes” that 
common belief is so much determined to place next to what is allegedly 
accepted by it for being the Principle of all.  But how can this duplication of the 
Cause comply with the truth that there is no, and could never be, such a reality 
that might come to being from more than one beginning?  Indeed, once having 
become subject to the on-going division (in the course of which alongside the 
Primary Cause there first emerge some primordial ones), the universal of the 
Principle – regardless of any attempts of common belief to postulate its status 
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quo – would fully flow over without residue into the singular and, replaced by 
the infinite number of individual things, would inevitably prove to be reduced to 
naught.  Nothing of the kind is however possible at all, when seen from the 
perspective of the reality as it truly is according to its substantial order; 
otherwise, it would have to be acknowledged that there could be such a reality 
that would continue to exist after the Principle of its being vanished or that, 
similarly to this, after having the entire creature brought forth to light, God 
would utterly cease to be.   
     From these reflections, encouraged by Eriugena’s discourse, it is quite 
evident therefore that the account of creation provided by a non-dialectical 
mode of reasoning would prove in fact to be basically incompatible with the 
creation itself, in so far as the latter – as the very nature of it requires – is 
conceived to take its origin from the only Source of all beings and to exist 
inseparably from It, while never transcending the infinite boundaries of Its 
universality.  To some extent, a threefold model of creation, as Augustine and 
his Carolingian followers saw it, might probably fit the reality of sensible 
things, where the finitude reigns through and through; yet such a model would 
be altogether inadequate to the reality of the Divine things, the infinite nature of 
which is utterly inconceivable in a non-contradictory way.  As a matter of fact, 
at the basis of a non-dialectical paradigm of thinking (as well as the construct of 
a single universe it provides) there definitely lies that false premise according to 
which, as already seen, the universal and the singular may be set apart and 
subsist independently, remaining as it were external to one another.  But what 
might seem from this perspective to be true concerning the finite things (such as 
tangibles and externals), turns out indeed to be absolutely wrong when applied 
to the infinite ones, such as the Divine Nature and God-centred reality of 
creation.  For by its proper nature, the universal is such that nothing whatsoever 
may ever be outside its absolute integrity; and it is because of the infinity of this 
absolute integrity that the universal as such is adequately thought to be at once 
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the beginning and the end of all.  As for the realm of the finite, however, the 
opposites there are countered as the entities, and therefore, as Eriugena holds, 
“are correctly thought to belong to the things which are subject to coming into 
being and passing away.  For those things which are in discord with one another 
cannot be eternal.  For if they were eternal they would not be in discord with 
one another, since eternity is always like what it is and ever eternally subsists in 
itself as a single and indivisible unity.  For it is the one beginning of all things, 
and there one end, in no way at discord with itself” (459a)   
     Hence, in continuity with what the Philosopher explores here, it would be 
not unfair to suggest that the need for the substantial correction of the blunder 
concerning the way the opposites are treated as the entities standing in a 
diametrical opposition would imply in fact to make a good effort for replacing 
an old (paradox-free) paradigm of thinking by a new (dialectical) one.  This 
would be the way to succeed in approaching the task of developing a radically 
new account of creation to make it thoroughly appropriate to the reality of 
God’s creation as it truly is.  And for this, first of all, the principle of finitude 
and dichotomy is to be counterbalanced by its opposite – that is, the principle of 
infinity and integrity, which is supposed to be all about the preservation of the 
universal nature of the Principle of all beings on account of comprising the 
opposites of the universal and the singular.  In fact, this is precisely what 
Eriugena does when in contrast to the second form of Nature introduces the 
fourth one to the overall account of Its division.  Thus he actually crowns the 
mind’s motion towards the truth of the absolute wholeness (that is disrupted by 
nothing and therefore never ceases to be) by offering a new definition of Nature, 
in accordance with which It comes to be known as the true Principle of all – that 
is, the Principle which is not only the Beginning, but also the Middle and the 
End of all.  As a result, thought in this way, God comes to be known as He truly 
(infinitely) is without getting confronted by any other being or non-being – 
namely, as the Principle truly universal by nature. Giving rise to the totality of 
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all things, God never abandons Himself nor disappears among the things 
created, but comprises everything that has ever been brought to being, so that 
nothing whatsoever proves to be lost, that is, to subsist separately from Him.  
And it is apparently in this sense that God should be rightly understood to 
encounter nothing apart from Himself in the entire creation, the universal whole 
of which is intimately and indivisibly one.  This is exactly what Eriugena means 
when refers to the Scripture in the following words: “For ‘God shall be all in 
all’ – as if the Scripture said plainly: God alone shall be manifest in all things” 
(450d).  Thus the truly universal Nature comes up at last to be defined with 
respect to Its absolute self-identity as the one which “neither creates nor is 
created” (441d).  
The meaning of God’s ‘rest’ 
          At first glance, this new form of Nature may look appropriate to the state 
of God’s ‘rest’ that, according to Gen.2 (2-3), comes when God, as it were, 
shrinks into Himself after the act of creation has been completed.  By virtue of 
introducing the fourth form of Nature’s subdivision, Eriugena might therefore 
seem to merely follow the letter of Scripture concerning the seventh ‘day’ of 
creation, without which the Genesis account (and likewise the division of 
Nature that is meant by the Philosopher to stand for the stages of creation) 
proves incomplete.  In fact, however, the scrutiny of Eriugena’s discourse 
undertaken so far does convince those carefully following it that the actual 
reason why the author of the Periphyseon does so is essentially different and 
may be better understood in relation to his attention to the spiritual meaning of 
the sacred writings in focus. This is the meaning that can have nothing to do 
with the transient world of temporality, where all things are said to be “subject 
to coming into being and passing away” (459a).25  
     Indeed, it is hardly possible for those following Eriugena’s logic (and thus 
brought to the fourth form of division) to disagree with his conclusion about the 
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way the universal Principle of all comes to be known – namely, the way that by 
allowing all things to be according to their substantial nature (which is 
inseparable from the Principle of their being) God actually does nothing other 
apart from making Himself manifest (454b).  This is the way in which God can 
truly be known as Him “Who is everywhere, without Whom nothing can be, 
and beyond Whom nothing extends” (453a).  So that, it may be clearly seen 
from this point of view that when the letter of the Scripture says about God’s 
‘rest’, it should actually imply the undeniable truth that, as the Primal Cause of 
all, God does not disappear among the things after they have been caused to 
being, but remains Himself – the same God as He has ever been before.   As a 
staunch upholder of the spiritual understanding of Scripture, Eriugena seeks to 
further deepen the proper knowledge of this fundamental truth by referring its 
validity to the infinite reality as a whole, where the beginning and the end of 
being are not severed by the duration of time.  In this way, he safely arrives at a 
firm conviction that not only at the end of procession of all things into being, 
but also since the very beginning and at every successive stage of its ongoing 
action it happens true that the Ultimate Cause neither decreases nor ceases to 
be.  And it could not be otherwise indeed; for the only Cause of all, beyond 
which there is certainly nothing, has been continuously retaining Its absolute 
universality and self-identity while giving rise to the totality of things, and thus 
proves in effect to be indivisibly one (comprising utterly everything in Itself), 
both in the Beginning and in the Middle and in the End of creation.  In this 
sense, not unreasonably counted for the spiritual one (that must be thoroughly 
compatible with the living reality as it truly is in its entirety), God’s ‘rest’ is to 
be inevitably viewed not as the end of that ‘motion’ which is directly associated 
with creation, but as the stability (or self-identity) of God’s absolute being 
which accordingly goes hand in hand with the course of creation itself, coming 
about solely within His truly universal Nature.  This is what allows Eriugena to 
fairly express as being perfectly true that all things that come forth from the 
219 
 
Divine Essence “are made by itself and through itself and in itself and for itself” 
(454c). 
     Regarding this therefore, it would be sound to assume that – despite the 
literal (grammatical or finite) meaning of the Holy Scripture but in line with Its 
spiritual (symbolic or infinite) truth hidden behind the surface of visible 
writings and amenable only to a dialectically coherent treatment of the 
contradictories (including those of Genesis 1 and Genesis 2 narratives) – God 
should be properly conceived not as Him Who first creates and then does not, 
but as Him Who creates and does not create at the same time.  For God’s ‘rest’ 
the Scripture points to, when no creation appears to be brought about any 
longer, should not be actually interpreted according to the letter as a state of His 
being that chronologically follows a sort of ‘motion’, by virtue of which all 
things are brought into being.   Rather, this ‘rest’ should properly be understood 
as the way God enjoys with no disruption the stability of His Nature, which ever 
remains identical to Itself while giving rise to the totality of things.  “Not 
without reason”, the Philosopher argues with respect to this, “for of all things 
that are at rest or in motion He is the Cause.  For from Him they begin to run in 
order that they may be, since He is the Principle of them all; and through Him 
they are carried towards Him by their natural motion so that in Him they may 
rest immutably and eternally since He is the End and Rest of them all.  For 
beyond Him there is nothing that they strive for since in Him they find the 
beginning and end of their motion” (453b).  “For of God it is most truly said”, 
he does infer therefore, “that He is motion at rest and rest in motion” (452c).  
     Hence, when defining God as the Nature that “neither creates nor is created”, 
Eriugena gives us to understand that God apparently is not simply meant to 
come to rest after “all the work of creating” has been done, as the letter of the 
Scripture seems to suggest, saying: “By the seventh day God had finished the 
work He had been doing; so on the seventh day He rested from all His work.  
And God blessed the seventh day and made it holy, because on it He rested 
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from all the work of creating that He had done” (Gen. 2, 2-3).  As a matter of 
fact, one can easily understand with Eriugena's help that the true knowledge of 
the universal nature of the Principle of all requires both ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ (that 
is, creating and non-creating) to be coherently understood as simultaneously 
correlated with the way God is, so as to describe Him as the infinite being, just 
as the Beginning and the End perfectly do, when simultaneously taken with 
reference to “the sole Principle, Origin, and universal Source of all” (741c).  
“For He is at rest unchangingly in Himself, never departing from the stability of 
His Nature” (452c), Eriugena explains.  “…yet He sets Himself in motion 
through all things”, he continues, “in order that those things which essentially 
subsist by Him may be.  For by His motion all things are made” (452d).   
     In this sense, therefore, aptly is God’s being defined in a dialectically 
coherent way as “motion at rest and rest in motion”.  For when known as the 
infinite being that truly (eternally) is, God cannot be conceived otherwise than 
by means of the opposites in their unity, like those of ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ 
equally taken for being true at the same time, that is, correlated with the 
substantial reality as it properly is.  Indeed, as the “single universal Cause and 
supreme Goodness” (743b) that the Book of Genesis is explicit about, God finds 
Himself well pleased with what has been caused by Him to being each ‘day’ of 
creation, because He recognises it not as something opposite lying in front of 
Him, but as being ‘good’, that is essentially akin to Him Who is universally and 
indivisibly One.  That is why it would be right in fact to say, following 
Eriugena’s dialectic, that, allowing nothing alien to Himself to subsist, the 
infinite God never “moves beyond Himself, but from Himself in Himself 
towards Himself” (453a), “because outside Him there is nothing” (452c).  “For 
it ought not to be believed”, Eriugena further holds, “that there is any motion in 
Him except that of His Will, by which He wills all things to be made; just as His 
rest is understood not as though He comes to rest after motion but as the 
immoveable determination of His same Will, by which He limits all things so 
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that they remain in the immutable stability of their reasons” (453a).  “For 
properly speaking”, the Philosopher concludes, “there is in Him neither rest nor 
motion.  For these two are seen to be opposites one of the other.  But right 
reason forbids us to suppose or understand that there are opposites in Him – 
especially as rest is, properly speaking, the end of motion, whereas God does 
not begin to move in order that He may attain to some end” (453a).   
A dialectically coherent treatment of the cardinal contradiction  
     Thus Eriugena gives the followers of his innovative logic to clearly see that a 
dialectical unity of the opposites, which alone is fully appropriate to the 
universal nature of the absolute whole (and, hence, to the spiritual truth of the 
Scripture), proves in fact to be the way the infinite being of God may be 
coherently thought of.  It is consequently the opposites taken in their unity (as 
recta ratio would require with a view to overcoming the division of the Divine) 
that actually become a means of advancing the fundamental knowledge of the 
true being as such, in accordance with which human being truly enters the 
substantial reality of creation, where nothing alien to God Himself does ever 
subsist.  But since, furthermore, the opposites attain their unity through the 
contradiction dialectically resolved, it cannot also be denied that at the heart of 
the fundamental knowledge in question (and subsequently of the way God’s 
being is conceived of) there must lie that cardinal contradiction which Eriugena 
is really after from the very outset of developing the Periphyseon’s doctrine of 
the fourfold division of Nature.  It is this contradiction which, as we understand, 
truly allows him to overcome any opposites that impede the mind to proceed 
any further ahead in its attempt to know one and indivisible God.  Unlike the 
oppositions formed, as discussed above, by the four species of Nature divided 
into pairs the cardinal contradiction may not improperly be identified as the one 
made up by the contraries (opposite definitions) that are predicated of one and 
the same subject.  And within the account of the fourfold division it is 
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undoubtedly the case with God alone: as being uncreated, He is found to be not 
unfairly associated both with the first and the fourth forms of Nature.  This is 
actually what Eriugena unambiguously means therefore when says about the 
cardinal and most intriguing pair of opposites, upgrading them to the status of 
the contraries: “…the first creates and is not created; it therefore has as its 
contrary that …which neither creates nor is created” (442a)26.   
     Taking into account what has already been said about the only possible way 
in which the opposites may be properly treated, it is scarcely needful to explain 
here that the contrary definitions of the Nature uncreated should not be 
considered in conflict with the spiritual understanding of the Divine truth.  In 
other words, these contraries should not be considered as referring to God in 
their temporal succession, according to which He would first appear to create 
and then to refrain from creating, as if taking ‘rest’ after hard labour of bringing 
all things into being, as a naïve attitude to the scriptural message could suggest.  
On the contrary, in like manner to ‘motion’ and ‘rest’ which cannot be, as 
shown above, separated from one another without putting at risk the integrity of 
God’s being, the first and the fourth forms of Nature ought to be coherently 
understood as being mutually inseparable in time and, therefore, simultaneously 
related to the one and indivisible God.  Otherwise, if only it were possible that 
each of these forms of Nature might be considered on its own (i.e. regardless of 
its counterpart), then neither of the two would actually be true.  Indeed, only the 
opposites taken together (or, more precisely, in their unity) do overcome the 
finitude as such and along with it (for the reason of its incompatibility with the 
living reality of the whole) the very ground of any falsehood, i.e. discrepancy 
between knowledge and the reality proper. 
      As follows, solely in the result of a dialectical approach to the matter, 
(namely, after the contraries are taken for being true when simultaneously 
applied  to one and the same subject), the Nature uncreated proves to be 
adequately understood as being the universal Principle of all which is said to 
223 
 
create and not to create at the same time.  Causing everything come into being, 
it does remain the same unchanging Principle caused by nothing, because 
beyond its infinite nature there is absolutely nothing that might oppose and, 
therefore, exist apart from it.  In this sense, it is fair to assert that, properly 
speaking, there is no such God Who only creates or only refrains from creating.   
Actually, He does both, and does it at the same time; otherwise His being would 
be found relevant to the realm of temporality only.  
      Thus, as we may deduce from what Eriugena means, the cardinal 
contradiction comes to fore.  So that, if divided into thesis and antithesis that 
make up the antinomy (where neither counterpart is conceivable without the 
other), it may take the following shape: 
                                          Thesis:                 God creates 
           Antithesis:            God does not create. 
      Having found the cardinal contradiction like this for being intrinsic to the 
fundamental knowledge of God (or the way He is really conceived of), the mind 
does not however stop at this as a final result of its efforts.  Obviously, not for 
its own sake is any contradiction in general (and above all the one specified as 
cardinal) sought by the mind, but for the purpose of turning it into an effective 
instrument of overcoming the finitude of knowledge as being utterly 
incompatible with the infinity of the absolute whole.  The proper significance of 
the contradiction identified must therefore consist in its genuine resolution.  
This is certainly the resolution that comes about not in the way of choosing one 
of the contraries for being true and rejecting the other, but in a dialectically 
coherent way of establishing the truth of both by getting them perfectly 
reconciled in the absolute whole.  Indeed, no antinomy, as well seen before, can 
be really resolved in either-or manner, when each of its constitutive contraries 
may be alternately taken for being true or false.  All the more, such a mode of 
treatment proves to be altogether irrelevant when the antinomy highlighted 
above is concerned, since neither of the contrary predicates in it, as the  
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Scripture and the scrutiny of Eriugena’s thought undertaken here convince, can 
be false.  Consequently, as far as both thesis and antithesis are recognised for 
being simultaneously true when predicated of God, this antinomy may only be 
resolved if its counterparts are found to be reconciled in a dialectically proper 
way, as follows: 
                        Thesis:                                   God creates
                         Antithesis:                            God does not create. 
Synthesis 
         (or resolution of                          
the antinomy): 
   God creates and does not                                                                      
create at the same time. 
 
The infinite reality from the metaphysical and dialectical 
perspectives 
         Therefore, in so far as the reality of God’s creation is consistently thought 
of in its absolute totality, it is not hard to further deduce from this that no single 
creature (which is supposed to come into being not otherwise than from the 
only Principle of all) may ever be understood to abandon the universal integrity 
of its Principle, not improperly defined as the Divine Nature.  For as it follows 
from 860b, within the Divine Nature the whole “of the created universe of 
things visible and invisible” (including those of the “primordial causes”) is 
really meant to be contained.   
      This logically sound conclusion follows of necessity from the synthetic 
resolution of the antinomy above, but it inevitably comes into collision with 
common belief which traditionally tends to alienate the creature from the 
Creator
27
.  The fact nevertheless is, and the logic carefully followed throughout 
the present inquiry does convince of this, that such a belief may only fit the 
finite knowledge of sensible things that divides the whole of reality into the 
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immanent and transcendent parts (as those lying within and beyond the mind’s 
grasp respectively).  It is also clear from the same logic that no belief such as 
this may have anything to do with the living reality of creation as it truly is 
according to the substantial order of things that do not subsist beyond the 
universal Principle of all they proceed from.  For nothing universal by nature, as 
the logic itself requires, can ever be transcended.  It is consequently nothing 
other but the corrupt (sense-dependent) mind that – breaking the Law of the 
Divine order by opposing the singular to the universal– actually envisions the 
created things as being alien to God.  In this way, the created things (along with 
the human nature defiled by its irrational motion) are made to leave God or, 
speaking closer to what the biblical story tells, to fall out of the paradise of the 
true being of God’s creation.  
     Indeed, this type of the mind entirely dominated by the irrational motion is 
actually forced, as previously seen, by the dictates of senses (whose power does 
not extend any further than the perception of externals) to treat God and His 
creation as mutually countered, and subsequently mediated in their relations by 
a similarly confined agent, not infrequently termed the “primordial causes”.  All 
the three thereby taken together – namely, God, creation, and the primordial 
causes – make up, as already mentioned, a threefold model of creation, which 
among Eriugena’s four forms of the division of Nature obviously corresponds to 
the first three.  As far as anything whatsoever is therefore grasped within the 
reality of creation modelled in this way, it inevitably proves to be merely 
external and, for this reason, lying only alongside the other: the creature 
alongside of God, the primordial causes alongside of both God and the creature.  
In the result of this, it might seem that not the integrity but the division alone 
dominates throughout the entire universe of creation, placing all things outside 
of God and making them in fact separated from Him.  Should it be the case, 
God Himself would turn into nothing more than just a confined being, utterly 
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distinct from the rest of reality and opposed to it, which might be appropriate to 
transient things only that are understood to come into being and pass away.   
      As known from the inquiry above, however, the situation defined by this 
threefold model of creation (which is found to be deeply rooted in a non-
dialectical mode of thinking and basically akin to the Augustinian type of 
discourse) radically changes as soon as the fourth form of Nature emerges in the 
account of its division offered by Eriugena.  Along with the introduction of this 
decisively ‘iconoclastic’ form, a new, integral, perspective of the entire universe 
of creation opens up before the mind so as to leave no room there for God as a 
confined being.  For it is undeniably true, as in the words of Hegel, dialectic 
teaches those who are concerned about the knowledge of God’s being, that the 
truly infinite God should not be considered “merely as what is beyond the 
finite”.28     Indeed, as Hegel further explains, “God is not merely an essence” 
(among other essences) “and not even merely the highest essence either.  He is 
the essence”29.  God is the only essence because outside and alongside Him as 
“the genuine Infinite” there can be no other essence: “Whatever else is “given” 
outside of God has no essentiality in its separateness from God; on the contrary, 
any such things lacks internal stability and essence in its isolation, and must be 
considered as a mere semblance”30.   And the fourth form of Nature, as it 
appears in the Periphyseon’s doctrine to be all about bringing the created things 
back to the infinite Principle of their being, proves in fact to be – when properly 
viewed, as recta ratio requires, in its contradiction with the first one – a means 
of revealing this profoundly dialectical truth.  According to this truth, nothing 
singular (the finite) can ever subsist apart from the universal (the infinite), nor a 
single whole is divided into parts that may be found outside it.   
      In the light of this truth, therefore, one can clearly see that such a flagrant 
misconception of God as that of positing His absolute distinction from the 
creation produced by Him, does solely result from the mind’s corruption (or its 
subjection to the power of the exterior senses) that is explicitly manifest in full 
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measure in a common sense approach to the infinite as being sharply 
distinguished from the finite (or the particular).  In accordance with this 
common sense delusion entailed by the irrational motion of the mind corrupted, 
both the infinite and the finite are thought to counter each other in like manner 
to the opposite entities, as if either could exist not otherwise than depending on 
its contrary as something substantial.  Meanwhile, the fundamental truth 
concerning both requires that neither can the infinite depend in its existence on 
anything whatsoever, nor can the finite as such be substantial, when taken in 
contrast to the infinite.  For as follows from the aforesaid (and is confirmed by 
Hegel’s argument again), such a dualism of the entities set apart, “which makes 
the opposition of finite and infinite insuperable, fails to make the simple 
observation that in this way the infinite itself is also just one of the two, [and] 
that it is therefore reduced to one particular, in addition to which the finite is 
the other one.  Such an infinite, which is just one particular, beside the finite, so 
that it has precisely its restriction, its limit, in the latter, is not what it ought to 
be.  It is not the Infinite, but is only finite.  In this relationship, where one is 
situated here, and the other over there, the finite in this world and the infinite in 
the other world, an equal dignity of substance and independence is attributed to 
the finite and to the infinite; the being of the finite is made into an absolute 
being; in this Dualism it stands solidly on its own feet. If it were touched by the 
infinite, so to speak, it would be annihilated, but it is supposed to be not capable 
of being touched by the infinite; there is supposed to be an abyss, an impassable 
gulf, between the two; the infinite has to remain absolutely on the other side and 
the finite on this side.  This assertion of the solid persistence of the finite vis-à-
vis the infinite supposes itself to be beyond all metaphysics” (as common to 
faith positing itself in contrast to reason), “but it stands simply and solely on the 
ground of the most vulgar metaphysics of the understanding.”31 Therefore, 
although erroneously following this division as intrinsic to a non-dialectical (or 
metaphysical, in terms of the Hegelian logic) type of mentality that common 
228 
 
belief normally rests upon, “thinking means in this way to elevate itself to the 
Infinite, what happens to it is just the opposite – it arrives at an infinite which is 
only a finite, and the finite which it had left behind is, on the contrary, just what 
it always maintains and makes into an absolute”32.  And this result is obviously 
incompatible with the true knowledge of God unconfined.  
      So that, as long as the upholders of metaphysics who remain captive to a 
non-dialectical paradigm of thinking “regard God only as the “highest essence” 
in the Beyond, then they have the world in view as something firm and positive 
in its immediacy.  They are forgetting, then, that essence is precisely the 
sublation of everything immediate.  As the abstract essence in the Beyond, 
outside of which all the distinction and determinacy must fall, God is in fact a 
mere name, a mere caput mortuum of the abstractive understanding.  The true 
cognition of God begins with our knowing that things in their immediate being 
have no truth”33.  
 
    Therefore, in order that God as He truly (infinitely) is might be adequately 
known, so as to be really worshipped in accordance with “what we know” (Jn.4, 
22), all things that only seem to exist on their own need to be brought back – as 
Eriugena insists on it (see 860b-c) – to the bosom of all-embracing universality 
of the Principle of their being, outside which nothing can actually be.  And for 
this, they all ought to be released from the grips of the mind corrupted by its 
perverse (irrational) motion – that is, the mind that, under the dictates of the 
exterior senses always focused on the singular, divides all things according to 
their appearance, and thus mistakes a mere construct of them for a substantial 
reality.  Indeed, only the things that are sensually perceived from without and 
mentally held in their separateness may be assumed, as though fully distinct 
from the infinite, to stand in a diametrical opposition to God.  Once they are 
contemplated however by recta ratio according to their proper nature that never 
abandons the universal Principle of their being, all things appear then as it were 
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transformed in the light of a new insight.  By this insight they are revealed as 
they genuinely are, while enjoying their intimate unity with Him Whose essence  
and existence are meant to be one, so as to identify Him by the name ‘I am Who 
I am’ that permits neither chasm nor discrepancy between the One Himself and 
His manifestations.   
      From this, it would be sound to infer therefore that since it is nothing but the 
corrupt mind who makes all things leave God to form a sensible world 
opposing Him, it is consequently the mind itself that must be restored to the 
proper ways of its operation.  This restoration would allow the mind to 
overcome the alleged opposition between God and the creature, and thus to 
bring all things back to the place they are supposed to occupy in creation – that 
is, in the reality coming into being from the only Principle of all, whose 
universal nature, though giving rise to everything particular, remains never 
transcended.   
      As follows, it would be right to suggest with respect to this that it is not in 
space and time that the return of things should be understood to come about, but 
in the mind itself, when the latter is thoroughly disciplined in accordance with 
its proper nature
34
, as previously discussed.  For this return, no doubt, is all 
about the restoration of the right perspective of being as a whole, in line with 
which all things are perspicuously seen as they truly are in the reality properly 
ordered.   And all this is brought about through the mind’s comprehension of 
the reality where nothing subsists outside the Universal Principle of all.  
Otherwise, unless the mind is restored to the true state of conformity with its 
deeply inherent rational motion (where senses do not dominate any more nor 
break the proper order of creation by positing the singular prior to the 
universal), the Divine reality cannot reveal itself according to its true (infinite) 
nature, which does subsist in the way of retaining its self-identity – that is to 
say, in the way of Return of the only Principle of all from Itself through Itself 
towards Itself.  
230 
 
 
     All this certainly gives us to realise that the restoration of the mind concurs 
with the way the reality of the Divine truly is (while proceeding from the 
universal to the particular), by virtue of which all things come to be no longer 
known as existing on their own but as being brought back to the place they 
originally belong to.  Indeed, by allowing all things to come back from their 
captivity in the bonds of the sensible world to the bosom of the universal 
Principle of their being, the mind itself comes to be perfectly adequate in its 
operation to the way the reality of creation truly is.  Giving rise to all particular 
things, the only Principle proves to actually subsist solely by unfolding itself as 
a single whole that is never transcended by the particular.  In this sense, 
therefore, it would be not improper to conclude that in so far as the “reasonable 
senses” properly guided by recta ratio turn to contemplate all things according 
to their true nature (that never subsists apart from the Source of being)
35
, any 
division within the entire universe of creation, including its alienation from the 
Creator, gets overcome.  For as the truth standing for the correspondence of 
knowledge to the reality requires (and the logic of the present inquiry into the 
meaning of Eriugena’s doctrine of the division of Nature does convince us of 
this), there is no other reality of creation save the one where, as mentioned 
above, there “is the one beginning of all things, and there one end, in no way at 
discord with itself” (459a). 
     That is why being chiefly devoted to the profound investigation of the mind 
and sense relationship as it is explicitly unfolding through the collision of the 
rational and irrational motions of human nature, the central task of the entire 
Book IV of the Periphyseon proves in fact to be all about finding the way to 
true knowledge as such, which, strictly speaking, is that of God Himself.  It is 
for this reason – as claimed at 743c and confirmed again at 860b – that Eriugena 
seeks “to consider the Return of all things into that Nature which neither creates 
nor is created”.  In agreement with this task, the mind’s construct of the sensible 
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world, made up of the things perceived from without and erroneously associated 
with the being itself, is meant to be decisively dismissed as the most pernicious 
blunder ever made by the mind, that is, the blunder leading human being astray  
to an illusory world of sensible phantasies which give rise to nothing other but 
finite things only
36
.   This dismissal would definitely allow the mind to see anew 
the whole of “the created universe of things”, namely as staying within the 
universal Principle of being (the Beginning and the End of all).  From this 
perspective, the Return of all things, including their “primordial causes” as 
those “contained within the Divine Nature”, may be fairly acknowledged to be 
brought about, and the things themselves to be perspicuously seen as they truly 
are according to their original nature. 
     Thus the author of the Periphysion comes to convince all careful readers of 
Book IV that the Return, without which the knowledge of the truly One God is 
unattainable at all, should not be understood as brought about in spatio-temporal 
terms  as a sort of reversio succeeding the initial processio. In other words, it 
should not be understood in like manner to contraction as a sort of movement of 
the entire creation backward to its original centre from the utmost periphery of 
its expansion.  In accordance with the rational motion of human being (where 
the mind and the sense are rightly ordered, as due to recta ratio), the Return is 
rather to be properly known as a spiritual process going on in the human mind
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hand in hand with its recovery, which is apparently all about bringing its 
perspective to conformity with the substantial order of the universe of creation. 
For in coherence with Eriugena’s train of thought, it appears undeniably true 
that any procession of natures in creation cannot be really understood otherwise 
than in the way of being at the same time the return
38
 of the same natures “into 
their primordial causes and into that Nature which neither creates nor is created, 
that Nature which is God Himself” (860b).  Not improperly therefore, when he 
expounds the meaning of the expression “that Nature which neither creates nor 
is created”, does the Philosopher say in conclusion to Book IV that the Divine 
232 
 
Nature is fairly “believed not to be created because It is the Primal Cause of all, 
and there is no principle beyond It from which It can be created.  On the other 
hand, because after the Return of the created universe of things visible and 
invisible into its primordial causes which are contained within the Divine 
Nature, there is no further creation of nature from the Divine Nature nor any 
propagation of sensible or intelligible species; for in It all will be One, just as 
even now in their causes they are One and always are so.  Therefore we can 
rightly believe and understand that this Nature creates nothing.  For what should 
It create when It alone is all in all things?” (860b-c).   
The unity of the infinite self-identical being 
      After all this, therefore, it would be not unreasonable to say that the One 
God does not create indeed.  This statement is true in the sense that in the 
course of creating God creates nothing different from Himself, and because of 
this encounters in creation nothing other in fact but Himself, that is to say, Him 
Who is rightly understood to be uncreated.  On the other hand, however, it 
cannot be denied either as almost a commonplace that in order that God might 
encounter Himself in creation, the creation itself needs to be produced; and God 
then, evidently enough, is to be plainly thought of as Him Who creates.  As 
long as it is the case, an obvious paradox develops here to cause a great deal of 
perplexity to common sense.  Indeed, while creating nothing alien to Himself, 
the One God does not actually manifest Himself in creation otherwise than in 
the way of being at the same time, as it were, created, and thus not inadequately 
known as Him Who, as Eriugena puts it, simultaneously “makes and is made, 
and creates and is created” (452a).  For in coherence with a dialectical approach 
to the truth of the absolute being (where the universal and the singular are 
properly ordered), it would be not unfair “to treat of the Divine Nature that not 
only does It create all things that are, but Itself also is created” (452a) in the 
sense that “in all things the Divine Nature is being made” (or revealed39), 
“which is nothing else than the Divine Will.   For in that Nature being is not 
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different from willing, but willing and being are one and the same in the 
establishment of all things that are to be made” (453d).   
     Thus, actually in confirmation of the unconditional truth that the Divine 
being as a whole is inconceivable at all beyond a contradiction, another crucial 
paradox (basically complementary to the cardinal one, though latently present 
throughout the Periphyseon) apparently comes to fore here: whereas on the one 
hand God is fairly known to be uncreated, on the other hand His infinite self-
identical Nature cannot be thought of otherwise in fact than in the way of being 
created at the same time.  And like the cardinal paradox considered above, this 
too gets resolved when both thesis and antithesis are reconciled in the way of 
presenting the ultimate Principle of all according to its universal nature.  Being 
uncreated (i.e. determined by nothing), this Principle solely subsists by 
unfolding itself, that is, by the return to itself, since nothing alien to it may ever 
be brought into being.  Indeed, in so far as God is truly known as the absolute 
being beyond which there is utterly nothing because He “fills out all things” and 
therefore “is always immutably at rest in Himself” (453b), to this extent it 
would be not improper to suggest that the Divine Nature “which is invisible in 
itself becomes manifest in all things that are” (454b).  In this sense, the Divine 
Nature may rightly be understood as “created because nothing except itself 
exists as an essence since itself is the essence of all things” (454a).  So that, 
when the Divine Nature is paradoxically said to be   created, it is fairly meant to 
be created “not by another nature but by itself” (455a).  “For when it is said that 
it creates itself”, the Philosopher concludes, “the true meaning is nothing else 
but that it is establishing the natures of things.  For the creation of itself, that is, 
the manifestation of itself in something, is surely that by which all things 
subsist” (455b).   
      And this is rightly so; for no true being (that never ceases to be) may ever be 
coherently thought of apart from the true infinity, which “consists in the going 
together with oneself in one’s other”40.   Indeed, as Hegel, the great master of 
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dialectic, would elucidate it in unison with Eriugena, the infinite as it truly is 
“consists rather in remaining at home with itself in its other, or (when it is 
expressed as a process) in coming to itself in its other”41.  From this, therefore, 
it is not hard to deduce that it is nothing other in fact but a thorough 
understanding of the identity as such
42
 that really allows us to approach the 
fundamental knowledge of God as the absolute or self-identical whole, which 
“contains the One and its Other, both itself and its opposite within itself”43.  “ In 
its truth, as the ideality of what immediately is,” the German philosopher holds 
in his Logic, “ identity is a lofty determination both for our religious 
consciousness and for the rest of our thinking and consciousness in general.  It 
can be said that the true knowledge of God begins at the point where he is 
known as Identity, i.e. as absolute identity; and this implies, at the same time, 
that all the power and the glory of the world sinks into nothing before God and 
can subsist only as the shining [forth] of his power and his glory.”44  “There is 
in fact,” Hegel further argues, “ nothing, either in heaven or on earth, either in 
the spiritual or the natural world, that exhibits the abstract “either-or” as it is 
maintained by the understanding.  Everything that is at all is concrete, and 
hence it is inwardly distinguished and self-opposed.  The finitude of things 
consists in the fact that their immediate way of being does not correspond with 
what they are in-themselves”.45  
     That is why as the true (infinite) being, which is “the unity of essence and 
existence”46 or, more specifically, “free equality with itself in its determinacy”47 
(because outside it there is definitely nothing), God may be properly defined in 
accordance with Jn.4, 24 as Spirit.  This means therefore that in His truth He 
can only be known as “absolute Spirit,”48 who in fact is the infinite being  
distinguishing “itself from itself…, so that it is at once mediation”49; for “ God 
can only be called spirit inasmuch as he is known as inwardly mediating himself 
with himself”50.   
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      It is consequently this train of thought (pivotal to which is a coherent 
understanding of the true nature of identity) that allows in effect any 
dialectically disciplined mind, Eriugena’s one included, to see in paradoxes, 
concerning God’s infinite and self-identical being, the way of approaching the 
absolute truth of Revelation.  Approached in this way and understood as God’s 
self-disclosure that is brought about in and through creation, Revelation allows 
the mind to grasp that fundamental truth that nothing particular does ever 
subsist on its own, that is to say, apart from the universal essence which brings 
it into being.  Indeed, anything whatsoever (with no exception of human being) 
does subsist not otherwise than in unity with its ultimate essence to make it 
manifest or, speaking more precisely, to let it really be, so that being truly 
unconfined this universal essence could actually be not in itself only but for 
itself as well.  This is the way in which “the created universe of things” has been 
established.  This is also the way to be followed in the mind in order that the 
only possible access to the substantial reality of creation might be provided.  
When a proper solution to any paradoxes concerning the true (unconfined) 
being is found indeed, human beings – prior to this, blinded by ignorance which 
the finite knowledge is inevitably fraught with – are let clearly see all things 
according to their true nature and enter thereby the reality as it substantially is.  
      To this extent, Eriugena believes, by analogy with the way the mind comes 
to manifest itself (while surpassing everything finite in any of its explicit 
forms), it can be not inadequately shown how the Divine Nature gets disclosed.  
In fact, the Divine Nature, “although it creates all things and cannot be created 
by anything, is in an admirable manner created in all things which take their 
being from it; so that, as the intelligence of the mind or its purpose or its 
intention or however this first and innermost motion of ours may be called, 
having… entered upon thought and received the forms of certain fantasies, and 
having then proceeded into the symbols of sounds or the signs of sensible 
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motions, is not inappropriately said to become – for being in itself without any 
sensible form, it becomes formed in fantasies – so the Divine Essence which 
when it subsists by itself surpasses every intellect is correctly said to be created 
in those things which are made by itself and through itself and in itself and for 
itself, so that in them either by the intellect, if they are only intelligible, or by 
the sense, if they are sensible, it comes to be known by those who investigate it 
in the right spirit” (454c-d).  Hence, if examined in full (up to the depth of a 
dialectically understood unity of the exterior and the interior as such), this 
analogy allows us not only to demonstrate the basic affinity between the proper 
order of the mind’s operation and the way the absolute whole truly is “by itself 
and through itself and in itself and for itself”; it also indicates the clue following 
which anyone can actually cleave to reality as it truly is.  
      As a result, by offering this articulate analogy the author of the Periphyseon 
helps his readers to realise that the investigation in “the right spirit” mentioned 
above is to be all about an unambiguous disclosure of the absolute unity, which 
unceasingly pertains to the reality of the living whole that does subsist “by itself 
and through itself and in itself and for itself”.  This is the reality of creation 
where the creature and Creator are perfectly and inseparably one in the living 
and indivisible Spirit that the Holy Scripture is explicit about.  For it is 
undoubtedly of Spirit’s essence to have nothing to do with finite (or discrete) 
things, of Whom it is fairly believed that He is living and ubiquitous, ever 
remaining the invisible one (Jh. 3, 8).  The investigative task, therefore, is 
apparently the one to be solved, as follows from Eriugena’s thoroughgoing 
approach to the matter, by means of dialectic (or the dialectical way of thinking, 
to be precise).  In fact, being intolerant of finitude as such and, above all, of any 
attempts of illegitimate application of the principles of non-paradoxical 
reasoning to the knowledge of the Divine, dialectic alone enables the mind to 
get rid of all illusions of the sense-dependent knowledge and thus to clearly see 
the reality as it truly is beyond any division – the division that tears up the whole 
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of being into separate pieces liable to decay only.  This means that,  irrelevant to 
the true being which never ceases to be, the total division proves in the light of 
dialectic actually to be nothing  more than just an abstract construct imposed 
upon the living reality by the corrupt mind, who falsely accepts the sensible (i.e. 
the realm of finite things) for true. 
      From this perspective then, as long as the dialectically-disciplined mind 
embraces reality as it actually is beyond any finite being and division, the forms 
of Nature explicitly presented in the account of its division at 441b may not 
improperly be seen in the light of their new meaning.  In particular, despite their 
appearance, they come to be seen not as a succession of separate species of 
Nature emerging as far as the division progresses, but rather as the distinct 
aspects of one and the same indivisible (though self-differentiating) Nature 
which unfolds through all the created things, so as really to be all in all.  This is 
the vision which alone is perfectly appropriate to Him Who is called “the only 
true God” (Jn. 17, 3) and Who indeed is the One or the infinite self-identical 
being.   
     As a matter of fact, since the Divine Nature as a whole may not inadequately 
be conceived (in accordance with the paradox dialectically treated above) as 
being uncreated and created at the same time, it should subsequently mean that 
the first, the second and the third divisions of Nature may be fairly considered 
not as taken at their face value, as though they respectively were just the 
Beginning, the Middle and the End of creation following one another in time.  
Instead, in accordance with the living integrity of the Divine Nature, they 
should be not literally but spiritually understood as an intimate threefold unity 
as it is expressly presented in the account of division by the fourth synthetic 
form of Nature.  This is the form within which the Beginning, the Middle and 
the End of creation, as those appropriate to the true (infinite) being that 
perfectly is in itself through itself and for itself, are reasonably understood to be 
inseparably and simultaneously one.  Likewise the absolute truth of God’s 
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Trinity requires of “the Cause of all things” to be “of a threefold substance” 
(455c) so as to be congruous to the totality of being, but not merely to the apex 
of a hierarchy-like model of it.  
      No wonder then, as Willemien Otten points out concerning the pivotal 
theme of the Periphyseon’s dialogue, that the “Master does not answer the 
suggestion of his pupil that the difference between the second and the third form 
is found in reality as well as in our contemplation thereof.  His abrupt transition 
to the audacious rhetorical unification of all four forms in the one indivisible 
divine essence may prove that he is not interested in such factual differences, as 
he has set his mind on the attempting to restore all forms to the divine 
harmony”51.  “It is obvious”, she concludes therefore with regard to the “real 
intentions” of the author of the Periphyseon, “that Eriugena endeavours to 
restore natura to its original undivided unity in God…”52     
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CONCLUSION 
 
     On completion of the present inquiry, we arrive at a clear vision that the 
prime concern of Eriugena (as well as the main objective of his intellectual 
endeavour) is to find the way of bringing human life to conformity with the 
reality of God’s creation, which proves in fact to be hidden behind the layers of 
sensible images that turn the world, where human beings think they live, into a 
conglomerate of finite things – that is, the transient world of things that come 
into being and pass away.  This profoundly philosophical vision of the 
liberation of human being from its captivity in the world of dichotomy, where 
fleeting human life is squeezed between the extremes of being and non-being, 
allows Eriugena to pose a soteriological question (ever central to Christian 
theology) as an essentially anthropological one, at the heart of which there lies 
both the epistemological and ontological agenda.  And all this, in turn, raises a 
question of Eriugena’s Christology.  For the way the liberation of human race is 
brought about and the role Christ plays in the drama of salvation
1
 appear quite a 
problematic issue in Eriugena’s vision of Christian faith.  Perhaps, a good deal 
of the influence of Eastern philosophy on his religious beliefs might give us a 
clue and shed some light upon the peculiarities of Eriugena’s thought, as well as 
let us learn a lot from the genius of his philosophical-theological discourse as it 
develops, above all, within the framework of his anti-division project, 
commonly known under the title of the Periphyseon.  In this sense, Eriugena’s 
system still remains to us a good example of thinking consistently about 
bringing the whole of reality to the bosom of God’s creation and, as a result, of 
building a coherent theology of God’s Unity. 
     In particular, students of Eriugena’s thought should learn from it the way that 
transcendence and immanence could get reconciled to allow us today to cure the 
most regrettable misconception of God severed from his creation (i.e. the one 
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guilty of many miscarriages of practical faith) by steering a safe course between 
the extremes of Radical Theology and Radical Orthodoxy
2
, and thus to address 
a wide range of calamities that institutionalised religion is currently undergoing 
in its deep crisis.  For this, as Eriugena teaches us, the very paradigm of 
thinking applied to faith and theology has to be cardinally changed: 
Metaphysics that tends to divide the living reality in two (providing thereby the 
ground for dualistic dichotomies of any sort) needs to be resolutely rejected as 
basically inappropriate to the truth of faith in the One God and, subsequently, be 
effectively replaced by Dialectic. As a way of thinking, which alone is perfectly 
fit for the task of conceiving the reality of the whole (where no room for the 
dichotomy between being and non-being can ever be found), Dialectic proves to 
be appropriate indeed for guiding human beings in their life in unity with Him 
Who is the One. 
     Furthermore, as a way of thinking the absolute whole that is brought about 
by means of contradiction (due to which, as seen from the Periphyseon’s 
discourse, the opposition of the eternal and temporal is overcome), this 
Dialectic is actually where Eriugena and Hegel meet to confirm the validity of 
Noack’s words of the medieval genius as the “Hegel of the ninth century”.  
Both Eriugena and Hegel are convinced that things in their truth are not as they 
appear to be.  Moreover, just as Hegel does not stop at this principal postulate 
of the Kantian epistemology that seeks to legitimise the dichotomy between the 
phenomenal and noumenal, likewise Eriugena is not keen at all on setting apart 
the infinite and finite.  They are both concerned about the way things can 
properly be thought of (and therefore known) as they actually are in the true 
reality of the infinite, living and indivisible, whole in order that – through the 
knowledge of the true things – human beings could actually be in the reality as 
it truly (unceasingly) is. 
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     For this, according to both Eriugena and Hegel, true things should not be 
thought of in like manner to finite ones, which appear to oppose one another as 
if existing in the world divided into opposites mutually separated.  All the more 
this is true about the infinite (unconfined) Being itself to be known as the 
absolute, self-sufficient and self-knowing, whole or God Himself.  God cannot 
be thought of as something external in like manner to external (finite) things, 
i.e. as an external object, when He is assumed to be known by virtue of 
predicating attributes of His essence, which has always been, according to 
Hegel, a favourite preoccupation of metaphysics.  Nor can the infinite God be 
known as a subject that is simply opposed to the object and therefore ever 
remaining to be the hidden (negative) inwardness only.  The true God may only 
be known as Spirit, the living and indivisible whole, Who ever makes Himself 
adequately manifest.  As Spirit, God is Him indeed in Whom there is no 
discrepancy between the inner essence and actual existence, and Who therefore 
truly says of Himself, ‘I am Who I am’.  To be consequently at one with the true 
God known as Spirit, human beings must likewise, as due to imago dei, make 
sure that the innermost essence of their nature (that really makes them 
distinctive among the whole creature) may find itself to be adequately manifest.  
This furthermore means that in order to live in the one indivisible reality of the 
infinite whole, and thus really worship and please the true God, human beings 
must actually be spirits – that is, the ones who make their reason adequately 
manifest as Logos.  This is actually what both Eriugena and Hegel, though each 
in his own way, prove to teach the faithful to get them focused on the truth 
revealed by Christ – the truth of God’s Oneness, according to which all men 
and women are to be nothing other but the children of the only Father in heaven.   
     This truth, central to Christian faith, is however incompatible with a dualistic 
vision of reality provided by metaphysics as a type of mentality.  It is 
metaphysics indeed to which it is essential to divide the reality as such in two 
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(being – non-being, infinite – finite, transcendent – immanent, sensual – 
supersensual, natural – supernatural, essential – superessential, etc.) and to 
understand the whole as resulting from the complementary counterparts added 
up.  Despite its obsession with dichotomies, metaphysics has been traditionally 
chosen by theology as a reliable method of understanding and theoretical 
underpinning of its truths.  By doing so, however, theology inevitably dooms 
itself to dogmatism, which is, as Hegel insists, the very nature of metaphysics.  
Indeed, of the two opposite definitions (as appropriate to the pairs of contraries 
indicated above) it has always to choose only one for true and reject the other as 
false, i.e. irrelevant to God’s being.  In the narrow sense of the word, as 
mentioned before, dogmatism therefore “consists in adhering to one-sided 
determinations of the understanding whilst excluding their opposites”3.  
According to Hegel, in metaphysics “one is of the opinion that one can speak 
only of the truth of a proposition, and that the only question that can be raised 
with regard to a concept is whether (as people say) it can be truthfully 
“attached” to a subject or not.  Untruth would depend on the contradiction to be 
found between the subject of the representation and the concept to be predicated 
of it.”4.   
     As for the theology that traditionally, as Hegel says, rested upon this 
metaphysics, “it was a science5 of God that rested not upon reason but on the 
understanding, and its thinking moves only in abstract thought-determinations.  
Whilst what was treated was the concept of God, it was the representation of 
God that formed the criterion for cognition.”6.  “In this account of God from the 
point of view of the understanding”, Hegel further explains, “what counts above 
all is which predicates agree or not with what we represent to ourselves as 
‘God’”7.  As a result, under the direct influence of metaphysics, and in attempt 
to avoid the dogmatism that this metaphysics imposes upon the church doctrine, 
theology turns at best into a body of external and accidental knowledge of an 
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empirical sort.  In fact, however, only under the direct impact of the critical 
philosophy
8
, the major task of which is fairly understood since Kant to consist 
in having the rights of reason identified and defended
9
, can the mind be 
awakened from the dogmatic slumber
10
.  The same is true of Christian theology 
as well.  It desperately needs an intimate union with a profoundly philosophical 
thinking to secure a proper access to the Truth of Revelation
11
.  For, as 
previously considered, even the highest truth given through faith still remains a 
category of knowledge, and may therefore be available to proper knowledge 
only
12.  “If theology provides a merely external enumeration and compilation of 
religious teachings”, says Hegel, “then it is not yet science.  Even the merely 
historical treatment of its subject matter that is in favour nowadays (for 
instance, the reporting of what this or that Church Father said) does not give 
theology a scientific character.  Science comes only when we advance to the 
business of philosophy, i.e. the mode of thinking that involves comprehension.  
Thus, genuine theology is essentially, at the same time, Philosophy of Religion, 
and that is what it was in the Middle Ages too”13. 
     As clearly seen from the very beginning of the present inquiry, Eriugena 
likewise understands that, in order to conform to the truth they are both focused 
on, true philosophy and true religion are to be known not as two different things 
but one and the same
14
.  And it is exactly a deep understanding of this unity 
(where finite forms of truth get overcome) that gave Hegel reason, as already 
mentioned, to see Eriugena as the beginning of philosophy proper.  “Philosophy 
properly speaking”, he maintains, “begins in the ninth century with John Scottus 
Eriugena”15. According to this view, philosophy cannot develop on its own, i.e. 
apart from its genuine interest in the infinite religious truth, in the sense that 
God Himself, as Hegel says, is the Truth.  Likewise, theology cannot really 
approach its own truth, unless philosophically disciplined thinking of the 
infinite whole is deeply implanted in its body.  Similarly to Hegel, it is clear to 
244 
 
Eriugena that until theology stops relying on metaphysics, it will continue to 
deal with nothing other than a mere misconception of God.  In metaphysical 
theology, the infinite and living God proves to be reduced to nothing more in 
fact than just a fictitious construct correspondent to a twofold representation, 
according to which He is believed to be 1) external (no matter whether remote 
or closely present) and 2) transcendent
16
.  By contrast, in the theology 
appropriate to the unity of philosophy and religion, as Eriugena understands it
17
, 
the emphasis is to be made not on the conception of God as such but on the way 
God is conceived and, as a consequence, on transformation of human beings as 
a means of getting them prepared for the reception of the Truth revealed.  The 
scriptural truths of the renewal of the mind (Rom. 12, 2) and making straight the 
way of the Lord (Jn. 1, 23) are therefore to be chosen for the pillars of a new 
theology to be built – that is, the theology of God’s Unity, to which it is the 
most essential that all humans are known as the children of the One God that 
are to be at one with Him (Jn. 1,12). 
     The role of philosophy in this construction work, as Eriugena sees it, is 
perfectly obvious.  It consists in offering the way of cleansing the mind of its 
alien (sense-dependent) content, loosely or tightly packed in the form of finite 
definitions, but unpacked by virtue of dialectical contradiction, tolerant of 
nothing finite
18
.  This is the way in which to those who are spiritually 
transformed and liberated (i.e. renewed and purified in their minds) the 
knowledge of God as Spirit, that the Truth of Revelation is all about (Jh. 4, 23-
24)
19
, becomes available indeed.  In other words, those who are spiritually free 
(i.e. not determined from without), and in whom therefore there is no 
discrepancy between the innermost essence of their nature and its adequate 
manifestation (actual existence), are summoned to be perfect as their Father in 
heaven is (Mat. 5, 48), and for this reason may fairly be called the sons of God.  
The new theology, hence, brings not a new shape to the old religious practices 
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and beliefs, but a new meaning to human life, revealing the secrets of 
immortality and transfiguration.  The ever-lasting being that never ceases to be, 
and the way all humans come to participate in it, is actually what appears to 
Eriugena central in theology, in so far as it is coherent with the heart of the 
message of Christ’s unique teaching of the kingdom of God20.  As our inquiry 
into the meaning of Eriugena’s thought convinces us, this teaching should 
rightly be understood as that of the reality of God’s self-disclosure, where the 
unity of the inner essence and its actual existence is utterly unshakable (Ex. 
3,14), and where therefore those capable of their adequate self-disclosure truly 
belong.   
*** 
     Such is a brief outline of Eriugena’s understanding of a coherently Christian 
theology, as it may be reconstructed by an analysis of the voluminous and dense 
text of the Periphyseon, a monumental landmark in the history of Christian 
thought.  It is the understanding which A.I. Brilliantov characterises as 
Eriugena’s monism, finding it firmly based on the Christian concept of God as 
“the self-knowing Spirit, analogous to the spirit of man”, when he is restored to 
the integrity of his nature
21
. 
     Does this understanding matter to us today?  It certainly does, to the extent 
that Christians are aware nowadays of the necessity of having their church-
centred faith cardinally reconsidered to let it recover from the deep crisis it has 
at least been in since Christendom became the arena of the horrors and atrocities 
of the world wars.  Eriugena’s honesty and profundity encourage us to look at 
our faith anew in the hope of understanding where a fatal mistake was made – 
the mistake that led us astray so as to bring us to the nowhere of bestial and 
meaningless life.  Was it a collusion with state at Nicaea that resulted, as Lev 
Tolstoy believes, in the substitution of the Sermon on the Mount by the 
Creed
22
?  Or was it the church itself, as Dostoevsky thinks, an institution of 
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human enslavement built on the principles of miracle, mystery, and authority
23
?   
Or are the genuine reasons of the perversion of Christian faith even deeper than 
these and should be searched for, say, in ourselves, as Eriugena teaches us – i.e. 
in our mind, in the way we think and impose our thoughts on the world we live 
in?  No matter how many other questions of the kind can be raised, the only 
thing we ought to understand is what is wrong with us that for so long we fail to 
adhere to the truth revealed to us two millennia ago.  To me, Eriugena seems to 
have come very close to the answer we are looking for, and this is why his 
legacy is immensely important to us today. 
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iconography God’s Mother (Theotokos) is always portrayed with an uncovered face, 
which may not unreasonably be understood to symbolise the truth revealed.  The 
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Parmenides often resorts to in his philosophical poem, to the philosophical clarity of 
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traversing of a distance impossible?  Does it not necessitate the denial of the existence 
of the movement itself?” (Mir Valiuddin, A History of Muslim Philosophy, pp.14-15) 
(page 111)  
3. Ibid, p.15.  (page 112) 
4. John Scottus Eriugena, The Voice of the Eagle: Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel 
of St. John.  Translated with introductions and reflections by Christopher Bamford; 
foreword by Thomas Moore. (Lindisfarne Books, 2000), II, p. 72. (page 113) 
5. Ibid, IX, p. 84  (page 113) 
6. Ibid, X, p. 86  (page 113) 
7. Ibid, X, p. 87  (page 114) 
8. The overcoming of this cardinal misconception proves to be extremely important to 
Eriugena, for it allows, as evident from the very logic of his discourse, to give way to 
a new prospect of human life.  Moreover, it is the latter that may not unfairly be 
understood as the ultimate goal of his intellectually passionate quest.  Indeed, it is the 
discussion of human true being that constitutes the fifth mode of understanding of the 
true being and, as the subject-matter of Book V of the Periphyseon, crowns the entire 
of his philosophical-theological system.  (page 114) 
9. A panentheistic model of God’s being, according to which all things are conceived to 
be in God, would be likewise inappropriate to the true knowledge of God.  In fact, a 
panentheistic conception proves to be largely based on a formal logic assumption with 
its characteristic appeal to notions as forms, mainly treated from the perspective of 
their content volume.  In particular, panentheism finds it theologically important to 
assert that ‘God is greater than the universe held in Him’ while actually ignoring 
some essential deficiencies within this approach.  One of them is that the ‘universe’ 
included in God’s being is assumed to be and remain ‘part’ of a bigger ‘whole’, and 
therefore is conceived to be nothing more than just a realm of finite being.  Thus God 
Who is supposed to be ‘greater’, remains in fact opposed to the finite universe 
created, and therefore confined, though, so to speak, from within Himself.  The 
deficiencies of this theology are quite obvious, and they will haunt theological 
thought until it keeps insisting on substantiality of the finitude of the universe created.  
As long as theological reflection tries to retain status quo of the sensual perception 
perspective as the only appropriate one for approaching the universe of creation, it 
will hardly succeed in developing a coherent theology.  (page 114) 
10. In spite of being almost a commonplace among the theologians of the biblical 
tradition to take for granted the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo, there is surprisingly no 
evidence or clue in the Bible itself for the legitimacy of such a doctrine.  The only 
reference to the Scripture, that is believed to provide ground for the doctrine in 
question, is usually associated with the second Maccabean book, i.e. the text written 
in the environment of Hellenised Judaism of Alexandria.  To be exact, only a few 
lines, namely II Mac. 7:28, are selected from the text to point to the matter: “I beg 
you, my child, to look at the heaven and the earth and see everything that is in them, 
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and recognise that God did not make them out of things that existed.  And in the same 
way the human race came into being”.  The ambiguity of these words (that is 
considerably enhanced by their contrast with the preceding context at II Mac. 7, 27) is 
so apparent, however, that an attempt to interpret them in the sense of creatio ex 
nihilo would rather look like a deliberate misreading of the text.  Taking into account 
the circumstances of the text’s origin, it would be not unfair to assume that the lines 
quoted are meant to refute the doctrine of creatio ex materia (creation out of some 
pre-existent matter), quite commonly shared by the Greeks and understood as a kind 
of formation of the primeval chaos.  Even purely grammatical reading of the lines in 
focus gives to understand that God is meant here to make the world not out of things.  
It would be therefore too biased to interpret these scriptural words in the sense of 
creation ex nihilo.  As for other scriptural references normally made in favour of this 
doctrine – such as Genesis 1:1, Hebrews 11:3, and Revelation 4:11 – they appear to 
be even more irrelevant.  (page 115) 
11. By no means would it be fair to confuse Eriugena’s conception of creatio ex deo with 
the Greek philosophy’s approach largely based on the truth that ex nihilo nihil fit.  The 
fact is that whereas the latter categorically denies a possibility of conceiving anything 
whatsoever apart from a pre-existent matter’s involvement, the doctrine of creation ex 
deo is likewise categorical in denying the existence of anything pre-given to God’s 
infinite being or consubstantial with it.  Thus, similarly denying nihil as the source of 
existence, both doctrines yet fundamentally differ in their understanding of the Divine 
nature.   (page 115) 
12. By the way, St’ Paul’s reminder about the necessity of human beings’ transformation 
by the renewing of their minds also contains a clear indication of the purpose of this 
transformation.  In particular, all humans are called by the Apostle to be transformed 
by the renewing of their minds so that they “may discern what is the will of God – 
what is good and acceptable and perfect” (Rom. 12, 2). (page 115) 
13. An outline of this conception and the way Eriugena treats it see in the chapter below.  
(page 117) 
14. Since Thomas Gale’s 1681 Oxford edition of the Periphyseon entitled by him 
(perhaps for some methodological reason suitable for his time) De divisione naturae, 
there has been quite a sustained tendency among readers of Eriugena’s work to 
uncritically look at the division of Nature as its central theme.  To the extent this view 
prevails, however, Eriugena remains an obscure thinker who is largely misunderstood. 
(page 122) 
Chapter V 
 
1. On the role of negation and contradiction in the Eriugenian approach to truth see for 
example: J.C. Marler, Scriptural Truth in the Periphyseon in G.Van Riel, C. Steel,  
J.McEvoy (eds.), Iohannes Scottus Eriugena: The Bible and Hermeneutics.  
Proceedings of the Ninth International Colloquium of the Society for the Promotion of 
Eriugenian Studies (Leuven, University Press, 1996), pp. 157-158 (page 149) 
2. This thesis might seem to common sense as unusual as the central postulate of non-
Euclidian geometry of Lobachevsky is, in agreement with which two parallel lines – 
in defiance of popular belief – must intersect.  Yet, it appears to be true in so far as a 
real space of the world that is spread over great distances, but not an abstract replica 
of it applicable to straight lines only, is concerned.  Similarly, in the case of the 
doctrine of contradiction, it proves again to be the fact that abstract ideas – as it often 
happens when abstraction dominates in human reason – are just irrelevant to the true 
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reality which they are supposed to correspond to.  Therefore, however unusual it 
might seem that the true and the false do not contradict each other and that, 
accordingly, contradiction is not constituted by mutually excluding statements (of 
which one is true and the other false), one should ever remember the only thing – 
namely, the need for being in touch with reality as it truly is in and for itself.       A 
classical exposition of the uncommon view, according to which a genuine 
contradiction does arise between the two contradictory statements if and only if they 
both appear at the same time to be true (or false), may be found for certain in 
philosophy of Immanuel Kant, namely in that part of his system which is called 
Transcendental Dialectic, where in particular contradictions, such as ‘World has a 
beginning’ and ‘World has no beginning’ or ’Soul is mortal’ and ‘Soul is immortal’, 
are considered.   True, it has to be also admitted that, in spite of having rightly 
understood this chief peculiarity intrinsic to the nature of contradiction in general, the 
German philosopher nevertheless reckoned contradiction among the impossibles in 
terms of its complete irrelevance to anything real.  To his mind, nothing true could 
ever be grasped by the opposed statements in so far as both of them proved to be 
equally valid.  Hence, as Kant argues, if in his discourse man arrives at some 
contradiction, it must apparently testify rather to his reason’s weakness and 
helplessness than to its merits and effectiveness.  And since, furthermore, it cannot be 
firmly decided which of the contraries is really true (i.e. whether the world is finite or 
infinite, and the soul is mortal or immortal, and so on), contradiction as such comes 
then to be recognised as nothing else but a definite sign of delusion that human mind 
should carefully avoid on its way to truth.  Thus, in his Critique of Pure Reason, 
while discussing in detail the antinomies of pure reason (which human mind finds 
itself to be trapped in as soon as self-assuredly tries to leave the solid ground of 
sensual experience and thus to transcend the utmost of its own capacity to look 
beyond the limits of the finite phenomena), Kant qualifies contradiction as an 
insurmountable obstacle on the way of cognition that does not allow human mind to 
go any further in its search for truth.  Therefore, while severely criticising the 
shortcomings of the Kantian approach to contradiction (mainly, the interpretation of it 
as a criterion of delusion), Hegel however highly appreciated Kant’s contribution due 
to his recognition of equal validity of thesis and antithesis.  And it was this equal 
validity of the contraries which allowed Hegel to suggest that contradiction is to be 
properly understood as a criterion of truth.  Contradiction, according to him, lets 
human mind know that it is on the right way to Godly Truth as far as, by relying upon 
the integrity of the opposites, it resolutely breaks through the finitude of the 
phenomenal world towards the reality as it truly is.  (page 156) 
3. The idea of freedom and existence interconnectedness is essential to any profound 
ontology.  No wonder, therefore, that it echoes even as far as in Jean-Paul Sartre, in 
whose Being and Nothing freedom is defined as a focal point of his anthropological 
ontology, according to which man is destined to freedom in the sense that “he is either 
free or he is not”  (Ж-Р Сартр.  “Бытие и ничто:  Опыт феноменологической 
онтологии”.  М., “Республика”, 2000, сc. 15, 156).  (page 158) 
4. About the sacramental formula  (co-essential to the Father) 
first introduced to Christian dogmatics by Athanasius the Great and  adopted by the 
Church at the Council of Nicaea (325 AD) see, for example: А.В. Карташёв. 
“Вселенские соборы”  М.,  “Республика”,  1994, с. 13. (page 161) 
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Chapter VI 
1. The Latin version of the quotation given reads: “Aliter enim omnis creatura in verbo dei 
in quo omnia facta sunt consideratur, aliter in seipsa.”  When in this context in seipsa is 
rendered as “in itself,” it should be rather understood in the sense of the Kantian Ding an 
sich – namely, as a thing that is on its own or by itself, i.e. without being perceived or 
conceived – but not in the sense of perfect accordance with its own inner nature.  Hence, 
the “aspects” meant here are those of being with God and without God (“in itself”), i.e. on 
its own, as it would appear to the sense.  By being in itself is therefore meant that, in spite 
of any changes that occur in the course of perception, an object perceived seems to a 
perceiver to exist on its own, remaining independent of man and safe from his 
interference.   (page 164) 
2. In connection with this, see also 770c, especially with regard to what is indicated of the 
so-called ‘first’ substance. (page 164) 
3. This independent status of knowledge is definitely the case, according to Eriugena, with 
the liberal arts, which not unreasonably should be thought of (in the framework of his 
discourse, at least) as the cognitive faculties of the independent (liberated) mind. (page 
167)  
4. To the extent that a certain affinity between the basic principles of Eriugena’s and Kant’s 
systems may be acknowledged, it would be beneficial for a better understanding of both 
thinkers to note that the prior and produced forms of knowledge, as they come to fore in 
the course of Eriugena’s speculation, could be fairly qualified in the Kantian terms as a 
priori and aposteriori knowledge respectively. (page 168) 
5. As it appears from 769c, among these may be counted, for example, qualities, quantities, 
forms, magnitudes, smallnesses, equalities, conditions, acts, dispositions, places, times, 
etc. (page 175) 
6. Since, in Eriugena’s conviction, the true concept (that is appropriate to the infinite being) 
constitutes all things according to their substance of which it is the concept, it 
indispensably follows from this that “the concept by which man knows himself may be 
considered his very substance” (770a).  And this is rightly so; because just as the concept 
as such inaugurates all things in their true status, likewise the mind and its proper concept 
– as the very essence of human nature – undoubtedly determine man’s true being.  In this 
way, the inner essence of his proper nature comes to perfectly accord with its outer 
existence, as the principle of self-identity universal to the entire substantial reality 
requires it of necessity.  With regard to this, it would be quite fair to remind of “an 
extremely true and very well tested definition of man” (768b) that the author of the 
Periphyseon gives: “We may then define man as follows: Man is a certain intellectual 
concept formed eternally in the Divine Mind” (768b).  This definition of man “as he is 
intellectually comprehended to be” (768b), which Eriugena himself calls substantial, 
apparently contrasts with any other unsubstantial ones that do not define the human being 
itself but only describe its accidents or, in other words, “what relates to the substance 
from the attributes acquired by the substance from outside itself through generation” 
(768c); as it, for example, does when Eriugena suggests that “man is a rational mortal 
animal capable of sense and discipline” (768c). (page 175) 
7. This is the point at which Eriugena’s understanding of the innate knowledge would 
considerably differ from the empiricists’ approach to it. Thus John Locke, for instance, 
assumed that if any ideas were innate, they would be available to everyone and 
everywhere.  By contrast, in accordance with Eriugena’s vision the innate concepts (and 
the knowledge based on them) become available to man’s mind not until the entire of his 
263 
 
nature is restored to its true integral state, i.e. to the unity of essence and existence. (page 
176) 
8. This cognitive task will become the prime concern of the philosophical comprehension in 
the system of Hegel to ensure the further progress in philosophical studies to come. (page 
176) 
9. Surprisingly or not, but in Zen Buddhism likewise (as probably in any other esoteric 
doctrine that similarly sets itself a task of bringing man to a perfect harmony with his true 
nature), the unity of causes and their effects is traditionally treated as nothing but the 
gateway into the Ultimate Reality.  Thus, as Hacuin's Song on Meditation (that is crucial 
to the ordinance of preparation for the lectures in the Buddhist monasteries) particularly 
reads, “the gate of unity of causes and effects opens before them” (i.e. the seekers), “and 
they enter upon the straight way, on which nothing dual nor triple can be found.” (See: 
Дайсацу Судзуки. “Основы Дзэн-Буддизма”;  Сэкида Кацуки. “Практика Дзэн” //  
“Дзэн-Буддизм.  Библиотека восточной религиозно-мистической философии”  
Бишкек, “Одиссей”,1993, с.269.)  (page 179) 
10. This assertion of Eriugena's should by no means be interpreted in the manner of the 
scholastic arguments for the existence of God, such as a design argument and alike 
(especially those of the cosmological and teleological ones).  What Eriugena means to 
suggest here has obviously nothing to do with an abstract way of reasoning in favour of 
so-called ‘arguments’, which are supposed to postulate God’s being.  In particular, 
seeking to give human mind logical evidence of the reality of God as a superior being that 
causes all other things, this sort of reasoning – be it Anselm’s speculation on ideally great 
quantities or Aristotelian contemplation of causal sequences (elaborated by Aquinas into 
‘five ways’ of reflection on the Divine) or Paley’s observation of the design apparent in 
the universe – appeals in fact to the experience of senses. The finite ideas that this sort of 
reasoning employs for argumentation prove actually to be induced from sensual 
perceptions (always particular by nature) and therefore fit the sensible world only, but not 
the superior being of the infinite and eternal.  As for Eriugena’s argument that it can be 
deduced from the creation that God is, the Periphyseon’s context convinces everyone 
who looks intently into the matter that it does not mean at all to affirm that a God exists 
‘elsewhere’ solely because ‘here’ (within the mind’s grasp) there is a creation that needs 
its cause or designer.  When Eriugena says that God’s being can be deduced from His 
creation, he rather implies to maintain that the proper being of God is to be necessarily 
thought of in its inseparable unity with the whole creation.  For only when dialectically 
understood as opposed to nothing different, God may really be known as He truly is, 
while coming to Himself in everything singular and thereby actually asserting Himself as 
ever-lasting universal being that is confined to nothing finite, i.e. diffuses itself in no 
individual things but remains the unfathomable (or infinitely self-identical) source of their 
existence.  All this consequently means that, according to Eriugena’s way of 
argumentation (implicitly present in the words quoted, but explicitly evident in the 
context as a whole), the necessary being of God might only be properly known in so far 
as He were dialectically conceived of as one and all at the same time.  Likewise, Nicolas 
of Cusa later sought to express the same idea by means of mathematical allusions when 
posited that God may be not unreasonably thought of as being the centre and the 
circumference at the same time.  (For further reading see, for example,  Hegel’s Lectures 
on the Arguments for the Existence of God, which apparently gives a classical pattern of 
refutation of any attempts of abstract reasoning to ‘prove’ God’s existence: Г.В.Ф. 
Гегель.  “Философия религии Соч. В 2-х Т.Т.  Т.2.”  М., “Мысль”, 1977, сс. 337 - 
467.   (page 184)                                                        
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11. Common belief normally appeals to the Aristotelian understanding of definition, 
according to which it should take shape of a statement ‘what a thing is’ (See  Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics 1031a  in: Аристотель. “Соч. В 4-Х ТТ.  Т.1”.  М., “Мысль”, 1976, сс. 
194-195). (page 185) 
12.  On the Uniform Subject see Chapter V. (page 186) 
13. With regard to Eriugena’s discourse, this sort of not knowing should by no means be 
interpreted in the grammatical sense of the expression and understood as being close to 
that of tabula rasa, to which such expressions as ‘full lack of knowledge’, ‘sterility of the 
mind’, ‘complete illiteracy’ or anything else of the kind might be found to be appropriate.  
On the contrary, in accordance with its use by the Philosopher, the ‘ignorance’ ought to 
be rather dialectically understood as a certain condition of knowledge that inevitably 
results from the awareness of some knowledge invalidity, and thus as a reliable means of 
overcoming quasi-knowledge that provides a sustained approach to the true one.  It is 
consequently this dialectically coherent meaning of the term that Eriugena is deeply 
concerned with, which in turn betrays in him a speculatively subtle thinker who might 
deservedly stand close to such authorities in Philosophy as Socrates with his famous 
statement ‘I know that I know nothing’, and Nicolas of Cusa with his paradoxical 
conception of ‘knowing ignorance’. (See: “Об учёном незнании”. // Николай 
Кузанский.  “Сочинения.  В 2-х ТТ.  Т.1.”  М., “Мысль”, 1979, сс. 47 – 184.) (page 
187)    
14. According to Nicolas of Cusa, for example, the way of approaching the Truth implies the 
unity of the opposites in the infinite.  In so far as the finite things are one-sidedly 
perceived to belong exclusively to the physical world, they are found to be opposite to the 
infinite; but when understood to subsist in God, these things and all distinctions between 
them come of necessity to be in unity: the opposites only occur when finite things are 
countered to the infinite, but are absent in the absolute.  God therefore is, in the words of 
Nicolas, “complicatio oppositorum et eorum coincidentia”.  “All this”, G. Reale admits, 
“leads to overcoming the views of common sense, which are based on the principle of 
non-contradiction” ( Реале Дж., Антисери Д.  “Западная философия от истоков до 
наших дней.  В 4-х ТТ. Т.2. Средневековье.”  СПб., ТОО ТК   “Петрополис”, 1995,  
с. 256)  (page 187) 
Chapter VII 
1. A set of attributes usually ascribed to God’s being in dogmatic theology includes such 
definitions altogether abstract in their extremity as omnipotence, omniscience, 
omnipresence, etc. On this one-sidedly abstract approach to God’s nature see for 
example: Генри Каарсенс Тиссен. “Лекции по систематическому богословию”. 
(Под ред. Вернона Д. Дерксена) СПб., “Логос”, 1993. сс. 93-104). (page 193) 
2. That the apophatic way of thinking is entirely aimed at transcending the finitude as such 
and, as a consequence, at overcoming all contradictions of human thought, it had always 
been a firm conviction for those who readily paid a tribute to Greek Fathers as the 
forerunners of their own doctrines.  Russian religious philosophers of the twentieth 
century, and notably Nickolai Berdiaev, may definitely be counted among them: “The 
ultimate union, where all contradictions and antinomies of human thought and 
integration are resolved, is achievable in apophatic way alone, that is, the way of 
apophatic knowledge of the absolute, which is also the way of being in communion with 
God in God’s Kingdom”.  Н.А. Бердяев. «’Я’ и мир объектов.  Опыт философии 
одиночества и общения» (Париж, 1934) // Н.А. Бердяев. “Философия свободного 
Духа”. М., “Республика”, 1994, с.258. (page 193) 
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3. Stanley J. Grenz, Roger E. Olson, The 20th-Century Theology: God and the World in a 
Transitional Age (Chicago, Illinois, InterVarsity Press, 1992), pp. 64-65 (page 193) 
4. Г.В.Ф. Гегель. “Лекции по истории философии . В 3-х Кн. Кн. 3”. Спб., “Наука”, 
1994, сс.195-196. (page 193) 
5. As discussed in Chapter I (see notes 20 – 21), Vladimir Soloviev.highly appreciated 
Eriugena’s way of treatment of faith and reason as one of the cornerstones of his system, 
apparently present in the Periphyseon at 511b. (page 193) 
6. When spoken of in terms that are close to the established way of approaching it, “the 
great truth that the Cause of all things is of a threefold substance” (455c) may appear 
articulated, as found in the Periphyseon, like this: “For, as we said, from the essence of 
the things that are it is understood to be; from the marvellous order of things that it is 
wise; from their motion it is found to be life.  Therefore the Cause and creative Nature 
of all things is, and is wise, and lives.  And from this those who search out the truth have 
handed down that in its essence is understood the Father, in its wisdom the Son, in its 
life the Holy Ghost” (455c).  And though this conventional language describing the 
triune nature of God is fairly thought to be infallible, its use nevertheless should by no 
means be accepted for the only way of treating the matter behind it, especially if a clear 
understanding of the truth conveyed is concerned.  (page 195) 
7. As A. Brilliantov holds while referring in particular to 527c, 528a, 688b, and 690a, “it is 
necessary to admit that the creature and its Creator are one, for in its creation the 
absolute reveals itself, so that beyond it there is nothing.  The one and universal nature 
is therefore the Divine nature.  The whole is one and, to be precise, is God, for God is 
the whole: God is the beginning of all, as it were, the middle and the end, or the 
purpose, and is Himself present in all”. (А.И. Бриллиантов. “Влияние восточного 
богословия на западное в произведениях Иоанна Скота Эригены”. М., “Мартис”, 
1998, с. 259). (page 195) 
8. From what A. Brilliantov for example says about the central point of Eriugena’s views, 
it is quite clear that the return of all the creature to its “ideal state” consonant with its 
“original predestination” may only be properly understood as being brought about in 
and through man’s mind: “Everything external, i.e. the external world, will return to the 
human nature, to man’s spirit; it will return exactly in the mind of all human individuals, 
for even now in fact the world exists in human nature.  As for the human nature itself, it 
will return to God and into God and will abide in Him.”  (Ibid, c 263).  And again, 
speaking of Book IV as a whole, he particularly admits that approaching “the doctrine of 
the process of return of all to God”, it proves to be entirely focused on considering the 
human nature, for it is in human nature and through human nature that the process of 
return is brought about (Ibid, c. 308). (page 196) 
9. This truth is supposed to be commonplace for faith.  Nevertheless, it is frequently 
blurred by those who believe that God and creation have always been opposing one 
another.  To them Vladimir Soloviev reminds about this plain, yet basic, tenet of 
Christian faith: “If the Divine essence were not all-embracing and did not include 
everything in itself, it would follow then that something could exist outside God; be it 
the case, however, God would be limited to this being external to Him and would not be 
absolute, i.e. would not be God” (В.С. Соловьёв. “Чтения о Богочеловечестве”. // 
“Собрание сочинений. Т.3.” Спб., “Просвещение” – Брюссель, 1966, с. 85). (page 
198) 
10. As it is well known, this trend of intellectual quest has eventually culminated in Kant’s 
critique of metaphysics and his attempt to tidy up in philosophical meditation by 
allowing it never to operate against the law of contradiction, according to which A can 
be B and not B’ at one and the same time (И. Кант. “Критика чистого разума”. М., 
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“Мысль”, 1994, с. 131).  In fact, in the Critique of Pure Reason Kant particularly holds 
that “contradiction altogether undermines and eliminates knowledge”.  The knowledge 
of truth is therefore identical, according to him, to banishing delusion and falsehood 
originating from contradictions (Ibid, c.130). (page 198) 
11. Августин Аврелий (Блаженный). “О граде Божием”. М., изд-во Спасо-
Преображенского Валаамского монастыря, 1994, сс. 253-255.  (page 198) 
12. Ibid, c.255. (page 199) 
13. Ibid, c.254.  (page 199) 
14. As a matter of fact, the works of Augustine were deeply respected by the Carolingians, 
and in the first instance none other but Charlemagne himself was apparently responsible 
for this respect.  It is well known in particular that he greatly enjoyed reading 
Augustine, and actually was so well-read in his writings that could even quote by heart 
extensive passages from them (А.П. Левандовский. “Карл Великий”. М., 1995, 
с.114).  Especially enjoyable reading of his, as A. Levandovsky points out, undoubtedly 
was On the City of God, to which the emperor frequently referred as a source of 
inspiration for the most challenging of his social projects: “…the treatise On the City of 
God by the Bishop of Hippo was not only his favourite book, but also a direct living 
guide and the great plan he envisaged to fulfil in reality”.  The enormous task of 
building the City of God was Charles’s “haunting idea” which he sought indeed to 
realize in practice (Ibid, c.124).  As a result, the central message of this particular 
treatise by Augustine had become a real agenda for the Carolingian scholars (Ibid, cc. 
125-128), which consequently means that all of them (with no exception of Eriugena, of 
course) must have been well acquainted not only with its general contents, but with the 
particular doctrines coming from it as well.  Little wonder, therefore, that even at first 
glance there is a striking affinity in the opening lines of the Periphyseon between 
Eriugena’s doctrine of the fourfold division of Nature and that of the threefold division 
of the Cause found in Augustine, at least as far as the first three subdivisions in it are 
taken in comparison to those three in the other one.  Anyway, hardly could such an 
affinity be just a coincidence.  As mentioned, it is plausible enough to assume that, like 
many of his contemporaries, Eriugena could be well aware of Augustine’s threefold 
approach to interpreting the order of creation.  But in contrast to those who agreed with 
that doctrine, he found it necessary to respond to its logical defects and, consequently, to 
wrong theological (as well as anthropological) conclusions to follow from them. (page 
199) 
15. This “general name”, which obviously stands “for all things, for those that are and those 
that are not” (441a), seems to be precisely what from the very outset of the Periphyseon 
Eriugena means by a general term Natura (441a).  “For nothing at all”, he explains, “can 
come into our thought that would not fall under this term” (441a). (page 201) 
16. In contrast to quite a common practice of associating the singularity of the Primal Cause 
of being with a mathematical point, the universality might be envisioned in like manner 
to an immense globe comprising the entire of being.  And if in the case of singularity a 
sort of outward motion of expansion starting from a certain centre seems to be natural 
for the whole stuff of the Universe, in the case of universality something opposite, or 
inwardly directed, should be counted for a generative movement within the Universe.  
As a result, unlike the latter the first model of genesis would appear then easier to be 
grasped and therefore more acceptable to common sense so as to remind in many 
respects the modern cosmology theory of Big Bang, so popular nowadays that even 
believers often find it possible to acknowledge some similarity of it to their vision of 
creation.  According to this cosmological theory (and subsequently the model of the 
Universe it provides), it is particularly assumed that the entire visible Universe “must 
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have emerged from a mathematical point – a singularity – at a definite time in the past” 
(John Gribbin, Almost Everyone’s Guide to Science (London, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 
1998), p.206).  When that infinitely dense point (a “cosmic egg” or “primeval atom”) 
spontaneously exploded, it created all the matter in space in the form of stars and 
galaxies, which have been rushing apart in all directions ever since and thus making the 
Universe continuously expand.  “The birth of the Universe,” cosmologists suggest, “was 
like a cosmic hurricane, but with the winds all blowing in one direction – outwards” 
(Ibid, p. 214).  If so, however, and if Edwin Hubble was right while hypothesizing, after 
the effect of “red shift” had been discovered, that “the Universe is expanding and the 
galaxies are expanding along with it,” (Ibid, p. 128) it yet remains unclear for the 
scientists whether the Universe will continue expanding for ever until it gets dispersed 
in space (so that the very space and time vanish), or it will slow down and eventually 
stop in order then to collapse back in on itself and suffer a similar final of annihilation 
(or perhaps of rebirth in another “big bang”).  Despite an obscurity concerning the actual 
fate of the Universe, both theorists and observers nevertheless agree (or, better to say, 
used to agree until recent discoveries) that, under the influence of gravity dominating 
across the Universe, its expansion has at any rate to be slowing down.  However, in the 
light of the new discoveries recently made by Saul Perlmutter and his team it has 
become clear that this belief cannot remain infallible any longer.  As the results of their 
extensive project originally focused on measuring the rate of the universal slowing 
down showed, the expansion of the Universe is not slowing down; it is in fact speeding 
up, and the galaxies appear to be pushed further away into deepest space, as if being 
affected by a mysterious force much more formidable than that of gravity.  All the 
scientists have been greatly confused by such an unexpected result which seems to be 
the greatest discovery of the century shattering the fundamental conceptions of Science: 
should it be true that the Universe is pushing itself apart faster and faster (though many 
still find it hard to believe), the known laws of Physics formerly assumed for those of 
Nature are to be radically reconsidered.  Could it not just signify that through this 
epoch-making discovery Nature presents a new face to us, and that accordingly neither 
the very foundations of knowledge nor the models based on them simply suit the reality 
as it truly is?  If the Universe is really speeding up in its motion, could it not be just 
because the entire cosmos is moving not from a point-like centre to an utmost periphery 
but in the opposite direction – towards the genuine centre and the source of 
unimaginable energy to eventually face Him Who is invisible now?  Is the problem not 
all about a radical change of our point of view and the logic we adhere to so as to 
become really able –   after they have fundamentally changed – to conceive the unity of 
singularity and universality, as appropriate to the true nature of the Universe origin.  The 
answer to all these is obviously quite simple: once the mind abandons the way of 
delusion that it used to grope obediently following the dictates of the sense, and after it 
becomes able to contemplate the proper order of things in reality, a new scenario of the 
origin of the Universe, alternative to that of the “big bang”, will come into vision.  
According to this new approach, the origin of the Universe will be understood as being 
caused not by the energy of destruction but by the energy of creation, hidden not in the 
infinity of density but in the infinity of universality, that is, the infinity of all-embracing 
Love and Goodness.  Hence, depending on the way the Ultimate Principle of all is 
coherently conceived of, the mind can offer two different models of the Universe, the 
nearest consequence of which however is that all humans thereby are actually offered 
two different kinds of life they may live – either life full of meaning or the one devoid 
of it.  It is up to humans therefore to choose where to start and which way to follow. 
(page 201) 
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17. In addition to what has already been said about causes before, it would be vital as well 
to remind here that as an abstract notion of the beginning of all things ‘cause’ appears to 
signify a factor very much external to the effects it precedes, as it is for example the 
case with the Aristotelian Prime Mover (an archetype of ‘uncaused cause’), that is 
understood to stand outside a never-ending chain of actions.  Meanwhile, apart from its 
antecedence the cause as such (or the first one) should also be thought to contain all 
things in itself, as due to a real source of their being.  In this sense, therefore, the term 
‘cause’ might happen to be not entirely suitable for conveying the idea of being the 
principle of all.  (page 203) 
18. To put it in other words, the universal should be understood not to disappear from being 
at all while getting dispersed among its particular forms, but rather conversely to 
manifest itself through them and thereby to affirm itself as a real whole.  (page 203) 
19. See: Августин Аврелий (Блаженный). “О граде Божием”, c. 255. (page 206) 
20. Generally speaking, by no means could Eriugena ever assert, and the course of 
reasoning really shows it throughout the Periphyseon, that “anything opposed to God or 
conceived alongside of Him exists” (458d).  In fact, this is undeniable truth to him, for it 
unambiguously refers to the absolute universality of God’s being, beyond which, as he 
gives to understand, no room for anything whatsoever may be found: “By ‘opposed’ I 
mean either deprived of Him or contrary to Him or related to Him or absent from Him; 
while by ‘conceived alongside of Him’ I mean something that is understood to exist 
eternally with Him without being of the same essence with Him” (458d). (page 207) 
21. From the very definition of the first and second species of Nature, as it is explicitly 
presented by the fourfold account of division at 441b, it is obvious that they both (i.e. 
“the Cause of all things” and “the primordial causes”) are meant to do nothing else but 
to create, that is, to bring all things from non-existence to existence.  (page 209) 
22. As Eriugena gives us to understand in Book I of the Periphyseon (455c-457c), it is 
hardly disputed by theologians how difficult it is to express “the mysteries of the Divine 
Unity and Trinity” (456a) by means of articulated speech otherwise than by using the 
names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit (see 455c).  “…but in order that the religious 
inclinations of pious minds”, he further argues, “may have something to think and 
something to say concerning that which is ineffable and incomprehensible…, these 
religious expressions by which the Faith is symbolized have been both devised and 
handed down by the holy theologians so that we may believe in our hearts and confess 
with our lips that the Divine Goodness is constituted in Three Substances of One 
Essence” (456a-b).  “And even this truth”, the author continues, “was discovered only in 
the light of spiritual understanding and rational investigation: for in contemplating, as 
far as the enlightenment of the Spirit of God would take them, the one and ineffable 
Cause of all things and the one simple and indivisible Principle they affirmed the Unity; 
and then by observing that this Unity did not consist in any singularity or barrenness 
they gained an understanding of the Three Substances of the Unity, namely the 
Unbegotten and the Begotten and the Proceeding” (456b).  Meanwhile, “it comes to be 
known by those who investigate it in the right spirit” (454d) that “the Cause of all things 
is of a threefold substance” (455c), which includes rather three conditions of being 
unbegotten, begotten and proceeded, and thus actually reject that paradigm of reasoning 
according to which they are seen as three distinct substances respectively: “For as we 
said, from the essence of the things that are it is understood to be; from the marvellous 
order of things that it is wise; from their motion it is found to be life.  Therefore the 
Cause and creative Nature of all things is, and is wise, and lives” (455c).  All this 
consequently means that “the great truth” of the Divine Unity is that this Unity is 
properly conceivable in a threefold way only, when He, Who truly is the absolute 
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whole, is perfectly understood to be in Himself through Himself and for Himself, and 
therefore is not unfairly defined as being “the Beginning, the Middle and the End” 
(451d).  So that, the “mystical names” of the Holy Trinity (the Father, the Son and the 
Holy Spirit) should be accordingly qualified as those conditions detected above that 
refer, as Eriugena suggests, to one and the same Nature, but not to the tree distinct 
natures (455c, 456c-457c).  And this is rightly so; for as the Philosopher fairly argues, 
with God “nothing is found to be co-eternal which differs from Him by nature” (459b), 
“because outside Him there is nothing” (452c).  (page 209) 
23. Not improperly, in line with Eriugena’s discourse, should the resolution of this collision 
be sought in a dialectical overcoming of the tyranny of finitude entirely rooted in the 
irrational motion of the sense-dependent mind. (page 210) 
24. This quite a basic truth of dialectic is utterly crucial for treating the absolute being, and 
no coherent theology can actually dispense with it. Thus speaking of Lev Karsavin’s 
views of this matter, N. Lossky particularly admits: “Like many other Russian 
philosophers (i.e. Vladimir Soloviev, Fr. Sergei Bulgakov, and Semion Frank), Karsavin 
assumes that if something, be it even created, were ontologically external to God, it 
would put a limit to God.  Therefore Karsavin persistently asserts that God is all-
unity…”, because, he further argues, “if God were not all-unity, then alongside Him 
there could exist another god and the third and the tenth and so forth”.  Н.О. Лосский. 
“История русской философии”. M., “Советский писатель”, 1991, сс. 384-386. (page 
212) 
25. Discussing Eriugena’s attitude to mathematical numbers as “the models of reality”, 
Dominic O’Meara admits that the author of the Periphyseon saw them as those giving 
“insight into the eternal paradigms after which the physical world is organized” 
(Dominic J.O’Meara, The Metaphysical Use of Mathematical Concepts in Eriugena in 
Werner Beierwaltes (ed.), Begriff und Metapher.  Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena  
(Heidelberg: Karl Winter. Universitätsverlag, 1990), p. 145), and thus allowing to 
approach metaphysics, that is, the science of the Divine (Ibid, pp.142-143).  As such, 
numbers on the whole, and particularly that of 6 explicitly standing for 6 ‘days’ of 
creation or its entire process as “a symbol of perfection”, “function rather as symbols, 
figures and types that permit the passage from the literal to the spiritual sense of the 
scriptural text.  They act as signs of the presence of various deeper meanings in the 
revealed word” (Ibid, p.148).  (page 217) 
26. The words omitted in this quotation are given in the text in square brackets, which 
apparently indicates, according to Sigla to Books I-III of the Periphyseon, that they refer 
to later additions to the text of MS. Rheims 875.  Not unreasonably therefore, though 
held to be of supposedly Eriugena’s  autograph, they may be treated as those of 
problematic origin, especially when prove basically irrelevant to the implicit meaning of 
the context at 441a-442a, where from the very outset the fundamental division of the 
entire being is brought into focus.  Indeed, to the extent the matter of division is being 
discussed, it is actually nothing other but the fundamental division of Nature (or, more 
specifically, the oppositio as it appears within Its four forms) that is supposed to be 
more fully elucidated and, for this reason, to remain throughout the whole fragment (and 
onwards up to examining the modes of understanding of being and non-being) a real 
pivot of the author’s discourse. See: Iohannis Scotti Eriugene Periphyseon (De 
Divisione Naturae). Liber Primus.  I.P. Sheldon-Williams (ed.). (Dublin: The Dublin 
Institute for Advanced Studies, 1968), pp. 33-34. (page 222) 
27. Thus, for instance, speaking on behalf of Orthodox theology, G.V. Florovsky finds it 
possible to relegate the idea of the Divine all-unity as it is developed and widely 
employed throughout the tradition of speculative thought from Neo-Platonism to 
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German idealism (notably, Schelling and Hegel) to nothing more than a mere remnant 
of the philosophical “naturalism” and “determinism”.  In contrast to these false doctrines 
(of any links with which, to tell the truth, the doctrine of all-unity is falsely accused), 
Florovsky offers the one to be associated with a faithful view of God’s creation and to 
agree with what he calls “a metaphysical split of being”: “In the religious experience the 
world is given as a creation of God’s free will, as a surplus which might have not been 
at all” (Г.В. Флоровский. “Метафизические предпосылки утопизма.”// Г.В. 
Флоровский. “Из прошлого русской мысли”. М., “Аграф”, 1998, с. 258).  The 
cornerstone of this belief, according to S.N. Bulgakov, is undoubtedly the principle of 
God’s absolute transcendence: “Between the world and God there is an absolute and 
insuperable [for the world] distance… As the transcendent, God is infinitely and 
absolutely remote from the world and alien to it…” (С.Н. Булгаков. «Свет 
невечерний: Созерцания и умозрения». В 3-х вып. СПб., “Чтение”, 2001, Выпуск 
1, Кн. 1, с.94; С изд.: С.Н. Булгаков. “Свет невечерний: Созерцания и умозрения”. 
М., ООО “АСТ” - Харьков, “Фолио”, 2001).  (page 224) 
28. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusatze). A new translation with 
Introduction and notes by T.F. Geraets, W.A. Suchting, and H.S. Harris (Indianapolis-
Cambridge, Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1991), p. 166 (§104, ad. 2). (page 226) 
29. Ibid, p.177 (§ 112, ad.). (page 226) 
30. Ibid, p. 166 (§104, ad.2). (page 226) 
31. Ibid, p.151 (§ 95, ad.). (page 227) 
32. Ibid, p. 151 (§ 95, ad.). (page 228) 
33. Ibid, p.177 (§ 112, ad.). (page 228) 
34. As it follows from what Willemien Otten for example suggests while discussing the 
fundamental principles of Eriugena’s anthropology, the return as such can hardly be 
understood in a coherent way unless it is considered from the perspective of man’s 
nature real state: “Since there is no chronological distinction between man’s pre – and 
post – lapsarean states, there is also no fixed point in time at which his procession ends.  
Neither is there a definite take-off point for the movement of nature’s return.  Instead, 
there is adopted a rational criterion by which one can discriminate between man’s inner 
state of integrity and his outer life of the senses, regardless of any time-factors 
whatsoever.  In accordance with this understanding, it can only be through a rational 
rehabilitation of man that natura can start on its movement of return”(Willemien Otten, 
Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena (Leiden, E.J. Brill, 1991), p. 165.).  Not 
improperly therefore should the return of the immense universe of creation be 
understood, she points out, to come about through “the subtle clarity of human 
reasoning (Ibid, p.189). (page 229) 
35. In this sense, perhaps, it would be right to suggest that the matter of Return might be 
considered by analogy with that of conversion described by Plato in the cave simile, as it 
particularly appears at 514b-517d of his Republic (Платон. “Сочинения в 3-х ТТ. Т. 3, 
Ч.1”. М., “Мысль”, 1971, сс. 321-325).  (page 230) 
36. According to Hegel, it is basic to dialectic in general that the “immediate knowing of 
the being of external things is deception and error, and that there is no truth in the 
sensible as such, but that the being of these external things is rather something 
contingent, something that passes away, or a semblance…” ( G.W.F. Hegel, The 
Encyclopaedia Logic, p.123, § 76).  As a paradigm of thinking originating from Plato, 
dialectic “ is concerned precisely with considering things [as they are] in and for 
themselves, so that the finitude of the one-sided determination of the understanding 
becomes evident” (Ibid, p.129, §81, ad.). (page 231) 
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37. While being focused on “the detailed analysis” of the ontological dimension of reditus-
reversio, Stephen Gersh admits that it would be quite unfair to refer to it in Eriugena’s 
context as merely “a cosmological principle” regardless of its relation to the mind’s 
perception of the creature (Stephen Gersh, The Structure of the Return in Eriugena’s 
Periphyseon in Berriff und Metapher.  Sprachform des Denkens bei Eriugena, see pp. 
110-111).   If reditus were considered as a purely natural process similar to cyclic 
motions found in abundance both in the physical and intelligible world, it would remain 
obscure then, he argues, why the return “is included in the order of things by the 
Creator” (Ibid, p. 111). (page 231) 
38. As Willemien Otten rightly says (referring to 526a in particular), “Eriugena stresses the 
fact that processio and reditus are complimentary movements, to the extent that one 
cannot act without the other” (Willemien Otten, The Universe of Nature and the 
Universe of Man: Difference and Identity in Begriff und metapher.  Sprachform des 
Denkens bei Eriugena, p. 204).  The only thing to be additionally emphasised here is 
however that both processio and reditus are to be thought of as simultaneously 
complementing one another. (page 231) 
39. Eriugena is certainly well aware that the Divine Nature is quite “inappropriately said to 
be made” (454b).  For this reason, it would be sound to offer some other terms (such as, 
for example, ‘revealed’) that might prove to be closer to the meaning implied in the 
context.  (page 232) 
40. G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic, p.173 (§111, ad.). (page 233) 
41. Ibid, p.149 (§94 ad.). (page 234) 
42. “It is of great importance to reach an adequate understanding of the true significance of 
identity,” maintains Hegel when discussing the basic principles of dialectic, “and this 
means above all that it must not be interpreted merely as abstract identity, i.e. as identity 
that excludes distinction.  This is the point that distinguishes all bad philosophy from 
what alone deserves the name of philosophy” (Ibid, p.181, §115, ad.).   As for an 
abstract law of identity, it reads, according to the German philosopher: ““Everything is 
identical with itself, A=A”; and negatively: “A cannot be both A and non-A at the same 
time.” – Instead of being a true law of thinking, this principle is nothing but the law of 
the abstract understanding.  The propositional form itself already contradicts it, since a 
proposition promises a distinction between subject and predicate as well as identity; and 
the identity-proposition does not furnish what its form demands”(Ibid, p.180, §115).  “If 
someone says”, Hegel goes on, “that this proposition cannot be proven, but every 
consciousness proceeds in accordance with it and, as experience shows agrees with it at 
once, as soon as it takes it in, then against this alleged experience of the Schools we 
have to set the universal experience that no consciousness thinks, has notions, or speaks, 
according to this law, and no existence of any kind at all exists in accordance with it.  
Speaking in accordance with this supposed law of truth (a planet is – a planet, 
magnetism is – magnetism, the spirit is – a spirit) is rightly regarded as silly; that is 
indeed a universal experience.  The Schoolroom, which is the only place where these 
laws are valid, along with it logic which propounds them in earnest, has long since lost 
all credit with sound common sense as well as with reason.”(Ibid, p.180, §115).  Before 
Hegel, the irrelevance of such laws to the cognitive tasks of philosophy entirely focused 
on approaching the absolute truth (which is that of God’s Oneness) was perfectly 
obvious to those few who successfully applied the principles of dialectic to the 
knowledge of the true (infinite) being, and to whom among the first Eriugena, beyond 
any doubts, does belong. (page 234) 
43. Ibid, p.188 (§120). (page 234) 
44. Ibid, p.181 (§115, ad.). (page 234) 
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45. Ibid, p.187 (§119, ad.2).  From this, it is quite easy to see that any charges against 
pantheism which Eriugena’s system has been so often suspected of are merely 
irrelevant for that simple reason, once suggested by Hegel in defence of Spinoza’s 
philosophy, that pantheism is usually understood as “the doctrine that considers finite 
things as such, and the complex of them, to be God”, which is altogether absurd 
“because no truth at all is ascribed to finite things or to the world as a whole…” (Ibid, 
p.227, §151, ad.).   To this, I think, Eriugena himself might also add the following 
explanation: “For that which is of all belongs properly to none, but is in all in such a 
way as to subsist in itself” (467c).  Furthermore, as the Dionysian theology suggests 
(and the author of the Periphyseon does agree with it), no finitude is compatible with 
God’s being: “For it says that God is not one of things that are but that He is more 
than the things that are…”(462d).  It remains unclear, therefore, how those accusing 
Eriugena of pantheism manage to keep ignoring such crucial things as the basic tenets 
of his speculation. (page 234) 
46. Ibid, p.240 (§163).  (page 234) 
47. Ibid, p.239 (§163).  (page 234) 
48. Ibid, p.133 (§83).  (page 234) 
49. Ibid, p. 121 (§74 ad.). (page 234) 
50. Ibid, p. 120 (§74).  (page 234) 
51. Willemien Otten, Anthropology of Johannes Scottus Eriugena, p.35. (page 238) 
52. Ibid, p. 32.  (page 238) 
Conclusion  
1 Careful and thoughtful reading of Eriugena’s texts brings us to impression that their 
author (though he is certainly inexplicit about this) is inclined to see the Saviour as a 
teacher par excellence – that is the teacher whose unique teaching of the kingdom of 
God leads those believing in his divinity and resurrection to complete transformation 
of their mind and life, resulting in their perfect conformity to the substantial reality of 
creation, as appropriate to being at one with the One God. (page 239)  
2 In their reaction to the crisis that the Church is undergoing, Radical Theology and 
Radical Orthodoxy stand for a thoroughgoing rethinking of the basics of Christian 
theology, though see it in different ways.  Speaking in general, both movements of 
thought find it possible to achieve cardinal changes by introducing a new language 
into theology.  The distinction between the two consists, however, in their different, 
and even opposite, approaches to this language (or ‘the way of speaking of God’).  
The radical theologians, such as John Robinson or John Spong, believe that the 
language of the traditional theism (including unintelligible notions of the Church 
dogmas) should be resolutely rejected as an obsolete.  In order that the remote God of 
theism might be brought closer to those to whom the old religious practices do not 
appeal any more, the language of faith should be translated, as the radicals suggest, 
into the terms of everyday life, meaningful and clear to the contemporary society as a 
whole (e.g. the ‘sinful’ or ‘fallen’ state of being into the ‘untrue existence’).  
Robinson calls his followers for the quest of a ‘middle way’ between the religious 
supernaturalism and the humanist naturalism, and for a profound justification of this 
quest he refers to such key figures of the twentieth-century theology as Bultmann, 
Bonhöffer, and Tillich.   In alliance with their teachings, and above all with the ideas 
of ‘demythologisation’, ‘irreligious Christianity’, and God as the basis and the 
purpose of being, the radical theologians hope to succeed in the enterprise of bringing 
Christian faith in touch with the secular society.  Unlike these attempts of the radical 
reconsideration of the traditional tenets of religion, Radical Orthodoxy (and John 
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Milbank in particular) seeks to provide a contemporary apology of faith by presenting 
anew its old truths, expressed in Christian theology as early as the teachings of 
Aquinas and Duns Scotus, and thus to render active the fundamental ideas (as well as 
the notions they coin) latently present to Christian thought. Among these truths and 
ideas, according to Milbank, one of the central is that of the radical transcendence of 
the Divine, actuality of which is to be affirmed in contrast to the virtual immanence.  
Along with this restoration of the traditional tenets, however, the old metaphysics 
likewise, as the way of putting them in order, is brought back to life.  As a result, the 
infinite comes to be treated, erroneously again, as belonging to ‘the transcendent 
height’ that lies beyond the transcendental categories of mind and is understood in 
terms of reality alternative to the finite being.  All this consequently means that no 
renewal of theology is attainable unless the very logic of the theological reflection is 
cardinally changed.  The language of theology does not consist of the notions only; it 
should also include the way of bringing these notions together, which is obviously 
nothing other than the inner logic of the theological discourse.  So it is in fact a 
reconstruction of the logic appropriate to the infinite nature of the truths revealed 
which alone would allow us in our attempts to restore the dignity of Christian faith to 
steer a safe course between the extremes of the old and new.  And this appeal to a 
proper logic of the theological thinking is one of the main things indeed that we learn 
from Eriugena’s system. (page 240)    
3 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic (with the Zusatze).  T.F.Geracts, W.A. 
Suchting, and H.S. Harris (trans.). (Indianapolis, Cambridge, Hackett Publishing 
Company, Inc., 1991), p.70 (§32 ad.). (page 242) 
4 Ibid, p.71 (§33).  (page 242) 
5 By no means should Hegel’s Wissenschaft be confused with science in the everyday 
use of the word.  To Hegel, Wissenschaft is not a body of empirically ascertained and 
verified truths; it is rather a coherent system of speculative knowledge targeted at 
attaining the Idea latently present to the reality as a whole.  (page 242) 
6 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic,  pp. 74-75 (§36, ad.). (page 242) 
7 Ibid, p.73 (§36).  (page 242) 
8 The critical philosophy (originally associated with Kant’s three Critiques, beginning 
with the Critique of Pure Reason) is where the German idealism agenda comes from.  
The focal point of the German idealism on the whole may not unfairly be understood 
as an attempt to overcome the naive way of thinking, as Hegel calls it.  This is a kind 
of thinking that squarely rests upon the belief that the reality is that of finite things, 
and thus mistakes the data delivered by senses from without for its own content, 
perfectly appropriate, as assumed, to the world as it ‘objectively’ is.  Kant resolutely 
shattered this naïve belief by appealing to a priori forms of reason and suggesting that 
the world given in perception is that of ‘experience’, and therefore is nothing more in 
fact than a construct of mind. (page 243) 
9 Иммануил Кант. “Критика чистого разума”. М., “Мысль” , 1994, c. 443. (page 
243) 
10 Ibid, c. 446.  (page 243) 
11 As it is well known, Christian theology has always been suspicious of philosophy, and 
sometimes even hostile to it, as Tertullian, for example, apparently was.  Paul Tillich 
is perhaps one of the recent notable exceptions to this predominantly negative attitude 
to philosophy.  In comparison to Karl Barth, “the Tertullian of our days”, Reinhold 
Niebuhr calls Tillich “the Origen of our days”, who seeks to bring the Gospel 
message close to the entire history of culture (R. Niebuhr, Biblical Thought and 
Ontological Speculation in Tillich’s Theology).  Similarly to Tertullian, Barth 
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vehemently resisted to a possibility of union between theology and philosophy: 
“Actually, there has never been a philosophia Christiana; for if it was philosophia, it 
was not Christiana; and if it was Christiana, it was not philosophia” (K. Barth, 
Church Dogmatics, I.1, p.5).  By contrast, to Tillich it is exactly philosophy, with its 
strong appeal to the problems and anxieties human beings have in their existence that 
really allows theology to bridge the gap between church and society.  Theology and 
philosophy therefore need, according to him, a constructive dialogue, so that their 
relationship may not unfairly be qualified as correlation.  As a method, correlation 
substantially differs from other approaches that previously dominated in Christianity, 
such as supranaturalism, humanism, and dualism.  The advantage of the new 
approach (i.e. correlation between philosophy and theology) Tillich finds to consist in 
its appeal to nothing other but God as Being itself, the infinite one, that is beyond the 
dichotomy between being and non-being.  Thus philosophy and theology, when 
properly correlated, translate the basic ontological question of distinction of being 
from non-being into the question of overcoming non-being and finitude as such.  This 
is, Tillich believes, the central issue of all human beings’ anxiety; this is where their 
existence acquires its new meaning, and the way to the New Being in union with the 
infinite Being itself opens up.  Therefore, only working together, philosophy and 
theology get human beings focused on the vision of the Being itself, that is the one 
living God, and thus give them a real opportunity of overcoming the finitude of their 
existence, threatened by non-being, and be re-united with God again.  It is, hence, a 
proper correlation between philosophy and theology that, in Tillich’s view, brings all 
human beings to the very centre of the Gospel message, making their life meaningful. 
(Дмитрий Бинцаровский. “Современная теология . Лекция 10: Пауль Тиллих” 
(cc.3-7) – http://www.ersu.org/ru/video    accessed on 13.10.2014.)  (page 243) 
12 The famous credo ut intelligam of Anselm’s theology does remind us about the 
validity of this approach to the Christian truth.  The objective of faith, as articulated 
by Anselm, may also explain why it is him who first after Eriugena managed to take 
the next considerable step in the evolution of Christian thought. (page 243) 
13 G.W.F. Hegel, The Encyclopaedia Logic,  p. 74 (§36, ad.).  (page 243) 
14 It is well known that Eriugena’s theology was many times condemned by church 
authorities, and although the reasons for accusations were never explicitly articulated, 
it is likely the originality of Eriugena’s approach to Christian faith that caused among 
the conservatives a great deal of discontent with his views.  Even the first big treatise 
On Divine Predestination, written by Eriugena at the request of the church superiors, 
was followed by a series of condemnations in the 850s – first at the council of 
Valence in 855 and then at the council of Langres in 859 (D. Moran, The Philosophy 
of John Scottus Eriugena: A Study of Idealism in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p.33).  Since then Eriugena remained unpopular 
with the senior churchmen, and in 1210 his works were condemned again.  This time, 
it remained likewise obscure why the thinker’s ideas were found inappropriate to the 
church dogmas.  Only later, in 1225, Pope Honorius III more or less explicitly 
(though rather emotionally then rationally) expressed his attitude to Eriugena’s legacy 
and “in a letter to the bishops of France condemned the liber periphysis titulatur and 
ordered that all copies be sent to Rome for burning, since the work was “teeming with 
the worms of heretical perversity”” (Ibid, p. 89).  What kind of the ‘heretical 
perversity’ was meant there is still a mystery.  Perhaps, the story of the 1210 
condemnation could shed some light upon this riddle.  “The events surrounding his 
condemnation”, says Moran, “are unclear.  He was associated with two Aristotelian 
scholars who were teaching at Paris – David of Dinant and Amaury of Bene”.  Both 
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Amaury and David of Dinant “were denounced by Thomas Aquinas as pantheists”, 
who respectively considered God as being either “the form of all things” or “the 
matter of all things”, as Aquinas presents it (Ibid, p. 86).  Unlike Amaury, however, 
Eriugena “does not use the term “formal principle”, but he does use the formula forma 
omnium to describe God on several occasions (e.g. I. 500a).  He also says that God is 
the essentia and subsistentia omnium” (Ibid, p. 87).  It does not follow from this, 
nevertheless, that Eriugena could share a pantheistic view of the Divine being, and 
those who ever studied his writings would readily agree that he actually did not.  Any 
charges against Eriugena’s pantheism, therefore, would only result from a substantial 
misunderstanding of his views, which was certainly the case with his accusers who 
did not bother to read what Eriugena himself wrote about the principle irrelevance of 
pantheism (or what later acquired this name) to a coherent theology.  In fact, a 
possibility of a pantheistic interpretation of his views, as Moran admits, horrifies 
Eriugena, and he firmly rejects any attempts of identifying the created world with 
God: “For God is not a genus of the creature nor the creature a species of God any 
more than the creature is the genus of God or God a species of the creature.  The same 
can be said of the whole and its part, for God is not the whole of the creature, nor the 
creature a part of God any more than the creature is the whole of God or God a part of 
the creature…” (I. 523d).  So that those who simply believed that Amaury had “found 
his teachings in the writings of Eriugena” (D. Moran, p. 87), in fact falsely accused 
the latter of the doctrine utterly alien to his theology.  And although there is no direct 
evidence that the Periphyseon was ever officially condemned in the thirteenth 
century, “the 1225 condemnation, however, refers to the Periphyseon as having 
already been banned by the “Synod of Sens”, presumably referring to the judgement 
of 1210”, made by the archbishop of Sens, Peter Corbelius, and by the council of 
bishops at Paris with regard to the works on natural philosophy by David of Dinant 
and Aristotle (Ibid, p. 89).  Since then “it has become a common place that Eriugena 
was a pantheist” (Ibid, p. 88), by which the Medieval Church actually meant to 
recognise Eriugena’s system to be unsuitable both for the ecclesiastical doctrine and 
practice.  Needless to say, nonetheless, how unfair (and simply wrong) this judgement 
was about Eriugena’s contribution to Christian theology.  As Moran argues, the 
phrase forma omnium used by Eriugena should be interpreted as linked to “scriptural 
pronouncements, such as I Corinthians 15.28 that God will be all in all (Deus erit 
omnia in omnibus), or John 1.3-4, that all things are in God as life (quod factum est in 
eo ipso vita erat), a phrase that appears frequently in Eriugena”.  This means that the 
“phrase can, of course, be interpreted purely devotionally to mean that God is 
omnipresent and that all things depend totally for their being on God; otherwise they 
would be nothing at all” (Ibid, p. 88).  (page 243) 
15 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of philosophy 1825-6.Volume III: Medieval 
and Modern Philosophy. Revised edition, translated and edited by George F. Brown 
(New York, Oxford university Press, 2008),   (page 243) 
16 Representations of this sort, the metaphysical nature of which is undoubtedly obvious, 
are so deeply inherent in theological reflection that they may hardly ever be 
completely eradicated from it.  Little wonder therefore that, despite a good deal of 
innovative developments in the Postliberal age, a twofold construct of Divinity goes 
on to survive in theology.  In particular, in the Barthian theology that appears to have 
heralded a new dawn in understanding of Revelation and has really opened up a broad 
way to postliberal endeavours, the doctrine of ‘complete otherness’ still insists that 
the Voice communicating the truth of God does come from ‘out there’. (page 244) 
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17 As seen in Chapter I with regard to Eriugena’s argument developed within the context 
of the predestination controversy, a certain affinity between his thinking and the 
Mu’tazilah doctrines suggests that a philosophically coherent approach to faith should 
be understood to lie at the heart of the theology of the Divine Unity.  This is the 
theology entirely based on a new vision of creation,  according to which there is 
nothing alien in it to God Who, as Mu’tazilites believe, is the absolute Good and 
Who, therefore, cannot be held responsible for the existence of evil in the world.  
Moreover, as a philosophically rigorous thinking of the absolute Oneness further 
suggests according to them, God can neither create evil nor have power over it.  
Nothing at all subsists in the reality of creation otherwise than in the way of being 
determined from within; God Himself cannot be known from without (by predicating 
attributes of His essence), for outside Him Who may only be known as the 
“Necessary Existent” (or the self-determined being) nothing at all can ever exist.  
Everything therefore can only subsist, as Mu’tazilites insist, by being at one with Him 
Who is the One and never acts contrary to His promise, because there is no 
discrepancy in Him between His will and being.  So it is by deviation from the inner 
essence of their genuine nature (or, in terms of the First Obligation doctrine, from the 
speculative reason, al-Nazar) that all humans go astray, causing all wrongdoings and 
bringing evil into the world.  Little wonder, therefore, that his Carolingian 
contemporaries were much confused when, arguing against the doctrine of double 
predestination, Eriugena put forward the arguments far removed from their traditional 
beliefs but close (which Carolingians might have been unaware of) to the doctrines 
developed within the Falsafah tradition.  Surprisingly or not, in agreement with his 
Eastern contemporaries Eriugena strongly believes that life of human beings in 
defiance of their essential nature is the root of evil; God does not create hell: it is 
human sinfulness that is responsible for creating its own hell.  Hence, salvation is 
available to all humans in so far as they take care of their genuine nature and live 
righteously in harmony with its right order, which is to be understood as its proper 
rational motion.  All this consequently means that the optimistic vision of salvation 
(thoroughly essential to Christian faith) is impossible without a profoundly 
philosophical attitude to religion, which unlike his Western contemporaries Eriugena 
is obviously enthusiastic about.  (page 244) 
18 As A.I. Brilliantov points out, an attention to Eriugena’s philosophy was drawn only 
after the emergence of the German idealist systems, when there was found a certain 
affinity between those systems and Eriugena’s views (See: А.И. Бриллиантов. 
“Влияние восточного богословия на западное в произведениях Иоанна Скота 
Эригены”. М., “Мартис” , 1998, cc. 420-421).  A deep understanding of the role of 
the dialectical contradiction in philosophical thinking is undoubtedly one of the 
central themes common to Eriugena and Hegel.  Since Kant’s antinomism raised the 
question of irrelevance of finite concepts of human understanding (the categories of 
Verstand) to the knowledge of the infinite as such (and the divine being, in particular), 
Hegel insisted that the solution to antinomies was to be sought on the way of their 
dialectical treatment, which would also require that our attitude to epistemology and 
ontology should be cardinally reconsidered.  Neither of them, according to Hegel, 
should be taken separately, in like manner to the ‘instrumentalist’ approach of 
metaphysics.  In other words, the dialectical treatment of antinomies required a 
complete paradigmatic shift in the mind towards a new type of mentality, based on 
the intimate interconnectedness of ontology and epistemology, and thus appropriate to 
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the absolute reality of Spirit, ubiquitous and indivisible, transcendent and immanent at 
the same time.  This paradigmatic shift in the mind also meant therefore a 
transformation of human being or, speaking more specifically, making it fit for living 
in the reality of the absolute whole. (page 244) 
19 Taking into account a great deal of Eriugena’s interest in St. John’s Gospel (obvious, 
for instance, in his Homily on the Prologue to the Gospel of St. John), we may not 
unseasonably refer to the fourth Gospels as one of the main sources of Eriugena’s 
thought.  Be it the case that Eriugena so highly valued this part of sacred writings, it 
would be hard to imagine that some of its most precious words could simply escape 
him.  In this sense, it would be fair to let the Gospel speak for itself to hear the words 
of Jesus: “But the hour is coming, and is now here, when the true worshipers will 
worship the Father in spirit and truth, for the Father seeks such as these to worship 
him.  God is spirit, and those who worship him must worship in spirit and truth” (Jn. 
4, 23-24).  (page 244) 
20 “It may be said”, A.I. Brilliantov writes about Eriugena’s work, “that the whole 
system of the Philosopher aims to banish non-being from the Universe, and thus to 
retain in it being alone” (A.I. Brilliantov, c.289).  Moreover, Brilliantov believes that 
Eriugena’s opus magnum is largely focused on what may be understood as the prime 
concern of Christ’s teaching – that is, “restoration of the whole of human nature to its 
ideal state or, in a sense, liberation of all with no exception from evil, sin, and 
death”…  “This is to happen,” the Russian theologian further comments on 
Eriugena’s doctrine, “with the Second Coming of Christ, …understood in the sense of 
the universal and full revelation of Christ as truth to all men and women” (Ibid, 
c.381).  (page 245) 
21 Ibid, cc.260,263.  (page 245) 
22 In The Kingdom of God Is In You: Christianity Not as a Mystical Doctrine but a New 
Vision of Life, Lev Tolstoy particularly says: “…what we are taught by clergy is not 
Christianity” (c.369).  “Churches,” he further holds, “face a dilemma: Sermon on the 
Mount or the Nicene Creed, one excludes the other.  If one sincerely believes in the 
Sermon on the Mount, then the Nicene Creed will lose its meaning and sense, 
likewise the church and its representatives.  If one believes in the Nicene Creed, … 
the Sermon on the Mount will become needless” (c..371). Understanding of Christ’s 
teaching “puts churches and their meaning to an end” (c.371).  Churches “have 
always been, and cannot be otherwise, institutions not only alien but even hostile to 
the teaching of Christ” (c.361).  There is nothing in common between churches and 
Christianity, “except for the name; these are two completely opposite and mutually 
hostile principles.  One is pride, violence, selfishness, stagnation, and death.  The 
other is humility, penitence, submissiveness, movement, and life.  It is impossible to 
serve these two masters at once; one or the other has to be chosen” (c.361).  (Л.Н. 
Толстой. “Царство Божие внутри вас, или Христианство не как мистическое 
учение, а как новое жизнепонимание”// Л.Н. Толстой. “Закон насилия и Закон 
любви: О пути, об истине, о жизни”.  Составитель и предисловие О.А. 
Дорофеев. М., “РИПОЛ КЛАССИК”, 2004.) (page 245) 
23 In his Legend of Grand Inquisitor, Dostoevsky features three powers able to conquer 
and hold captive for ever the conscience of those disobedient to the rule of the 
Church, and these powers are miracle, mystery, and authority. (See: Ф.М. 
Достоевский. “Легенда о Великом Инквизиторе”.  
http://www.ilibrary.ru/text/1199/p.37/index.html      Accessed on 07.07.2015). (page 
246) 
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⃰⃰  ⃰  ⃰ 
⃰ The term ‘man’ comes from the language of Eriugena’s discourse (in I.P.Sheldon-Williams’ 
translation) and has nothing to do with the gender issue. 
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